DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF DECCAN SULTANATES

Thesis submitted to the Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy
in
History

Submitted by
MOULAPPA K. KAMBLE
M.A

Under the Guidance of
Dr. (Mrs.) ZAKIA KHANUM.K.ANSARI
M.A., Ph.D.
Professor of History (Rtd.)
Department of Studies and Research in History
Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi

DEPARTMENT OF STUDIES AND RESEARCH IN HISTORY

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Certificate

Gulbarga University
Kalaburgi

DR. (MRS). ZAKIA KHANUM.K.ANSARI
M.A, Ph.D
Professor of History (Rtd.),
Department of Studies and Research in History
Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi-585106

This is to certify that the thesis entitled "DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF DECCAN SULTANATES" *submitted by* **MOULAPPA .K. KAMBLE** *is an original work of research carried out by her under my supervision and guidance. The thesis or a part thereof has not been submitted hitherto to any other University or Institution for the award of any degree or diploma. I recommend the same for submission for the degree of* **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY** *in the faculty of Social Sciences from Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi.*

Place: Kalaburgi **Dr. (Mrs.) Zakia Khanum. K. Ansari**

Date: *Professor (Rtd.)*

Decleration

I hereby declare that the thesis entitled **"DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF DECCAN SULTANATES"** *submitted for the award of the degree of* **DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY** *is an original work carried out by me under the supervision and guidance of* ***Dr. (Mrs.) Zakia Khanum .K. Ansari****, Professor of History (Rtd.), Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi. The thesis or a part thereof has not been submitted for the award of any degree.*

Place: ***Kalaburgi***

Date:

Moulappa .K. Kamble
Research Scholar,
Department of Studies in History,
Gulbarga University, Kalaburgi

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Moulappa .K. Kamble

Contents

Key to Abbreviations

BISM	*Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal, Pune*
Bustaan	*Bustaan-i-Salatin by Ibrahim Zubairi*
CSBM	*Centenary Souvenir of Bijapur Municipality*
DJSH	*Deccan Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*
E&D	*Elliot and Dowson*
EIM	*Epigraphia Indo Moslemica*
IA	*Indian Antiquary*
IC	*Islamic Culture*
IHC	*Proceedings of Indian History Congress*
IHRC	Indian Historical Records Commission
JBBRAS	*Journal of Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society*
JIH	*Journal of Indian History*
JMU	*Journal of Muslim University*
JNSI	*Journal of Numismatic Society of India*
JRASB	*Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*
OMLRC	*Oriental Manuscript Library and Research Centre*

CHAPTER – I

Introduction

Introduction:

A glimpse at the political situation in the Deccan, which was marked by political confusion and disintegration during the last two decades of the 15th century is necessary to follow the trend of events which contributed to the evolution of the off-shoots Sultanates of Deccan.

The murder of Khwajah Mahmud Gawan, the savior of Bahmani Sultanate and the architect of a grand Empire in the 1481 A.D. struck a fatal blow to the Sultanate. Khwajah Mahmud Gawan's dying words "the death of an old man is of little moment, but to your majesty it will mean the loss of your character and the ruin of your Empire", proved to be prophetic. Within a decade, the vast empire of the splendid edifice of the Bahmani Sultanate presented a chequered scene. His death removed a dominating personality and let loose the forces of disintegration. This signaled the beginning of the decline and fall of the mighty empire.

Soon Sultan Muhammad Shah-III realized the folly of his indiscreet and unjust action of ordering execution of Mahmud Gawan. He was overwhelmed with remorse, and in delirium he constantly cried out that he was very much perturbed by the dream of the innocent Gawan.

By this action of the Sultan many nobles and their followers lost confidence in the Sultan, and they, while withdrawing from the camp of the Sultan, communicated their opinion that they would not accompany the Sultan and they would shape their conduct by the advice of Yusuf Adil Khan. The Sultan soon summoned Yusuf, who was instrumental in resolving the dispute between the Sultan and the nobles. But Yusuf was no match to replace Gawan. Soon factionalism at the court rudely subverted the political equilibrium; and egotism, intrigue, and disordered.

The lunar year that lapsed between the death of Gawan and the death of Sultan Muhammad on 5th Safar 887/26th March 1482, was the first phase of the last chapter of the Bahmani dynasty, and it was full of forebodings for the destiny of the Kingdom.

Mahmud Shah, the younger son and successor of Muhammad-III, was a boy of eight at the time of accession to the Bahmani throne. Though he ruled for thirty-seven years, he had neither the strength of the personal character, nor the guidance of an able prime minister, to enable him to maintain the integrity of his kingdom. He was nothing more than a puppet and his dominion was confined to the capital of Bidar and its immediate vicinity.

The first few years of the reign of the young Sultan was signalized by a series of struggles and intrigues. The capital itself was for many days the scene of struggles between the Dakhnis and the Habashis on the one hand and the Turks and the Mughals on the other. The Dakhni amirs unanimously agreed to the succession of the Sultan Mahmud. Though at first the Dakhnis came to an

understanding with the afaqi party in the end they played false with them, and suddenly falling upon them they massacred the afaqis. The cause was that the afaqis gradually dominated the society and captured the entire governmental machinery to the humiliation of the Dakhnis. Thus there existed continuous party dissensions at the court and each party safeguarded its own interest. And this continued with unabated rancor. The Dakhnis Dissatisfied by the Sultan's attitude conspired to dethrone him. Consequently, on the night of 7th November 1487, the Dakhnis entered the palace and attempted to kill the Sultan. The attempt was foiled by the timely action of the afaqi slaves who were in attendance of the Sultan and who held the ground against the conspirators until the Sultan escaped.

The Sultan from thence devoted himself entirely to amusement and totally neglected the administration. Consequently, the powerful governors of the Bahmani provinces, who enjoyed extensive authority, availed themselves of the prevailing anarchy and became recalcitrant to the nominal central authority. They began, from 1489, to exert and assert their autonomous authority within their provinces.

Thus seeds were sown for the dismemberment of the Bahmani Kingdom. This, in due course, produced the five Sultanates-'Adil Shahi at Bijapur, Barid Shahi at Bidar, Qutb Shahi at Golconda, 'Imad Shahi in Berar, and Nizam Shahi at Ahmednagar. However, dismemberment of the Bahmani kingdom and assumption of virtual independence by its provincial governors was not prompted by any disaffection towards the Bahmani Sultan; and like

other governors, Yusuf ‘Adil Khan and his successors entertained loyalty and affection towards the Bahmani Sultans so long as the dynasty lasted.

After the assumption of the virtual independence by the Bahmani governors the history of the Bahmani kingdom was in fact the history of the Baridi rule and its struggle for the hegemony of the tottering Bahmani Empire. Qasim Barid, entitled Barid-u’l-Mamalik marched to Bidar in 1492 and compelled Sultan Mahmud to appoint him Prime Minister of the Bahmani Kingdom. He then held the Sultan in thrall, and ruled at his own discretion in the name of the Sultan. After the death of Qasim in 1504, his son ‘Ali Barid became Prime Minister.

The Baridi rule was greatly disliked by almost all the leading nobles (including the provincial governors), which further aggravated the political conditions and facilitated the provincial governors to become autonomous.

After Mahmud Shah’s death in 1518, the last four successors-Ahmad-IV (1518-20); ‘Alauddin (1520-23); Waliullah (1523-26); and Kalimullah (1526-37 or 38), to the house of Bahmanis were nominal rulers under the tutelage of the Baridis. Thus fell ignominiously the magnificent edifice of the Bahmanis. After the extinction of the Bahmani Kingdom five Sultanates of Nizam Shahi, ‘Adil Shahi, Barid Shahi, ‘Imad Shahi, and Qutub Shahi, which were under evolution from 1489, sprang into existence as independent sovereign states.

The external relations of Deccan Sultanates were multiplex. They maintained heterogeneous relations simultaneously with diverse states. Their diplomatic relations can be broadly classified into seven groups, their parent

being Bahmani kingdom, Iran and other Islamic Afro-Asian countries, Deccan Sultanates, Vijayanagara and its succession states, the Mughals, the Marathas and the European settlements (Portuguese, British, Dutch and the French) in south India. The relations with these groups of states shall be discussed from conceptual point but maintaining the chronological order.

Though the diplomatic relations of Deccan Sultanates differed from state to state, the primary motives behind the relations were the struggle for existence and territorial expansion. To achieve the goal, they came in clash with several other states, and their diplomacy interacted. This interaction of diplomatic relations has been carefully evaluated in this study to produce a synthesis of Deccan Sultanates diplomatic history from their origin to their fall. And a summing up of the entire study of Deccan Sultanates diplomatic history has been classified in five phases, discussed in this study. Hence a humble attempt is made to make a broad study about this research work entitled "Diplomatic Relations of Deccan Sultanates."

Aims and Objectives:

The present study aims to project the Diplomatic Relations of Deccan sultanates in the history of Karnataka. The socio-cultural organization and institutions have undergone the least changes despite the political vicissitudes. The invasions during the Bahmani period from outside and within have not failed to bring any changes in the development of external and diplomatic relations. It is for this reason an attempt is made to bring forth a critical study

about Diplomatic Relations of Deccan sultanates. As research is the activity to be undertaken to bring out something new, to extend the horizon of knowledge and to contribute some original ideas. The efforts of any research scholar without aims and objectives will become null and void and of no value. The sultans of Deccan have played a vital role in enriching their name and fame in the history of medieval Deccan (Karnataka). The aims and objectives of the study are infact the academic pursuit of a researcher to know categorically about something on the basis of new findings.

Research Method:

In the development of thesis all care has been taken to adopt historical method. The present study is based on primary and secondary sources, contemporary and near contemporary records as far the epigraphical, archival and archaeological sources are concerned, their authenticity is unquestioned. The literary sources help us in utilizing the sources as far as their credibility is concerned. The present research work is totally based on historically method.

Though the subject of diplomatic relations of Deccan sultanates is concerned it attracts the attention of scholars from different places in Karnataka in particular and India in general. Very little study has been conducted on the history of medieval Deccan. In the available studies more attention on language and literature during Deccan Sultanates has been neglected. Hence, there is a need to highlight external and diplomatic relations of Deccan sultanates.

Renowned scholars like, Dr. M.A. Nayeem, Dr. A.R. Kulkarni, Dr. T.N. Devare, Dr. H.K. Sherwani, P.M. Joshi, G.M.D. Sufi, Narendranath Law and others have brought to light much new material on the history of medieval Deccan, through their numerous articles on new inscriptions and documents published by them. The account of foreign travelers constitutes valuable sources which are rich in volume, variety and interest and gives details about socio-economic conditions, life, customs, tradition, external and diplomatic relations of the people under rule of Deccan Sultans.

Justification for the study:

The history of Medieval Deccan has been attracting more and more number of research scholars consequently every conceivable facets of Deccan history has been subjected to scrutiny and a good number of thesis and dissertations are being produced. A brief account of historiography of Deccan sultanates reveals beyond doubt that diplomatic relations of Deccan Sultanates is a need for undertaking research on the topic with justification.

Nature and scope of the study

As far as the nature of the present study is concerned no independent research work on diplomatic relations of Deccan sultanates has been done. There is a need for analyzing the different facets of diplomatic and external relations of Deccan Sultanates under study.

After the disintegration of the Delhi sultanate Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah established a Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan, which was one of the most important kingdoms of Deccan. The Bahmani sultans followed a policy of peace even after bloodshed and tyranny. They developed mutual understanding with native Hindu rulers and subjects in the kingdom. Later the five-off shoots of the Bahmani kingdom, i.e., Adil Shahis of Bijapur, Nizam Shahis of Ahmednagar, Qutub Shahis of Golconda, Imad Shahis of Berar and Barid Shahis of Bidar also followed the same policy.

Evaluation of Sources:

Numbers of unpublished documents are available in Arabic, Persian, Urdu, Marathi and English Concerned to the topic. In this study an extensive use of such sources has been used. Further, the study is supplemented with the secondary sources.

Regarding the nature of the sources concerned, they are scattered and not exclusively meant for present topic. This is same in respect of all ruling powers of Deccan Sultanates. The scattered sources are arranged in a systematic manner. They are as follows;

Account of Abdur Razzaque:

Abdur Razzaque was also a contemporary of Khwaja Mahmud Gawan, he was a Timurid Sultan Shah Rukh's ambassador to Vijayanagara, Abdur Razzaque has left a short note with description, of his connection with the

Kingdom of Sultan Alauddin of Gilan. He writes that, in 1471 A.D; *i.e.*, in Khwaja Mahmud Gawan's life time, he cites him as an instance of that the great new Gilan had produced. He says the Khwaja Mahmud Gawan was "Like a mid-day Sun in the world in general and India in particular" and also outwardly he was the chief of the nobles of the Kingdom of the Deccan, his inner self was full of the life of mysterious. He gives us full name of his father and tell us the fact that *Resht* was not a Kingdom as suggested by Ferishtah but only a "*Wilayat* or province of the Kingdom of Gilan.

Account of Afnasy Nikitin:

Afnasy Nikitin was a Russian traveler, who came to India in 1468 A.D and remained here up to 1472 A.D. He met Khwaja Mahmud Gawan, the Bahmani Wazir, and traveled through out the Bahmani Kingdom. His account throws light on the prodigal way of life of the ruling class and on the extreme poverty of the general people who were not even able to get a square meal a day. He mentions about the diamond mine in Raichur. His account is very valuable for the social history of the Deccan. It has recently been published by the Indo-Soviet cultural society in Russian, Hindi and English languages.

Burhan-i-Maasir:

This book was compiled by Sayed Ali bin Azizullah Tabatabai. It is essentially a history of the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmednagar and derives its name from Burhan Nizam Shah-II under whose patronage the work was

written. It begins from the Bahmani Kingdom and comes down to the latter part of A.D. 1595-96.The style of the work is more ornate than Ferishtah's history and in general completeness is inferior to the latter. It throws light on the relations between Bijapur and Ahmednagar and serves as a useful compliment to the other source material. The part of the work dealing with the history of the Bahmani dynasty was translated by Major J.S. King and published in 1900. Sir Walsley Haig translated some part dealing with the Nizam Shahi dynasty.

Futuh-us-Salatin:

This history of contemporary events in the Deccan in the poetic form was compiled by Moulana Isami who migrated from Delhi to the Deccan at the time of the establishment of Daulatabad as the second capital of the Empire in 1327 A.D when he was 16 years old. He says that he started composing his chronicle of 12,000 verses on 10^{th} December, 1349 and completed it in a remarkably short space of five months on May 14, 1350. It covers the period of the struggle of the Deccan for independence. Having lived under the aegis of the first Bahmani Sultan Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah, he is full of praise for that monarch and at times describes him in much exaggerated terms. Like his contemporary Ziauddin Barani is an eye witness to the events he records and may be regarded as being for the most part correct. Barani is full of interesting details of the campaigns, undertaken by the leaders of the revolutionary forces as well as the Tughluq armies, and various other matters pertaining to the story. He is not so profuse with regard to the actual dates as Barani, but dates may be

calculated fairly correctly as he is often very particular in giving the actual time taken by the course of a certain event. In spite of this there is little flaw is the sequence of events related.

Tarikh-i- Ferishtah:

The author of this chronicle, Mohammad Qasim Hindu Shah Ferishtah was born at Astarabad on the Caspian Sea about 1570. His father Ghulam Ali Hindu Shah was a tutor to Prince Miran Hussain, a son of Murtuza Nizam Shah of Ahmednagar. On the dethronement and murder of Miran Hussain in 1589, Ferishtah left Ahmednagar to Bijapur. He was well received by Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah-II. Under the immediate protection of the Sultan, he spent remaining part of his life till 1623 A.D.

Ferishtah was commissioned by Ibrahim Adil Shah-II to write the general history of the Muslims in India. He presented the first draft of his work to the Sultan in 1606, and spent the rest of his life in revising it. The chronicle divided in to six sections, deals with the Kingdoms of the Deccan. The first section devoted to the Bahmani sultans. The second section fully deals with the history of Adil Shahi dynasty from its foundation to the political relations with Bahmanis, during the evolution of the Adil Shahi kingdom. Ferishtah has described chronologically, in different sections, the history of each Adil Shahi rulers from Yusuf Adil Shah to Ibrahim Adil Shah-II bringing his narrative up to the year 1606 A.D.

Riyaz-ul-Insha or Manazir-ul-Insha.

The Riyaz-ul-Insha is the collection of the letters of Bahmani Wazir Khawaja Imaduddin Mahmud Gawan written either on his own behalf or on behalf of his master Mohammad Shah-III the Bahmani Sultan. The collection has now been printed under the able editorship of S.C. Hussain.

There are altogether 148 letters in the collection out of which 84 have a direct bearing on the historical atmosphere in which they were written, while the letters to foreign potentates and ministers of foreign states are also of great historical significance. The material contained in the collection throws light on various aspects, such as Khwaja Mahmud Gawan's private life, Bahmani diplomatic relations, military campaigns, factional politics and party animosities of the period so on and so forth. They are couched in highly ornate style, full of similes and metaphors, and interspersed with lines from poems, *Qasidas* and *Ghazals* as well as extract from the *Holy Quran*, and *Hadith* and numerous Arabic and Persian writers. It is no wonder that the work has been regarded as the Garden of Diction as it name signifies, rather than a historical source book.

Of the 148 letters 14 are addressed to the ministers of the Deccan from the battle fields, 13 to ministers of foreign countries, 11 to rulers of Indian Sultanates and 32 to rulers of non Indian Kingdoms. Parts from these, there are letters to the Khwaja Mahmud Gawan's own relatives and men of learning in some of which the writer has included long descriptions of events in the Deccan. The great mass of the collection consists of letters written during the

reigns of Nizamuddin Ahmed-II and Mohammad Shah-III, which, apart from occurrences of purely domestic interest, deal with the Malwese and the Maharashtra campaigns and help us to follow the course of these wars as well as to trace the chronology of the period almost from month to month and day to day.

Tabaqat-i-Akbar Shahi:

Nizamuddin Ahmed was the author of Tabaqat-i-Akbar Shahi the first general history of the India and the foundation of a number of later works of the same category. He was the son of Muqim-al–Haravi who held a high position in the household of Babur the conqueror and was later raised to be *Wazir* of the Governorship of Gujarat. He was born in 1549 and held several military offices under the Emperor Akbar by whom he was finally raised to the *Bakshiship* of the whole Empire. The *Tabaqat* is the first chronicle of its kind and deals with history of India from the 37^{th} year of Akbar's reign upto 1593 A.D, *i.e.,* the year before the death of the author which occurred in 1594 A.D, and ends in a most useful supplement containing the who's who of the eminent personalities of the period. The parts relating to the Deccan are rather short but they have their own value in their compactness as well as their correctness as a correct chronology which often corresponds with other numismatic and other evidence.

Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi:

The author of this work is, Ziauddin Barni, who is said to be the chief chronicler of the period ending in the 6^{th} regnal year of Firoz Shah Tughluq (1357 A.D), and is one of sources for the storm and stress leading to the independence of the Deccan. As his surname shows he was born at Baran, the modern Buland Shahar and lived from 1265 to 1357 A.D, the year of the completion of his great work which he had commenced in 1333. He was a disciple of Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya and admirer of Mohammad-bin-Tughluq whom he accompanied to the Deccan on one occasion. He is therefore an eye witness of some of the events he describes, though the picture he draws is rather one side especially with regard to the personality of Mohammad –bin-Tughluq or of Firoz Shah Tughluq. He had a wonderful memory, and the number of facts and dates recorded is simple. He died shortly after he had completed his book as probably he lost the favour of sultan Firoz Shah on whom he had lavished his praises. He is main source for the event in the Deccan, and if his book is read in conjunction with Isami's *Futuh-us-Salatin* we are sure to discover a correct measure of contemporary history as well, while Isami is a Protagonist of Bahman Shah, Barani applauds the acts of the Mohammad-bin-Tughluq Sultan.

Tazkirat-ul-Mulk:

Mir Rafiuddin Ibrahim Shirazi was the author of the celebrated chronicle, the '*Tazkirat-ul-Mulk'*. He was born in 1541 and wrote "*History of*

the Kings” when he was 70 years old. He migrated to India from Shiraz as a merchant and later joined the service of the Sultan of Bijapur. Rafi-ud-din rose to fairly high office at Bijapur, being appointed as the Master of the Mint and was even sent on an important diplomatic mission to Ahmednagar. Having adopted Bijapur as his home, he naturally gives details regarding events at that court, but we find certain interesting details in the chronicle about the Bahmani’s as well. There is a good account of detail with a sprinkling of the supernatural here and there regarding the life of Sufi Saint Siraj-ud-din Junaidi, the preceptor of Bahman Shah and his immediate successors, which are not found elsewhere. There are certain other interesting and intimate details regarding such matters as Mujahid’s Sobriquet Balwant and some facts regarding the dress and the manners of the period found in the work. There is one rather significant remark about Sultan Tajuddin Firoz Shah which runs counter to the description of that ruler’s private life as depicted by Ferishtah, and that is the reference in Tazkirat-ul-Mulk that he had only one wife. On the whole, some of the details mentioned on the work are certainly well worth consideration and fill certain lacunac left by other chroniclers.

Zafar-ul-Walih:

This is one of the few books on the history of India in the Arabic language, the author, Abdullah Al-Makki, surnamed Haji-ul-Dabir, arrived at Ahmedabad, the capital of sultanate of Gujarat, in 1555 A.D at the age of 15, and became employed in the household of Ulugh Khan the Abyssinian

nobleman. Four years later, he lived on right up to the conquest of the Kingdom by Akbar the Great by whom he was appointed administrator of *Auqaf* or endowments for the benefit of the holy cities of Mecca and Madina, a post which he filled up to 1576. His history naturally centres round Gujarat, but he takes a bird's eye view of India right up to 1605, and has some interesting details regarding the history Deccan, although he deals with it only in a secondary manner. His works are specially valuable when we have to compare variants in order to arrive at correct conclusions.

Zau-ul-Lami:

The author of this work is Mohammad-bin-Abdur Rahman-us-Sakhawi, was born in 1428 and lived up to 1497, and thus his life corresponds almost exactly with that of Khwaja Mahmud Gawan. His work, *Zau-ul-Lami li ahl-Qarm-i-Tasi* or the Dictionary of eminent Men of the Ninth Century, a voluminous work in ten Volumes, contains a fairly long notice of the life of Khwaja Mahmud Gawan and quite useful information regarding important personalities of the Deccan contemporary with him. We must, however, remember that he was at Mecca when the news of the Khawaja Mahmud Gawan's murder reached him and it is quite possible that the details may have been distorted to a certain extent.

Research Design

The theme of diplomatic relations of Deccan Sultanates will be well defined in the following chapters;

- The First chapter serves as an introduction to the entire thesis. It lays down the aims and objectives of the study, justification for the selection of the topic, nature and scope of the study, research method employed and the sources of the study.
- The Second Chapter gives information about the evolution, rise and fall of the Deccan Sultanates.
- The Third Chapter reviews the principles of the external policy of Deccan Sultanates, which are formulation of the external policy and structure of the diplomatic practices.
- The Fourth Chapter discuses about international relations with the Islamic world, viz., Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Arab States.
- The Fifth Chapter discuses about the relations with Europeans, viz., Portuguese, Dutch, British and French.
- The Sixth Chapter throws light on domestic relations. The relations between the five offshoots of the Bahmani Sultanates and with the Mughals.
- The Seventh Chapter highlights the relations with Vijayanagara kingdom, which was the neighbour kingdom of Bahmani Sultanate.
- The Eighth Chapter will draw conclusion and epilogue of the entire thesis.

CHAPTER – II

The Evolution, Rise and Fall of the Deccan Sultanates

Bahmani Sultanate:

Nasiruddin Ismail Shah asked Zafar Khan to become the Sultan with the title of '*Sikandar- uth- thani Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah al-wali*'. The new Sultan was crowned on Friday August 3, 1347 A.D in the mosque of Qtubuddin Mubarak Shah Khilji at Daulatabad. According to one historian, Hasan was the nephew of Malik Hizhbaruddin entitled Zafar Khan' Alai, who was killed in 1298 AD when Hasan was only 6 years old[1].

The first act of the new Sultan was to transfer his seat of Daulatabad to Ahsanabad (Gulbarga). He sent Qutub-ul-Mulk who conquered Kotgir, Maram, Mahendri and Akkalkot. Qir Khan was sent to conquer Kalyan. After the news of this great victory of Kalyan, Sultan renamed Daulatabad to Fatahabad. Sikander was send to Malkhed which was held by the Hindu Zamindars who opposed first but subdued later. Krishna Nayak of Tilangana entered into treaty and became friend of Sikander and loyal to the King. Qir Khan revolted and was beheaded by the Sultan[2].

The Sultan died on *Rabi-ul-awwal* 1, February 11, 1358 at the age of 67.

Muhammad Shah-I ascended the throne. He was better known as organizer of Bahmani Sultanate and founder of its institutions. His Silver

throne from his father was replaced by the magnificent '*Takht-e-Firoza*' (Turquoise Throne) on March 23, 1363 presented to him by Raya of Tilangana. He constructed 'Jama Masjid' in Gulbarga Fort and Shah Bazaar Masjid in Gulbarga town. His father Alauddin Bahman Shah, Muhammad was involved in wars with Vijayanagar. However he also became embroiled in wars with Warangal. Sultan invaded Tilangana, Kanya Nayak offered Huns, elephants and horses along with Golconda Town. Sultan died on Zi-qada April 21, 1375 A.D from drinking too much[3].

Silver Coins struck in the name of Muhammad Shah-I in, Silver coin of and a Gold coin is also known. No coin of his successor Mujahid Shah is known. Mujahid Shah's Gold coin is known. This indicates that Muhammad Shah-I might have died in 1375 and issue may be a posthumously in his Mujahid Shah's reign.

Muhammad-I was succeeded by his son Aladdin Mujahid Shah at the age of 19. Mujahid Shah was murdered by Masud Khan son of Mubarak Khan and Daud Khan.

Immediately on Mujahid's murder Daud Shah proclaimed king of Deccan and all those present paid homage to him. It is said that Ruh Parwar Agha (Mujahid's sister) got Daud murdered through a royal slave Bakah while he was attending Friday prayer of Muharram, in great mosque of Gulbarga Fort[4].

Ruh Parwar after taking revenge of her brother's death, blinded. She put Muhammad-II brother of Daud-I on throne. Muhammad Shah-II's 19 year reign

was one of the most peaceful period in the whole Bahmani history. Since he had no son so he adopted two sons Firoz Shah and Ahmad-I of his uncle Ahmad Khan s/o Bahman Shah. But after the birth of Tahmatan Shah, Muhammad on his death bed wished that Ghiyasuddin Tahmatan Shah should succeed him and Firoz and Ahmad should pay homage to him.

Muhammad died of typhoid on. The next day died the grand old man of the Deccan Malik Saifuddin Ghori who had lived through five reigns and who was the Prime Minister of Bahmani State in the time of storm and three of four rulers[5].

Muhammad's elder son Ghiyasuddin Tahmatan Shah succeeded to the throne without any trouble. Taghalchin (Turkish slave) who wanted to be the Prime Minister arranged a big feast at which king was also invited. Taghalchin blinded the king on Ramadan, and imprisoned him at Sagar and his step brother Shamsuddin Daud-II was put on the throne.

The first thing the boy king was made to do was to promote Taghalchin to be the Malik Naib and Mir Jumla of the kingdom. The manumitted slave girl who was Shamsuddin's mother was now raised to the rank and title of Makhduma-i-Jahan (Dowager Queen). Taghalchin tried to persuade Shamsuddin to imprison Firoz and Ahmad and asked king's mother to have them done to death. On hearing of the conspiracy the two brothers fled to Sagar. Firoz proclaimed himself king making his younger brother Ahmad Khan Amir-ul-umra, Mir Fazlil-lah Inju Wakil (Prime Minister). He had the blind boy Ghiyasuddin Tahmatan with him[6]. He directly attacked into the Darbar

Hall. Taghalchin and his son was killed Daud II was blinded and allowed to move Mecca with his mother. Shamsuddin Daud II died in 1414 AD at Mecca.

Firoz Shah was one of the most learned of Indian sovereigns. He was a good calligrapher and poet (poetic name Uruji or Firozi). Among other public works he under took the construction of an Observatory on the chain of hills near Daulatabad called Balaghat which could not be completed due to his death[7].

'*Hazrat Khwaja Syed Muhammad Gesu Draz*' was a Sufi (saint) and was deeply related with the Bahmani kings and the people of Gulbarga. He was the s/o Syed Yusuf who came to Daulatabad in the reign of Muhammad Tughlaq. Hazrat was born on Jan 30, 1331 and started living near 'Gulbarga Jama Masjid'. He died on Nov 1, 1422 AD at the age of 105 years.

Firoz Shah paid tribute to him. He gave him many villages for his maintenance. He knows and can carry translation in Persian, Arabic, Turkish, Telugu, Kannada, Marathi, Bengali and many other languages. He tamed prince Bukka and Harihara of Vijayanagar and Narasingha of Kherla in battle.

Firoz's army tried to kill Ahmad Khan (brother of Firoz) but defeated in battle fought cleverly by Ahmad. Gates of the city was opened for Ahmad and he was taken to dying king Firoz. Firoz died on Sep 28, 1422.

At the beginning of his reign he suffered the shock of the death of 'Hazrat Khwajah Syed Muhammad Gesu Daraz'. He decided and shifted his capital from Gulbarga to Bidar. He made Khalaf Hasan Basri as his Wakil-i-Saltanate (Prime Minister)[8].

He constructed the Tomb of Gesu Daraz at Gulbarga any buildings at Bidar.

Ahmad Shah attacked Vijayanagar and over powered Vijayanagar. In the last year of his reign he appointed his eldest son Alauddin Zafar Khan to be his heir, giving him the full charge of kingdom. King died after a short illness.

He was a great patron of arts and culture. He brought artisans from Iran, including the metal-worker Abdulla-bin-Kaiser, who was the father of bidriware, the inlaying of zinc alloy with silver and gold[9].

Ahmed Shah's, and his empress's, tomb is located in Ashtur village, Bidar District, and is the subject of an annual 'urs', or anniversary of death festival.

Ahmad-I had been very successful as a Sultan and when he died he was popular even to the extent of being regarded as a saint. His son Zafar Khan who assumed the title of Ahmad on his accession. He gave preference to newcomers from outside over the old in his cabinet. This created a great cleavage between them and the Dakhnis (old comers). He married the daughter of Raja of Sangmeswar and gave her the title of Zeba Chehra apart from the daughter of Nasir Khan Faruqi of Khandesh '*Agha Zainab*'.

There became two party, aparently the old-comers and the new-comers. King died early due to his wound in his shin (front of lower leg)[10].

Ahmad Shah-II had nominated his eldest son Humayun heir to his throne. King made Khwajah Mahmud Gawan, Malik-ut-Tujjar, tarafdar of Bijapur and Wakil-e-Sultunate giving him full control of military matters.

Humayun was a very short tempered and cruel man. He made his own cousin Sikander Khan as Sipahsalar. Sikander became rebellion and was crushed to death with the help of Mahmud Gawan. Humayun died on Sep 4, 1461.

On Humayun's death his son Ahmad succeeded to the throne as Nizamuddin Ahmad-III at the age of 8. He was escorted to the throne by Shah Muhibullah and Syed-us-Sadat Syed Hanif. Late king had nominated a council of Regency constituting of Khwajah-e-Jahan Turk, Mahmud Gawan with the Dowager Queen Makhduma-e-Jahan Nargis Begum. Master mind which ruled the country during the short reign of Ahmad Shah-III was that of the great queen. All the political prisoners of Humayun period were released. Ahmad-III died on the very night of his marriage on and was succeeded by his younger brother Muhammad Khan as Shamsuddin Muhammad Shah-III[11].

Shamsuddin Muhammad was between 9 and 10 years when he succeeded his elder brother. He was escorted to the Turquoise Throne by Shah Mohibullah (who was released by his captor Mahmud Khilji of Malwa) and Syed Hanif. Nizam-ul-mulk murdered Khwajah-e-Jahan Turk (one of the member of the three party committee of Regency after the death of Humayun) at the instance of Queen in the presence of boy Sultan in 870 AH.

Mohammad Shah-III got married at the age of 14 years. Dowager Queen retired from active role. Malik-ut-Tujjar Mahmud Gawan was made Prime Minister. The Prime Minister ship of Mahmud Gawan saw the Bahmani State attaining high unequalled in the whole of its history. During this period Parenda Fort, Great College of Bidar and Madarsa at Bidar[12]. Kherla was

besieged in 872 AH. Kapileswar of Orissa was defeated in 1470 AD. Goa was annexed on 20th of Shaban 876 AH. Queen Dowager died in 877 AH.

Boundaries of Bahmani Sultanate now touching the Bay of Bengal in the east and the Arabian Sea in the west. Mahmud Gawan was one of the first ministers in Medieval India to order a systematic measurement of land, fixing the boundaries of villages and towns and making a thorough enquiry into the assessment of revenue.

Sultan annexed Kanchi on 1st Muharram, 886 AH. This was the southernmost point ever reached by Bahmani. Nobles conspired against Khwajah Mahmud Gawan and prepared a false paper on behalf of Khwajah saying he wants Deccan to be partitioned between him and Purushottum of Orissa. King sentenced Khwajah to death on 5th Safar 886 AH at the age of 73. Later Sultan came to know that Khwajah was innocent. He appointed his son Mahmud as his heir. He died on 5th Safar 887 AH[13].

The long reign of Mahmud Shah Bahmani, was a period of gradual weakening of the state. He ascended the throne at the age of 12 years, when new-comers had been over thrown. New Regency was formed with Queen as president. Qasim Barid was entitled with Barid-ul-Mumalik.

Sultan began to indulge in wine, women and song and spent so much money that he had to extract many jewels from the Turquoise throne at the instigation of Qasim Barid. Qasim Barid forced Mahmud to make Prime Minister of the kingdom[14]. Malik Ahmad Nizam-ul-Mulk revolted and made a beautiful palace making it the center of his newly created capital, which he

named after himself, Ahmednagar. Qutub-ul-Mulk was appointed as the Governor of Tilangana in 1495-96 AD who controlled over Warrangal, Rajakonda, Dewarkonda and Kovilkonda. Qasim Barid died and was succeeded by his son Amir Barid. Ahmad Nizam died and succeeded by his son Burhan. Sultan died on Dec 27, 1518 AD.

Amir Barid was very clever, He put Mahmud's son Ahmad on throne. Amir Barid was careful that king should not leave the palace but he actually set about to spoil his life and morals. New Sultan was forced to break up the ancient crown of the Bahmanis, worth 15 lakes of Rupees (Rs. 1,500,000), and sell the jewels in order to provide himself with the means of ease and pleasure. Sultan died on Muharram Dec 15, 1520[15].

After 1518 the sultanate broke up into five states, Ahmednagar, Berar, Bidar, Bijapur, and Golconda, known collectively as the Deccan sultanates.

Amir Barid's wish to become king was rekindled with Ahmad's death. He put the crown on Ahmad's son Ala-ud-din on Dec 28, 1520.The new Sultan was wise and courageous. Amir Barid conspired against him and Sultan was dethroned.

Amir Barid put Waliullah son of Mahmud on throne. He was imprisoned in his own zanana (ladies room) and lived on bread and clothes provided to him by his master. Amir Barid married the pretty Bibi Sitti, Ahmad's widow who was just 22-23 yrs. Amir Barid was now a royal kinsman and was free to enter the zanana apartment of the palace. He began to make love with the queen. When Sultan resisted he was poisoned[16].

After 1538 Bahmani Sultanate gets converted in to 5 off-shoots. Kalimullah son of Mahmud Shah was the last king of the Bahmani Dynasty. He was closely guarded by Amir Barid. A new political force had now appeared on the Indian Horizon in the person of Zahir-ud-din Muhammad Babur. All the rulers of Deccan i.e. Bijapur, Ahmednagar, Berar, and Burhanpur sent their congratulations to the Mughal conqueror. Kalimullah also wrote letter to Babur to relieve him from Amir Barid. This news was leaked and out of fear of his life Kalimullah Shah fled to Bijapur in 1527 AD. He was not welcomed there[17]. He left for Ahmednagar. He was first received well by Burhan Nizam-ul-Mulk, but never again called in open court. Kalimullah soon breathed his last in Ahmednagar. The men of shahis rulers planned to murder him after he was got down from his post because they thought that he could regain the position. His coffin was brought to Bidar. His date of death could not be confirmed. After the death of Kalimullah his son Ilhamullah proceeded to Mecca and never returned.

Adil Shahi Sultanate:

The Adil Shahi Sultanate was a one of the off-shoots of Bahmani dynasty, founded by Yusuf Adil Shah, that ruled the Sultanate of Bijapur, centered on present-day Bijapur district of Karnataka in India, in the Western area of the Deccan region of Southern India from 1489 to 1686. Bijapur had been a province of the Bahmani Sultanate (1347–1518), before its political decline in the last quarter of the[18] 15th century and eventual

break-up in 1518 A.D. The Bijapur Sultanate was absorbed into the Mughal Empire on 12 September 1686 A.D, after its conquest by the Emperor Aurangzeb.

The founder of the dynasty, Yusuf Adil Shah (1490–1510), was appointed Bahmani governor of the province, before creating a de facto independent Bijapur state. Yusuf and his son, Ismail, generally used the title *Adil Khan*. 'Khan', meaning 'Chief' in Mongolian and adopted in Persian, conferred a lower status than 'Shah', indicating royal rank. Only with the rule of Yusuf's grandson, Ibrahim Adil Shah-I (1534–1558), did the title of *Adil Shah* come into common use[19].

The Bijapur Sultanate's borders changed considerably throughout its history. Its northern boundary remained relatively stable, straddling contemporary Southern Maharashtra and Northern Karnataka. The Sultanate expanded southward, first with the conquest of the Raichur Doab following the defeat of the Vijayanagar Empire at the Battle of Talikota in 1565. Later campaigns, notably during the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah (1627–1657), extended Bijapur's formal borders and nominal authority as far south as Bangalore. Bijapur was bounded on the West by the Portuguese state of Goa and on the East by the Sultanate of Golconda, ruled by the Qutub Shahi dynasty[20].

The former Bahmani provincial capital of Bijapur remained the capital of the Sultanate throughout its existence. After modest earlier developments, Ibrahim Adil Shah-I (1534–1558) and Ali Adil Shah-I (1558–1579) re-modeled

Bijapur, providing the citadel and city walls, congregational mosque, core royal palaces and major water supply infrastructure. Their successors, Ibrahim Adil Shah-II (1580–1627), Muhammad Adil Shah (1627–1657) and Ali Adil Shah-II (1657–1672), further adorned Bijapur with palaces, mosques, mausoleum and other structures, considered to be some of the finest examples of Deccan Sultanate and Indo-Islamic Architecture[21].

Bijapur was caught up in the instability and conflict resulting from the collapse of the Bahmani Empire. Constant warring, both with the Vijayanagar Empire and the other Deccan Sultanates, curtailed the development of state before the Deccan Sultanates allied to achieve victory over Vijayanagar at Talikota in 1565. Bijapur eventually conquered the neighbouring Sultanate of Bidar in 1619. The Portuguese Empire exerted pressure on the major Adil Shahi port of Goa, until it was conquered during the reign of Ibrahim Adil Shah-II. The Sultanate was thereafter relatively stable, although it was damaged by the revolt of Shivaji, whose father was Maratha commander in the service of Adil Shahi Sultanate. Shivaji founded an independent Maratha Kingdom which went on to become the Maratha Empire, one of largest empires in India, just before the British conquered India. The greatest threat to Bijapur's security was, from the late 16th century, the expansion of the Mughal Empire into the Deccan. Although it may be the case that the Mughals destroyed the Adil Shahis it was Shivaji's revolt which weakened the Adil Shahi control. Various agreements and treaties imposed Mughal suzerainty on the Adil Shahs, by stages, until Bijapur's formal recognition of Mughal authority in 1636[22]. The

demands of their Mughal overlords sapped the Adil Shahs of their wealth until the Mughal conquest of Bijapur in 1686.

Qutub Shahi Sultanate:

The dynasty's founder was Sultan Quli Qutub-ul-Mulk , migrated to Delhi with his uncle, Ala-Quli, some of his relatives and friends in the beginning of the 16th century. Later he migrated south, to the Deccan and served the Bahmani Sultan Muhammad Shah. He conquered Golconda, after the disintegration of the Bahmani Sultanate into the five Deccan Sultanates. Soon after, he declared independence from the Bahmani Sultanate, took the title *Qutub Shah*, and established the Qutub Shahi dynasty of Golconda. He was later assassinated in 1543 by his son, Jamshed Qutub Shah, who assumed the sultanate. He later died in 1550 from cancer. Jamsheed's young son reigned for a year, at which time the nobility brought back and installed Ibrahim Quli as sultan. During the reign of Muhammad Quli Qutub Shah, relations between Hindus and Muslims were strengthened, even to the point of Hindus resuming their religious festivals like Diwali and Holi. Some Hindus rose to prominence in the Qutub Shahi Sultanate, the most important example being the ministers Madanna and Akkanna[23].

Golconda, and with the construction of the Char Minar, later Hyderabad served as capitals of the sultanate, and both cities were embellished by the Qutub Shahi Sultans. The dynasty ruled Golconda for 171 years, until the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb conquered the Deccan in 1687.

The Qutub Shahi rulers were great builders, whose structures included the Char Minar, as well as patrons of learning. Quli Qutub-ul-Mulk's court became a haven for Persian culture and literature. Sultan Muhammad Quli Qutub Shah (1580–1612) wrote poems in Dakhani Urdu, Persian and Telugu and left a huge poetry collection. Subsequent poets and writers however, wrote in Urdu, while using vocabulary from Persian, Hindi and Telugu languages. By 1535, the Qutub Shahis were using Telugu for their revenue and judicial areas within the sultanate[24].

Initially, the Qutub Shahi rulers patronized Persianate culture, but eventually adopted the regional culture of the Deccan, symbolized by the Telugu language and the newly developed Deccani idiom of Urdu became prominent. Although Telugu was not their mother tongue, the Golconda rulers spoke and wrote Telugu, and patronized Telugu so exclusively they were termed the "*Telugu Sultans*". In 1543, fearing for his life, Prince Ibrahim Quli fled to the Vijayanagara court, which lavishly patronized the Telugu language. Upon his enthronement as sultan in 1550, Ibrahim Quli was thoroughly acquainted with Telugu aesthetics[25].

The Qutub Shahi architecture was Indo-Persian, a culmination of Hindu, Moorish, Mughal and Persian architectural styles. Some examples of Golconda Indo-Persian architecture are the Golconda Fort, tombs of the Qutub Shahis, Char Minar and the Char Kaman, Meccam Masjid and the Toli Mosque.

Nizam Shahi Sultanate:

Malik Ahmad was the son of Nizam-ul-Mulk Malik Hasan Bahri. After the death of his father, he assumed the appellation of his father and from this the dynasty found by him is known as the Nizam Shahi Sultanate. He founded the new capital Ahmednagar on the bank of the River Sina. After several attempts, he secured the great fortress of Daulatabad in 1499[26].

After the death of Malik Ahmad in 1510, his son Burhan, a boy of seven was, installed in his place. In the initial days of his reign, the control of the kingdom was in the hands of Mukammal Khan, an Ahmednagar official and his son. Burhan Shah-I died in Ahmednagar in 1553. He left six sons, of whom Hussain Nizam Shah succeeded him. After the death of Hussain Nizam Shah-I in 1565, his minor son Murtaza ascended the throne. During his minority, his mother Khanzada Humayun Sultana better known in history as Chand Sultana or Chand Bibi ruled as a regent for several years. Murtaza Shah annexed Berar in 1572. On his death in 1588, his son Miran Hussain ascended the throne. But his reign could last only a little more than ten months as he was poisoned to death. Ismail, a cousin of Miran Hussain was raised to the throne, but the actual power was in the hands of Jamal Khan, the leader of the Deccani/Habshi group in the court[27]. Jamal Khan was killed in the battle of Rohankhed in 1591 and soon Ismail Shah was also captured and confined by his father Burhan, who ascended the throne as Burhan Shah. But Chand Bibi fought him. Winning the kingdom, Chand Bibi ascended the throne. After the death of Chand Bibi in

July, 1600 Ahmednagar was conquered by the Mughals and Bahadur Shah was imprisoned.

Although, Ahmednagar city and its adjoining areas were occupied by the Mughals, an extensive part of the kingdom still remained in possession of the influential officials of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Malik Ambar and other Ahmednagar officials defied the Mughals and declared Murtaza Nizam Shah-II as sultan in 1600 at a new capital Paranda. Malik Ambar became prime minister and *Vakil-us-Saltanat* of Ahmednagar. Later, the capital was shifted first to Junnar and then to a new city Khadki (later Aurangabad). Malik Amber died in 1626. Soon, Shah Jahan ordered the Subahdar of Deccan, Mahabat Khan to finish off the Nizam Shahi when the commander-in-chief, Shahaji Bhosle was away. Mahabat Khan attacked Ahmednagar and quickly killed Fateh Khan along with the boy prince Hussain Nizam Shah-III, his relatives as well as two pregnant women so that there would not be any male heir to the throne. But soon, Shahaji with the assistance of Bijapur, placed an infant scion of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, Murtaza on the throne and he became the regent[28]. The scion Nizam and Shahaji's family was stationed in the Mahuli Fort. Shah Jahan quickly made an alliance with Mohammed Adil Shah of Bijapur and the respective Mughal and Adil Shahi generals, Khan Zaman (son of Mahabat Khan) and Ranadulla Khan (father of Rustum-e-Zaman) besieged Mahuli. Shahaji tried to break the siege externally several times, but failed. So Jijabai along with young Shivaji successfully escaped from Mahuli in disguise. However, the mother of scion Nizam, Sajeeda was caught while

fleeing along with the Nizam. Nizam was brought before Shah Jahan and Mohammed Adil Shah. Shah Jahan proposed to murder the boy Nizam so as to finish the Nizam Shahi once and for all. But Shahaji intervened and requested Shah Jahan to change his decision. But Adil Shah was adamant. After some thinking, Shah Jahan ordered Nizam's release much to the surprise of Adil Shah. However, he set a condition that Shahaji would be placed in deep south so that he could not pose any challenge to Mughals. The Nizam was taken away by Shah Jahan to Delhi and was made a Sardar.

Hussain Nizam Shah-I is known to have been one of the leading figurehead of the Deccan Sultanates during the Battle of Talikota. After his death Chand Bibi repulsed an invasion by the Mughal Empire with the reinforcements of Bijapur Sultanate and Golconda Sultanate[29].

The revenue system introduced by Malik Ambar was based on the revenue system introduced in Northern India and some parts of Gujarat and Khandesh subahs by Raja Todarmal. Lands were classified as good or bad according to their fertility and he took a number of years to ascertain accurately the average yield of lands. He abolished the revenue farming. At first, revenue was fixed as two-fifths of the actual produce in kind, but later the cultivators were allowed to pay in cash equivalent to approximately one-third of the yield. Although an average rent was fixed for each plot of land but actual collections depended on the conditions of crops and they varied from year to year.

Under the reigns of successive rulers of the dynasty, architecture and art flourished in the kingdom. The earliest extant school of painting in the Deccan

sultanates is from Ahmednagar. Several palaces, such as the Farah Bakhsh Bagh, the Hasht Bahisht Bagh, Lakkad Mahal were built, as were tombs, mosques and other buildings. Many forts of the Deccan, such as the fort of Junnar, Parenda, Ausa, Dharur Lohagad, etc. were greatly improved under their reign. Daulatabad, which was their secondary capital, was also heavily fortified and constructed in their reign. Literature was heavily patronized in the kingdom, as seen through manuscripts such as the *Tarif-i Husain Shah Badshah-i Dakan*. Sanskrit scholarship was also given a boost under their rule, as demonstrated by the works of Sabaji Pratap and Bhanudatta. The city of Ahmednagar, founded by the Nizam Shahis, was described as being comparable to Cairo and Baghdad, within a few years of its construction. It was modeled along the great cities of the Persianate world, given the Shi'a leanings of the dynasty[30].

Barid Shahi Sultanate:

The sultanate was founded in 1492 by Qasim Barid, who was a Turk from Georgia. He joined the service of the Bahmani Sultan Muhammad Shah-III. He started his career as a *sar-naubat* but later became the *mir-jumla* (prime minister) of the Bahmani sultanate. During the reign of Mahmud Shah Bahmani, he became the de facto ruler. After his death in 1504, his son Amir Barid became the prime minister and controlled the administration of the Bahmani sultanate. After the death of Mahmud Shah Bahmani in 1518, he was succeeded by four sultans, one after another, but they were mere puppets in the

hands of Amir Barid. When the last Bahmani ruler Kalimullah fled to Bidar in 1527, Amir Barid became practically independent. But he never assumed any royal title[31].

In 1542, he was succeeded by his son Ali Barid, who was the first to assume the title of *Shah*. Ali Barid joined the other Deccan sultans in the battle of Talikota against the Vijayanagar Empire in January, 1565. After his death in 1580, Ali Barid was succeeded by his son Ibrahim Barid, who after his death in 1587 was succeeded by his younger brother Qasim Barid-II. After his death in 1591, he was succeeded by his infant son Ali Barid-II, who was soon dethroned by one of his relative, Amir Barid-II. In 1601, he was also overthrown by one of his relative, Mirza Ali Barid. In 1609, he was succeeded by the last ruler, Amir Barid-III, who fought against the Mughals in 1616 under the leadership of Malik Ambar[32]. In 1619, he was defeated by the Bijapur Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah-II. Bidar was annexed to Bijapur sultanate. Amir Barid-III and his sons were brought to Bijapur and kept "under surveillance".

Imad Shahi Sultanate:

During the disintegration of Bahmani sultanate, in 1490 Fathullah Imad-ul-Mulk, governor of Gawil, who had formerly held all Berar, proclaimed his independence and founded the Imad Shahi dynasty of Berar sultanate. He proceeded to annex Mahur to his new Sultanate and had capital at Ellichpur. Imad-ul-Mulk was by birth a Kanarese Hindu, but had been captured as a boy

in one of the expeditions against the Vijayanagara Empire and reared as a Muslim. Gawilgad and Narnala were also fortified by him.

He died in 1504 and his successor, Alauddin Imad Shah resisted the aggression of Ahmednagar with the help from Bahadur Shah, sultan of Gujarat. The next ruler, Darya Imad Shah tried to align with Bijapur to prevent aggression of Ahmednagar, but was unsuccessful. In 1568 when Burhan Imad Shah was deposed by his Minister Tuffal Khan, and assumed the kingship. This gave a pretext for the intervention of Murtaza Nizam Shah of Ahmednagar, who invaded Berar, imprisoned and put to death Tuffal Khan, his son Shams-ul-Mulk, and the ex-king Burhan Imad Shah, and annexed Berar to his own dominions of Ahmednagar Sultanate[33].

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CHAPTER – III

The Principles of the External Policy of Deccan Sultanates

A. Formulation of the External Policy:

Bijapur was a theocratic, multi-racial, and dynastic State. It was predominantly an Afaquis State. Besides the ruling Perso-Turkish elements, Bijapur's nobility included several races of Central Asia, and Arabs, Habashis, Hindustanis, Deccanis etc. Thus leading to factionalism at the Court. The Afaquis constituted the upper strata of the nobility and dominated the administration, both at the Central and Provincial levels[1].

The 'Adil Shahis were Shi'ahs intermittently and there were periods when Sunnism prevailed as the State religion in Bijapur. Out of the nine rulers of the 'Adil Shahi dynasty five were Shi'ah while the others were Sunnis. The Shi'ah rulers looked to the Shah of Iran for allegiance, spiritual leadership, etc.

The territories of which the Bijapur Kingdom was composed were collected in a rather haphazard way-by inheritance from the Bahmanis, by indiscriminate conquests in various directions and by barter etc. Consequently, the inhabitants of the Kingdom lacked the unifying bond of a common nation-hood. The only cohesive force which built and maintained the State was the dynastic loyalty, but that too was blind and was based on power. It was the military power only that could maintain the integrity of the State[2]. The Afaquis, in their own personal interest, were of course loyal to the ruler, with a few

exceptions, and contributed much to the making of the external policy and continuance of the dynasty.

Bijapur was a feudal State. It was built on the system of contractual relations. The Sultan offered land and protection, which the nobility reciprocated by allegiance and service both, military and civil. It was subjected to the inherent danger of the delegated authority of losing actual control over the powerful vassals down in the feudal nexus.

Thus the various structural factors which contributed to the making of the Bijapur State the formulation of the external or foreign policy of its rulers and these constantly impinged on the external affairs, either directly or indirectly[3].

Organization for the External Affairs:

The Sultan was the supreme power as a sovereign head of the State. He was the ruler, judge, administrator, military general, sometimes even a preacher and leader of public worship. The personal character of the Sultan, the environment in which he was educated and brought up, his predilections, whims and fancies etc., had a profound sovereignty devolved upon the minister. Though theoretically the Sultan's authority was unlimited, in practice he took advice of his ministers on all matters particularly in the case of external affairs. The chief duty of these ministers was of course, implicit obedience to the Sultan's wishes, whose decision was final[4].

Next to the Sultan the highest officer of the kingdom was Vakilu's-Saltanat or simply Vakil. He was also known, as wazir. During the sixteenth century the wazir was in charge of practically the entire administration of the kingdom. Sometimes he acted as a regent for the infant Sultan and thus controlled all the affairs of the State both internal and external. Even during the times of powerful Sultans the advice of the wazir in external affairs carried weight. The wazir could declare war or make peace at his discretion. Once during the reign of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I, the wazir was entrusted with the royal seal by the Sultan, so that he could issue orders on any measure he deemed fit in the best interest of the State. As the wazir's duties embraced all duties, acting as the head of civil and military administration, conquering new territories, realizing tributes from the vassals and subdued states, and maintain diplomatic relations with other states. In the discharge of all these duties the wazir was assisted by several other officers of the central government at the capital and the provisional governors[5].

In important matters of external affairs the Sultan consulted the Maijis-i Kingdom which consisted of high officials of the court, military officials, and jagirdars. It was purely an advisory body. Though the Sultan was not bound to accept its advice, he often agreed to act upon it. On several conspicuous occasions the Sultans implemented the policy of the Majlis in regard to the external affairs[6].

BASIC DETERMINANTS IN POLICY FORMULATION:

As the external policy of Bijapur was continually changing with the interaction of internal and external forces, its rulers could never formulate and adopt a definite policy[7]. Thus the policies were not consistent-they just grew. They were the result of the interplay of several factors which affected the formulation of the policy in different ways in different circumstances. But to a certain extent they grew out of the past policies-based on that inherited from the Bahmani Kingdom, heavily circumscribed by the logic of the events and depending on the following basic determinants:

- Political Interests and Objectives
- Physical Geography
- Economic Geography
- Demography
- Belligerent Power
- Ideology
- The Environment
- Domestic Affairs
- Political Interests and Objectives

In the beginning the fundamental policy objective of the 'Adil Shahi rulers was to preserve the territorial integrity of the Bahmani province of Bijapur and by autonomous rule to consolidate their hold over it to gradually carve it out into an independent kingdom[8]. To achieve this goal the first four 'Adil Shahi rulers maintained nominal allegiance and owed sovereignty to the

Bahmani rulers. After the extinction of the Bahmani rule in 1536, the fourth 'Adil Shahi ruler, Ibrahim assumed full independence and royal title. Thence forward the main objective in the formulation of Bijapur's external policy was to maintain its political independence and territorial integrity, which were essential for its existence. To this goal Bijapur had to adopt different policies towards different states[9].

The interests and objectives of all the Deccan Kingdoms were almost identical with those perceived by Bijapur ; and their policies had four common denominations-State's security, safe guarding or augmenting of State's power in relation to its neighbors, economic advancement and the State's prestige. Bijapur, while pursuing the basic objectives, tried to achieve the hegemony of the Deccan. This clashed with the interests of the other powerful neighbours and each, in order to assert its influence, adopted incompatible means. Thus, throughout its history, which is a record of continuous strife, Bijapur was variedly aligned with her neighbours according to the circumstances and exigencies of time[10]. None of her alliances and counter-alliances were consistent nor permanent. Evidently a consistent policy was not the aim but, security and integrity of the State were the sole motives, irrespective of any breach of previous commitment. It may by noted that community of religion among the Deccan Sultans could not also hold them together permanently. The formulation of the external policy, adaptation of diplomatic techniques, alliances and counter-alliances knew no bounds when the security of the State was at stake.

Physical Geography:

The external policy of Bijapur was inherent in its physical geography. The facts of physical features influenced the behavior of the Bijapur is which in its turn dictated the attitude to be adopted towards their neighbours. Topography had a vital bearing on the State's security, economic well-being and the belligerent power. The strategic location of Bijapur, its wide rivers, high mountains and sea played a major role in the settlement of frontiers. It was due to Bijapur's access to the sea that forced many Western countries to establish political and diplomatic relations with her. Consequently Bijapur emerged as a dominant power in the Deccan[11].

The possession of the Raichur doab, a fertile tract rich in mineral resources, was the cause of recurring hostilities which her neighbours to possess and laid claim over its ownership. The territory of Sholapur, Naldrug and its surroundings were the both of contention between Bijapur and Ahmednagar.

The desire to maintain natural frontiers as the barrier with her neighbours involved Bijapur into hostilities subverting the status quo. Sometimes Bijapur adopted a forward policy seeking a simple and limited revision of her map or for expansion into a power vacuum and for hegemony of the Deccan[12].

Lack of natural frontiers facilitated Bijapur to conquer her weak neighbours Geography contributed both, as an advantage and disadvantage to Bijapur's belligerent power and in shaping her policies.

Economic Geography:

The dimension and fertility of arable land, natural resources of energy and raw materials played a dominant role in shaping the formulation of Bijapur's external policy. Though Bijapur declared wars frequently, they sued for peace and sought conclusion of war mostly on economic grounds.

The economic factor, with numerous elements having multi-directional effects, greatly contributed to the over-all belligerent power of Bijapur, which dictated the terms in war and peace. Trade and commerce, the economic nexus, brought Bijapur more closely to some of the Western countries and made necessary diplomatic relations with them. It was the maritime trade which compelled Bijapur to conciliate and grant political concessions to some of the Western countries which were powerful at sea[13].

Demography:

The size and nature of the population of Bijapur influenced greatly the external policy. Bijapur's population was heterogeneous. Besides the natives of soil, the demography consisted of innumerable foreign immigrants from various parts of Central and South-central Asia, including Afghanistan. The foreign immigrants formed the Afaquis party at the Court, which played a major role in shaping the destiny of the 'Adil Shahi dynasty. The Afaquis were greatly patronized by almost all the 'Adil Shahi rulers and were invited to settle down in Bijapur[14]. Although the immigrants were foreign in the beginning but after coming to Bijapur they made it their home and settled there permanently.

Bijapur's army was drawn mostly from the so-called foreign immigrants. And during the middle of the 17th century the Afghans formed more than half of the Bijapur's army. Thus racial element was the dominating factor in shaping the external policy.

Belligerent power:

Bijapur's belligerent power depended mainly on the military strength, impregnable forts, arms, foreign horses available and physical, economic and human geography. Any action or policy of Bijapur was dictated by the strength of arms. War was considered as a function of policy. Diplomacy and arms went together[15].

The military weakness of Bijapur was considered an invitation to invasion. Consequently, large and strong army formed part of the policy. Diplomacy was clearly related to military strategy, which is evident from the scores of alliances and counter-alliances, both offensive and defensive, which Bijapur formed. But, too large an army for the defenses of the Kingdom was often a temptation for adopting a forward policy. It was Bijapur's strong belligerent power which tempted it to acquire the hegemony of the Deccan. It also enabled Bijapur to expand her dominions from Arabian Sea to Bay of Bengal during the 17th century[16].

Ideology:

In medieval times it was the religious ideology that prevailed in shaping the external policy, though at did not exert its influence. The 'Adil Shahi Kingdom being Islamic in character (though tolerant towards other religions), the two ideologies, Sunni and the Shi'ah, partly shaped the external policy of Bijapur. The 'Adil Shahis intermittently adopted Sunni and Shai'ah doctrines, which altered the social relations, modified the State's attitude towards other States and changed the character of the kingdom. Policy determination had to cope with the problem of ideological disputes, which made the implementation of policies difficult and sometimes impossible. On occasions Bijapur had to change the ideology due to its impact on the external relations with other States, which took up arms against Bijapur. On the one hand ideology was advantageous for Bijapur, as it enabled her to maintain closer contact with a powerful Islamic country, while on the other it prevented her alignment with other powerful States[17].

The Environment:

There existed traditional suspicion and antipathy among the Deccan Kingdom. In spite of friendly and family relations (by marriages) not only the 'Adil Shahi rulers, but their counterparts in Deccan, considered their contiguous neighburs as their enemies and neighbours of their enemies as their friends[18]. Thus, always prejudiced, the Deccan rulers maintained an intelligence service to keep themselves well informed of the happenings in the

neighbouring States. The rulers maintained personal correspondences. Their ambassadors also reported to their rulers.

Domestic Affairs:

Though the internal and external policies of Bijapur were separate, yet they were interdependent. Repercussion of one over the other was inevitable on almost all occasions. Internal prosperity, tranquility and stability contributed much to adopt a strong and a consistent external policy.

The character of the Bijapur Kingdom required the raising of feudal armies. Every official of the State was required to maintain certain number of soldiers and horses according to his rank. The deployment of feudal armies during war had its repercussion on the external policy[19].

Factionalism at the Bijapur Court had a profound impact with far-reaching consequences on its external policies. Any change in ruling faction correspondingly changed the course of external policies. The powerful faction- Afaqis, Habashis and Dakhnis were obviously of divergent views and when in power each tried to subvert the policies of the other. Each party tried to disapprove the action of the other. To whom one party considered the State's enemy, the other tried to extrend its friendly hand. With a change in the ruling faction, the new party tried to subvert all the previous commitments to other States by their predecessors[20].

Sometimes the internal party quarrels at Bijapur were resolved amicably by the mediation of other States.

The inextricable mixing of internal and external affairs was patent among the Deccan Kingdoms, which were allied to each other by their ethnic origin of being succession states of the Bahmani Kingdom, and due to their close geographical proximity, with their common political interests and motivations[21].

B. The Structure of the Diplomatic Practices:

The Instruments of the External Policy:

The diplomatic practices followed by 'Adil Shahs of Bijapur were an admixture of Persian, Arab, Mughal and Ottoman techniques. Broadly the instruments by which the 'Adil Shahs of Bijapur implemented their external policy and which gave shape and direction to it were:

- Diplomacy;
- Conquests and Condominiums;
- Economic Actions;
- Armed Forces; and
- Matrimonial Alliances

Diplomacy:

Following the traditions of their predecessors-the Bahmani Sultans, the structure of the diplomatic practices of the 'Adil Shahs of Bijapur was based upon acceptance of the fact of the right of existence of a number of independent territorial kingdoms of the Deccan[22], free from external control

and able to pursue their own interests by bargaining and fighting with one another. The Deccan politics were a competitive struggle for power, each ruler waged a war on the other creating an uneasy equilibrium in which the weak combined against the strong in order to maintain the balance of power in which no one kingdom could become so powerful as to threaten the independence of the others. Thus, maintenance of diplomatic relations first among the Deccan Kingdoms and then other with other Indian States and foreign countries became a necessity[23].

The traditional diplomacy adopted by the 'Adil Shahi rulers were of the following forms;

- Diplomatic Communications;
- Diplomatic Sanctions;
- Treaties, Contracts and Agreements;
- Persuasion, Compromise and Diplomatic Pressures;
- Duplicity and Coercion; Espionage;

Use of threat of force in the background of negotiations, and Good offices and Mediation;

Diplomatic Communications:

Diplomatic correspondence was not only made by 'Adil Shahi rulers with their counterparts in other States but were also made by their ministers and nobles[24]. The correspondence which the 'Adil Shahi rulers themselves entered into were of five categories: Communications addressed to other

Sultans of the Deccan were on equal terms; those addressed to the Shah of Iran were on the terms of a subordinate official writing to a Sovereign; those addressed to the Mughal Emperors were on the terms of a provincial governor writing to an Emperor, they were in the form of ‘Arzi or Arzdasht; those addressed to petty Rajas, Nayaks as a sovereign writing to vassals; and to the European officials in the Deccan, a royal Farman was sent[25].

The ‘Adil Shahi diplomatic correspondence was sent through envoys, the special envoy personally presented the communiqué at the Court of the receiving State in the absence of a resident Bijapuri envoy. But in the presence of the latter, the carrier-envoy passed on the letter, with the presents etc., to the resident envoy, which in turn used to present it in the Court. Secret matters were not mentioned in the letter, but in it was mentioned that the special envoy will also communicate verbally some important matter for consideration and negotiations. The envoys were authorized to make verbal negotiations and settle problems, disputes, alliances and counter-alliances. Verbal negotiations were very common during post-war period for the settlement of a peace treaty. Moreover, due to lack of fast communications, the Bijapuri envoys were given absolute power to negotiate treaties etc. The verbal negotiations often created external policy[26].

Negotiations were at various official levels and also at summit meetings between the Sultans. The Sultans, almost at the end of every war, met at a summit conference and resolved their conflicts and disputes.

Diplomatic Sanctions:

The diplomatic sanctions which Bijapur practiced were in the nature of recognition and non-recognition of any political change in other States. The types of recognitions were de jure and de facto. The diplomatic sanctions were either formal document or an oral declaration. The de jure recognition was that whenever any change in the Government or the ruler occurred in the other State the ‘Adil Shahi rulers made a formal recognition by a diplomatic action. This they did by deputing a special envoy or a plenipotentiary with formal letter of recognition, compliments, praise and best wishes for the future. While the de facto recognition was the acceptance of the new political or ideological change as an inevitable, with or without an official statement of recognition[27].

Treaties, Contracts and Agreements:

The treaties which Bijapur made with other States were of four types- Oral and Written Treaties, Contracts and Agreements. They were motivated by military alliance, peace, or commerso-economic purpose.

According to the custom and practice of the medieval times Bijapur made oral and secret treaties with other States. Wars were concluded and peace was made on the basis of the verbal agreements among the Deccan Sultans or their officials. Territory was sometimes ceded or acquired on the basis of verbal treaties. Likewise, peace was broken and wars sometimes declared on the breach of the verbal treaties. These were both political and military in nature. The verbal treaties were both bilateral and multi-lateral[28].

The written treaties of Bijapur which have came down to us are only those with the Mughals and the Europeans. The treaties with the Mughals were unilateral and political in nature. While those made with the Europeans were bilateral, less political and more economic in nature. The Bijapur-Portuguese treaties were termed as “Contracts’’ (“Contrados”). Protocols preceded before the signing of treaties and were later on ratified[29].

The treaties with the Portuguese were drafted and signed at Goa. The practices followed was that, for this purpose, a plenipotentiary envoy was deputed from Bijapur to Goa who negotiated and settled the terms of the treaty on his own authority and discretion and under his seal. The draft treaty was later sent to Bijapur for ratification and on its return a special ratification ceremony was held at Goa, then the treaty came in force.

Persuasion, Compromise and Diplomatic Pressure:

The basic technique of Bijapur’s diplomacy was an endeavor to persuade rulers or representatives of other States through inducements and appeals to reason friendly or matrimonial attachment, magnanimity, self interest, pride or even fear. This the Bijapur’s did through manipulation against their enemies. They tried to instill in the minds of others the thoughts that evoked favorable response. It was the technique of persuation and mutual compromise that enabled the Deccan Sultans to form and break frequent alliances and counter-alliances[30]. Formal approaches by the Sultan, his minister and nobles were often supplemented by informal conversation with receptions,

dinners, parties etc., in order to achieve the goal for which the Government spent lavishly. When the ordinary forms of persuation alone were not sufficient to achieve the desired ends, Bijapur brought in to play inducements and diplomatic pressures in various forms through direct and indirect means.

Duplicity and Coercion

Deceit and duplicity were traditional characteristics of medieval Deccan polities; and Bijapur was not an exception. These were in fact the recognized and accepted techniques of the diplomacy of medieval times. Bluff involving coercion was not uncommon in Bijapur's diplomacy. Ultimatums and threat to attack were the part of double dealings by Bijapur and other Deccan Kingdoms. Each tried to play or out moot the other. At times, though there were no aggressive designs yet, show of military strength was a part of duplicity[31].

Espionage:

Espionage was one of the common practice of diplomacy among medieval Deccan kingdoms. Every State, of which Bijapur was not an exception, appointed special staff for spying on other Deccan kingdoms. This helped the State in knowing the activities of the enemies not only during war times but also during peace times. Espionage was more active during the war times and was also employed to find out terms of war and peace. Due to lack of fact moving transport and communications[32], the armies took months or quite a considerable time to start an expedition, and as such espionage was very

effective in bringing news of the impending danger and thus facilitated advance preparation to meet the challenge.

Use of threat of force in the Background of Negotiations:

Show of military power was a part of diplomacy. The use of force short of war was invoked by Bijapur on many occasions, as an accompaniment to diplomacy when other techniques failed to provide the desired protection and satisfaction. Show of large Bijapur forces was used to compel the enemies from any aggressive designs, or to settle a treaty on favourable terms or to hold in check a powerful neighbor from casting envious eyes on a weaker ally of Bijapur or in exacting tribute from the South Indian feudatories. Force was the main factor in shaping Bijapur‘s external relations[33].

Good offices and Mediation:

Very often Bijapur offered its good offices to help and resolve the disputes among the Deccan Kingdoms. It succeeded on several occasions in finding a basis for an amicable settlement between her neighbours. The key to the success of Bijapur as a mediator in the Deccan polities was partly due to its astuteness in closing the gaps between the positions of the parties and in suggesting acceptable grounds of accommodation. But very often while mediating Bijapur diplomatically safeguarded its own interest and tried to accrue benefits from the settlements. It was Bijapur's key location which gave it a dominant position to play a role of mediator[34].

Conquests and Condominiums:

Territorial acquisitions were one of the main and most active instruments by which Bijapur implemented its external policies.

During medieval times the term "conquest" had double meaning-the territories which were conquered and directly absorbed within kingdom and governed by the Bijapur officials were called "conquests"; while the territories of petty Rajas, Nayaks etc., which were subdued and compelled to acknowledge overlord ship of 'Adil Shahi monarchy but their territories were left to them to govern on payment of annual tribute were also called "conquest". Territories so acquired by both the mode of conquests were included as part of the Bijapur kingdom[35].

It was by the second mode of conquests that Bijapur was able to extend its dominions rapidly from Arabian sea to Bay of Bengal in the 17th century.

Payment of annual tribute by feudatories to Bijapur was compulsory. Failing to pay tribute was an invitation to military action by Bijapur to re-impose their authority.

The policy of condominiums for acquiring south Indian territories of the former Vijayanagar kingdom proved to be most successful. More so because of the inability of 'Adil Shahi Sultans to directly govern the far flung provinces of the kingdom. So they were satisfied with annual tribute in cash and kind and left the newly acquired territory on acknowledgement of Bijapur's sovereignty. Such condominiums, owed sovereignty to both 'Adil Shah and the local chief or the Nayak[36].

Economic Actions:

The policy objectives of Bijapur, lying behind the use of economic actions as an instrument of external relations, were not always economic, but the means were sometime economic. Some of the goals of Bijapur's external policies were directed towards securing requirements though the expansion of trade. It was the economic need that dictated and shaped the external policy of Bijapur in relation to the Portuguese in particular and other Europeans in general. Thus Bijapur's relationship with the Europeans (for its maritime trade) was economic[37]. The instruments for the policies of Bijapur pertaining to the external trade were: agreements, tariffs, quantitative controls and directed trade etc.

Armed Forces:

Bijapur adopted recourse to military force as the final arbitrator in conflicts. Military power formed an integral part of the backdrops of Bijapur's external affairs. The external policy and supporting programmes of Bijapur were materially concerned with the military instrument of policy. The entire strategy of Bijapur's external policies rested on its military power. It alone dictated the terms in war and peace. Particularly in relation to Deccan polities, the military instrument was used by Bijapur for two general purposes namely, to influence the external environment and to enhance its internal stability[38]. Thus, Bijapur used its forces as a backdrop to strengthen diplomacy, as an instrument for a show of force, and for active military operations. Bijapur's

military strategy was inseparable from other types of instrument of policy-diplomatic, economic and psychological.

Matrimonial Alliances:

Matrimonial alliances among the Deccan Sultans and with the Mughals were one of the strongest instruments of diplomacy adopted by Bijapur. Though at times they proved very useful and had the desired effect yet sometimes the Deccan Sultans disregarded the matrimonial alliances and made wars on each other. Occasionally, to save a certain crisis and political situation, Bijapur entered into matrimonial alliances. By this system the ‘Adil Shahi rulers established dynastic relationship with the Bahmanis, the Mughals and with almost all the five contemporary Deccan Sultanates[39].

Diplomatic usage:

During the period of the evolution of the Bijapur kingdom (1489-1536) and after its full independence the ‘Adil Shah is exercised their right of legation (droit de legation) and exchanged envoys with other States.

Following the traditions of the Persian diplomacy the diplomatic agents of Bijapur were called IIchi, Safir, Vakil, Rasulan, Hajib etc., all meaning an ambassador. Their functions were called as Ilchigiri, Sifarat, Vakalat, Hujjabat etc.

The Bijapuri envoys to other Courts were in the nature of permanent, resident, visiting, ordinary, and extraordinary according to the purpose[40]. On

several occasions, time factor or the duration of the stay of Bijapur envoys at other Court was not the criterion. Moreover, the leave for the envoy depended not on him or the ruler whom he was representing but on the ruler of the Court he was attending. The ‘Adil Shah is detained ambassadors to their Court for years. The number of envoys was not restricted. Envoys were sent in rapid succession. Even before the return of one envoy sent earlier on a particular mission, another envoy, with a different mission was dispatched[41].

Besides the special envoys, ‘Adil Shah is sent visiting ambassadors annually on the day of Naurouz to the Mughal Court and or to the Court of the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan with offerings (Peshkash) and gifts. It was a regular feature for ‘Adil Shahis to send diplomatic envoys, with rich presents to the Mughal Court.

The Bijapur envoys or ambassadors enjoyed complete representative character. As they were the only means through whom the ‘Adil Shahis could communicate with rulers. They were authorized by ‘Adil Shah to negotiate peace treaties and ratify treaties.

There were five kinds of missions on which ‘Adil Shahis deputed their envoys:

Ordinary Missions-The usual permanent missions were rare in the medieval times. Sometimes Bijapur had permanent missions at the Courts of other States[42].

Regular Missions-The vakil sent annually to the Mughal Court on the Naurouz day with the peshkash gifts etc.

Special Missions-When the envoys were deputed to condole the death of a monarch and to congratulate the new soverign on his accession. This practice was very common among the Deccan Sultans.

Political Missions-They were to negotiate peace or war, signing of a treaty, ratification of a treaty, for the formation of an alliance and counter-alliance a very common feature among the Deccan Sultans.

Secret Missions-These were usually politico-diplomatic in nature. They were sent to from either an alliance or counter-alliance[43].

The ‘Adil Shahi envoys to the Courts of other States always carried a letter of credence. The letter not only introduced the envoy but also gave full details of the purpose of the mission. Sometimes it carried authorization empowering the envoy to negotiate any matter relating to an alliance, treaty etc., on behalf of Bijapur government. These letters of credence were peculiar in nature. They were valid only for the particular envoy and the mission for which it was meant. In some cases, the letter of credence gave full power (Plein Pouroir) to negotiate a treaty or ratification of the previous treaty. It also authorized the envoy to make some secret verbal communication on behalf of the ruler and carry back a verbal reply[44].

Diplomatic passport to the diplomatic agent of other states was issued by ‘Adil Shah in the form of a farman. Without this, the envoy could not proceed further into the Bijapur territory from the point of entry. The ‘Adil Shahi farman also provided instructions to the Bijapuri officials for the safe conduct of the ambassador during his journey to the Court and back.

The arrival of embassies, specially from foreign countries, was a matter of great importance to the ‘Adil Shahi Sultans. For it signified the recognition of their position and status. Further, embassies were anticipated and welcomed by the ‘Adil Shahi sultans on their accession, as it meant recognition of their succession.

Ambassadors were warmly welcomed and were received cordially with usual honours. They were accorded reception at several points on their journey to the Court. A special officer was appointed by the ‘Adil Shah to go ahead to meet the ambassador and conduct him to the Capital. An ‘Adil Shahi Farman was issued to the officials of the provinces through which the ambassador was to pass, for his reception. In certain cases nobles were sent forward from the Court to receive the ambassador. In the case of a special ambassador (who was certainly an ordinary man) ‘Adil Shah himself went a few miles outside the city of Bijapur to receive him[45].

In spite of showing such an honour, the ‘Adil Shahis rarely granted audience to any ambassador immediately on his arrival at Bijapur. A date was fixed, according to the will of ‘Adil Shah, for the audience of the ambassador.

For the ambassador a good house was chosen in Bijapur for his lodging. Sometimes he was allowed to stay with lending Court official. The ambassador, during his stay in Bijapur, was treated as a royal guest ; and a large part, sometimes entire expenses of the ambassador were defrayed by the ‘Adil Shah[46].

The Hajib or Lord Chamberlain of Bijapur was the link between the 'Adil Shah and the outside world. It was his duty to introduce ambassadors and other persons to the Sultan.

Every ambassador was required to offer salutation to the Sultan. After the salutation and a brief conversation between the envoy and the Sultan, the next thing was the delivery of the credential letter or a royal letter or a Farman (in the case of the Mughals). The normal custom at the 'Adil Shahi Court was for the ambassador to hand over the letter to one of the nobles in attendance, who would then place it in the Sultan's hands. An exception was made in the case of the Persian and Mughal ambassadors from whom the Sultan condescend to accept the royal letter directly[47]. The letter was usually read by some official of the Court in the presence of all. Secret communiqué was read privately by the Sultan. After the reading of the letter the audience generally ended in the Sultan giving a robe of honour and a reward in cash and kind to the ambassador which the latter received with ceremonial salutations.

An ambassador to Bijapur was expected to return to his State as soon as the purpose of the mission was over. The letter of credence almost invariably included a request for the ambassador's early dismissal. The period of stay for the permanent or resident ambassador was not limited. The Sultanates were usually represented at Bijapur by resident ambassadors. Bijapur reciprocated this gesture by appointing permanent ambassador at the Courts of the Deccan rulers and at the Portuguese possession of Goa[48].

The ‘Adil Shahi Sultans were fond of conferring rich rewards lavishly on ambassadors of other States. This was the routine practice with a view to enhance their reputation and to please the ambassadors in order that they carried good opinion to their monarchs[49].

On arrival of ambassadors at Bijapur, their return was not at their discretion nor on that of the Court they represented but depended on the ‘Adil Shah. Date for the dismissal of the ambassador was subject to the approval ‘Adil Shah. On the appointed date the ambassador had to present himself before ‘Adil Shah or the Regent as the case may be and on that day the Sultan honoured the ambassador with special robes, presents for him and for his ruler, and sent any communication written or verbal, through him.

Besides the political missions, ‘Adil Shahis not only received but also reciprocated semi-diplomatic missions. They were in the nature of individuals or religious, travelers and traders[50].

During the times of strained relations due to hostilities or in anticipation of declaration of hostilities the Bijapur ambassadors were recalled from the Courts they were stationed. Sometimes during the hostilities, the ambassador of the hostile state resided at Bijapur and had audience with ‘Adil Shah in order to settle the conflict. Usually during the times of strained relations ‘Adil Shah treated the ambassadors of the hostile State with contempt and insult. However, ‘Adil Shahis never tried to ill-treat the Mughal ambassadors even during the times of hostilities.

General Principles

The formulation and implementation of Bijapur's external policies was the result of a wide variety of facts, attitudes, circumstances and were subject to traditions, geo-political and ideological interpretations, domestic milieu etc., and whims and fancies of the person or faction at the helm of affairs at the Court. The mechanizes of all these factors were both advantageous as well as handicaps for the policy formulation and implementation, thus necessitating deviation from maintaining any consistency and adhering to any fixed principles of the external relations[51]. As will be evident from the following chapters that Bijapur's external policy was inextricably tied with domestic issues and ideological trends. External affairs were not only political relations but were socio-economic, religious, ideological, and psychological as well. The external affairs were not only related to the domestic milieu of the kingdom that created external affairs, but were also influenced by the external currents and pressures from outside the kingdom.

As will be evident, Bijapur never evaluated and developed any basic policies deliberately. The basic policy of 'Adil Shahi rulers were territorial aggrandizement and monetary gains. Throughout, Bijapur's decisions of policy were quick, tactical and without permanence. All fast-moving inter-stately events of the Deccan polities were matted swiftly and were settled swiftly to give a new shape to its new policies, motivated by fresh interests etc. Thus, consistency in any action is not found, there were no rigid principles of Bijapur's external policies[52].

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CHAPTER – IV

Relations with the Islamic World

Relations with Iran:

From the eight century onwards wave after wave of immigrants from ‘Ajam (Persia and Central Asia) poured into India either as peaceful traders or proud conquerors. These immigrants slowly migrated to the Deccan parts of which later constituted the Bijapur Kingdom. Further, during the thirteenth and four. tenth centuries, the political situation in Persia deteriorated due to the Mongol devastation. Consequently, thousands of peace-loving Persians fled to west coast of India and settled there or migrated to other parts. Again emigration took place due to the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad by Muhammad bin Tughluq bringing in the nobility and the gentry consisting of Persians and Central Asian nationals to the Deccan[1].

Thus by the time the ‘Adil Shahi dynasty was founded the demographic structure of the Bijapur consisted of “Iranian race”, which included not only Persians but also Afghans and others. The “Iranian Plateau” which extends over Persia, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and eastern portion of the Asia Minor etc., is the domain of the “Iranian race”. The ‘Adil Shahi nobility and the upper strata of the population, besides Turks, were Persians and Indo-Afghans, who were ethnologically Aryans, and constituted the bulk of the Bijapur army[2]. In 1529 Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah formed an army of ten thousand cavalry consisting of

Persians, Arabs, Turks, Uzbegs, Kurds etc. The Kurds and Armenians too belong to the Iranian race and by 1660. The Afghans formed more than one-half of the army of Bijapur.

Though the demographic structure of Bijapur consisted of various types of Iranian race, of one single ethnological family differing slightly in their cranial morphology[3].

Further, the afaqi emigrants who had settled permanently in Bijapur, and Indians that is, Perso-Aryans and Indo-Aryans emerged from a common racial stock and migrated from a common homeland, sharing, common linguistic racial past and at one time they coexisted. Thus, the Iranians and Indians are like two brothers, who, according to a Persian legend, had got separated from each other, one going to the east and the other to the west. This racial affinity between the Persians and the people of Bijapur persisted even centuries after migration and which was strengthen, time and again, by the periodical influx of immigrants from Persia and Central Asia.

Cultural Affinity

Bijapur culture in particular and Indian culture in general was the result of a long fusion of ethnic unity. The idea of races in its formation has been varied, extensive and deep. Its innumerable incidents were drawn from different sources[4].

Iran and India being adjacent countries, have both been from the remote past a common ground of cultural activities of different branches of the Aryans;

and they had maintained a fairly regular interchange of cultural values, which moulded their mutual lives in social, intellectual and religious spheres. Thus, close cultural relationship between Iran and Bijapur existed through the ties of common blood of afaqis, religious beliefs, ritual observances, customs and manners. And culture being complementary to trade, commercial relations between Bijapur and Iran provided opportunities for mutual understanding, appreciation, interested influence. The indigenous ideas and attitudes, mixed with Persian thought and traditions formed the composite culture of medieval India in general and Bijapur in particular[5].

With the introduction of Shi'ah religion almost simultaneously in Iran and Bijapur the rulers of the latter looked to those of the former as a source of inspiration. The Shi'ah practices at Bijapur naturally made it a replica of Persian culture. Shi'ism gave a new set of ideas and social pattern. The Perso-Bijapur collaboration in political and religious affairs had its repercussions not only on cultural and intellectual activities of the 'Adil Shahi Sultans, but its impact penetrated deep into various aspects of life and society at Bijapur.

Commercial Factors

Several factors contributed to the deep interest shown by the Bijapur traders in the Persian market. The easy accessibility of Persia by sea route from the Bijapur ports was one of the factors[6].

Bijapur could get foreign horses only from Arabia, Iraq and Persia. Owing to irregular and uncertain supply from Arabia and Iraq, Bijapur had to depend on Persia for a regular supply of horses. It was an item of primary

military importance for an efficient cavalry, with our which Bijapur could not maintain its army. This necessity encouraged Bijapur rulers to sustain and maintain economic ties with Persia in a determined manner. And due to Perso-Mughal conflict over Qandhar, the "ruler of Persia was happy to allow the export of horses (to Bijapur) which could be used in war against his foe[6]." The horse trade between Iran and Bijapur was carried on by the private Arab, Persian and Bijapur merchants. Moreover, in order to maintain their alien culture, the afaqi nobility, including the Persians required Persian articles of various descriptions for their daily life. This necessitated regular naval trade between the two States, more so because Persia too needed various Indian articles, which were exported from the Bijapur ports. The chief port of Bijapur, Dabul, was great commercial mart which had large trade with the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Red-sea.

Political Relations:

The Safawis:

At the time of the founding of the Bijapur Kingdom in 1489 and up to 1501 Persia presented a chequered political scene. It was parceled out into numerous Persian States, ruled by different rulers. During this period (1489-1501) there seem to be neither any political nor diplomatic relations between Bijapur and the Persian States. However there existed cultural and commercial relations and there was a continuous flow of Persian migrants to Bijapur, who were patronized by Yusuf 'Adil Shah[7].

Political and diplomatic relations between Iran and Bijapur were established after the accession of Shah Isma'il Safawi to the throne of Adharbaijan in 1501. Then within a decade Shah Isma'il conquered and consolidated all the Persian States into one united State, ruled by a single Safawi monarch[8].

The Vital Link–Shi'ah Ideology:

Before coming to India, Yusuf 'Adil Shah, during his wanderings in Persia, about 854/1450-1 was taken to Ardabil by Khwaja 'imaduddin. At Ardabil Yusuf was enrolled as disciple of the venerable Shaikh Safiuddin, ancestor of Shah Isma'il of Iran and from whom the Safawi dynasty took its name. Thus, both Yusuf 'Adil Shah and Shah Isma'il were disciples of the same house and had strong leanings towards Shi'ism, which became the basis for their political relations and formed the vital link between the two States.

Shah Isma'il, immediately after his accession to the throne of Adharbaijan, introduced Shi'ism in Iran and got the K'hutbah read in the name of the Twelve Imams.

Yusuf 'Adil Shah being unaware of the happenings in Iran, called an assembly of his nobles in 908/1502 and proposed his long cherished desire to promulgate the faith of Imamiyah and have the Khutbah read in the Shi'ah fashion. However due to the unwillingness of his powerful Sunni nobles he deferred the idea temporarily[9].

When the news arrived from Persia about the introduction of Shi'ism by Shah Isma'il, Yusuf became elated and wished to follow in the foot-steps of the Safawi monarch. He took measures to accomplish his objective. In November 1502, Yusuf himself went to the mosque of the Ark-fort, along with several nobles, and got the text of the Adh'an modified with the addition of the words- " 'Ali Wali Allah", and then caused the Khutbah to be read in the name of the Twelve Imams in exactly the same fashion Shah Isma'il did at Iran. The dissatisfaction of powerful Sunni nobles and diplomatic pressure of the neighbouring rulers, compelled Yusuf to discontinue the innovation and restore the Sunni practices. As soon as both the internal and external pressures faded out, he re-imposed Shi'ah doctrine. This time he gave liberty to the public to practice whichever faith they wish, without any compulsion[10].

During the infancy of Isma'il 'Adil Shah, when Kamal Khan was regent, the latter belonging to the Sunni School gave an impetus to his own faith. In conformity with the old usage, he got in 1511, the Khutbah read in the name of the four Caliphs. Temporarily the vital link between Iran and Bijapur was broken.

Isma'il 'Adil Shah soon after assuming the reins of the government re-imposed the Shi'ah practices in 1514 and showed greater zeal for this creed than his father. The background of Isma'il 'Adil Shah's leanings towards the Shi'ah ideology was the impact of his foster-aunt Dilshad Agha, a Persian lady of Shi'ah faith and who was instrumental in bringing Isma'il 'Adil Shah to power[11].

In return for the small help which Isma'il 'Adil Shah rendered in getting release of Persian ambassador from Bidar, the Shah of Iran paid him glowing tribute in a letter of 1519. The Shah very much appreciated the religious leadership of Isma'il 'Adil Shah in sponsoring Shi'ism in Bijapur. Thus elated and encouraged Isma'il 'Adil Shah ordered the holding of the prayers for the longevity of Shah Isma'il Safawi, every Friday and 'Id days; and this practice was strictly followed during the entire reign of Isma'il 'Adil Shah, upto 1534.

Isma'il 'Adil Shah's efforts to popularize and maintain Shi'ism were relegated by Ibrahim 'Adil Shah on his accession in 1534. He suppressed the rituals of Imamiyah sect and deleted the names of the Imams from the Khutbah; he also restored officially the exercise of the Sunni practices[12].

The ideological bond was re-established by 'Alil 'Adi Shah I (1557-80). On the very day of his coronation, he reinstated the Shi'ism as the State-creed of Bijapur. He modified the Adh-'an according to the Shi'ah fashion; and while removing the names of the Caliphs from the Khutbah, he introduced those of the Imams. 'Ali did his best to propagate Shi'ism. He patronized at his Court master minds of Iran, Turan, Kirman and Khurasan. And about three hundred of these foreigners called Tabarraiya were appointed in the State services to abuse or vilify the Caliphs. The curses against the Caliphs were uttered in the Sultan's presence in the mosques and at the public audiences. The Shi'ah doctors were paid by the State for their missionary activities[13].

'Adil Shah I re-established Shi'ism firmly. "Iyyama-i-Ma'sumin", which in the words of Shah 'Abbas-I of Iran, was the vital link of Perso-

Bijapur relations. Shah Abbas-I says in a letter to ‘Adil Shah that the Safawi and ‘Adil Shahi dynasties were one family of “Tayyabin and Taherin”. The link was strengthened during the seventeenth century by Ali ‘Adil Shah II.

Theoretical Sovereignty of Safawids over Bijapur

Orthodox Sunni rulers generally regarded the ‘Abbasid Khalifah of Baghdad as the final authority and the legal sovereign of the entire Islamic world. As such, it was generally considered expedient to get legal sanctions of their rule from the Khalifah. They held the view that a king could hold the title of Sultan only with a covenant between him and the Khalifah. Likewise, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Shi’ah rulers of the Deccan looked to the Safawids of Persia for their link with Dar al-Islam. The Shi’ah rulers of Bijapur too sought recognition, patronage and guidance from the Safawids[14].

Having established Shi’ism at Bijapur, Yusuf ‘Adil Shah in 1509, sent Syed Ahmad Harwi to Iran with presents and “declaration of attachment to Shah Isma’il Safawi.” But the recognition of Adil Shah’s sovereignty came about a decade later, in 1519, when Shah Isma’il in a letter sent through the Iranian ambassador Amir Ibrahim Beg, addressed Isma’il ‘Adil Shah with royal titles: “Glory of the Kingdom, State and Majesty etc.”, as an independent ruler. Isma’il Adil Shah highly gratified at the flattering acknowledgment of his sovereignty said that “now his dynasty got a royal status.”

Isma’il ‘Adil Shah ordered the recitation of prayers for the Safawid dynasty in the Khutbah on Friday, ‘Id day etc. It implies that Isma’il ‘Adil Shah has acknowledged the Safawid monarch as the final authority and sovereign of

Bijapur. He may be said to have established a covenant like that of Khalifah. Further, Isma'il 'Adil Shah's going down twelve miles to receive the Iranian ambassador clearly indicates the acceptance of subordination, like a vassal or protectorate, of the Shah of Iran. Therefore, it may be inferred that 'Bijapur appeared as if it was an extension of the Persian Kingdom------."

The existence of the theoretical and spiritual sovereignty of the Safawids over the Shi'ah rulers of Bijapur is further confirmed from a letter of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II of 1612, addressed to Shah 'Abbas-I. in the letter, preserved in Makatib-i Zamana-i Salatin-i Safawiyah, 'Adil Shah writes that : it is "from the humblest slave Ibrahim to the exalted Emperor Shah 'Abbas --" and that "Deccan territories form as much as a part of Safawi Empire as the provinces of Iraq, Fars, Khurasan and Adharbaijan. Accordingly, the names of the Safawi monarchs have been recited in the (Friday) sermons and will continue to be recited in future. Our forefathers were appointed to rule over these territories and protect them by His Majesty's ancestors. So our function is to rule the countries on His Majesty's behalf and defend them against foreign aggression. And we would be as enthusiastic in performing our duties and rendering our service to His Majesty as other governors and officials." However, these considerations of 'Adil Shah were absolutely theoretical and nominal, consistent with the traditions of the medieval times[15].

The case of Bijapur is analogues to that of Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century. Theoretically the Delhi Sultanate was a part of Abbasid Caliphate, and as such an Arab traveler observed that a traveler could "pass

from the confines of China to the Pillars of Hercules, from the banks of Indus to Cicilian Gates, from the Oxus to the shores of Atlantic, without stepping outside the boundaries of the territory ruled over by the caliph of Baghdad". And in the fourteenth century Bahman Shah, the founder of the Bahmani dynasty, acknowledged the theoretical supremacy of the Abbasid Caliphate and on the coins he styled himself as "right hand of Caliphate."

Though the sovereignty of the Safawids was only theoretical and nominal, yet the 'Adil Shahs in practice did seek from them help, guidance and advice. Once in 1612, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II, while seeking the advice of Shah 'Abbas-I on the Bijapur-Mughal relations, sought the latter's permission in the following words "whether to send a Bijapur ambassador to the Mughal court or not-we would seek-clarification in this matter, from the court and may act as directed." This practice is corroborated from a letter of Shah 'Abbas-I to Sultan Muhammad Qutub Shah of Golconda (1611-26). In the letter, the Shah says that "Adil Shahi rulers al-ways reported and consulted in an affectionate way, in every matter, according to the royal courtesy[16]."

However, the Safawids never expressed themselves, the opinion, that they were the sovereign authority of Bijapur. On the contrary, the Safawids treated 'Adil Shahs as independent rulers, right from the times of Isma'il 'Adil Shah. In a letter of 1612, preserved in Jami'ul-Murasalat, Shah 'Abbas-I prefixes honourific titles with the name of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II, and he is addressed as an independent sovereign ruler. But still, in the letter there is a touch of his (Shah Abbas) superiority manifesting that he was the protector and

benefactor of ‘Adil Shah and Bijapur. This manifestation is corroborated by an independent authority Sir Thomas Roe, who wrote in 1616 that the “Persian King takes to heart the protection of the Kings of Deccan”.

A unique feature of the Safawid-Bijapur relationship was that Shah ‘Abbas-I, while holding the theoretical sovereignty of Bijapur, allowed the Mughal Emperor, Jahangir to exercise legal sovereignty there while advising Jahangir to make a peaceful settlement of Deccan affairs without conquering the Deccan kingdoms, Shah ‘Abbas-I, desired that Bijapur should be allowed to remain a tributary of the Mughals on payment of annual tribute. Thus, Bijapur formed a link between the Safawids and the Mughals, the two of the three great empires of Dar al-Islam of the seventeenth century. This contributed to the unity of the Dar al-Islam of the period in the midst of diversity[17].

Diplomatic Relations:

The initiative to establish diplomatic relations with Iran was taken by Bijapur. In 1509, Yusuf ‘Adil Shah for the first time sent his ambassador, Syed Ahmad Harawi with presents to the Court of Shah Isma’il-I. As a diplomatic sequel, in the following year the Shah sent an ambassador to ‘Adil Shah persuading him to join him in a general war against the Portuguese. The Persian ambassador, along with one from Ormuz (in Persian Gulf) on their arrival at Goa found that the place has been already conquered by the Portuguese. So they diplomatically pretended and adroitly changed the purpose

of their mission, and made overtures of friendship to Albuquerque. Later on, the Persian ambassador proceeded to Bijapur to meet ‘Adil Shah.

In the meanwhile, Harawi continued to reside, upto 1514 at the Court of Shah Isma’il. The Portuguese ambassador, Ferria, sent by Albuquerque from Goa, in 1514, found Harawi much offended at the better reception accorded to him. Thus, Harawi was a resident ambassador of Bijapur at Iran from 1509 to 1514 or even much later, because exact date of his return is unrecorded. But, it is quite certain that he returned to Bijapur by 1522, since in 1523 he was sent as an ambassador to Ahmednagar[18].

The Persian ambassador who had proceeded from Bijapur to Bidar was detained by Amir Barid. In this dilemma the ambassador approached Isma’il ‘Adil Shah through a letter, and sought his assistance for his release. Isma’il promptly came to the rescue ; and through his diplomatic manoeuvre, he obtained the requisite permission from the Bahmani Sultan for the release and safe return of the Persian ambassador. On his return journey the ambassador met Isma’il ‘Adil Shah at Allahpur, when the latter honoured the former with rich presents and provided suitable escort to accompany him to the port of Dabhol, from whence he embarked for Persia.

Shah Isma’il, in recognition of this meritorious service of ‘Adil Shah, sent a plenipotentiary in 1519, Ibrahim Beg to Bijapur, with a letter and valuable presents. On arrival at Bijapur, Ibrahim Beg was accorded a warm reception by ‘Adil Shah[19].

With the adoption of Sunni doctrine at Bijapur by Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I on his accession in 1534, there was seldom any diplomatic activity between Iran and Bijapur, upto the end Ibrahim l’s reign in 1557.

In spite of Sunni policies of Ibrahim I at Bijapur, Shah Tahmasp of Iran did not manifest any-Bijapur attitude. Thus in 1548, when Burhan Nizam Shah-I of Ahmednagar sought military help from Iran against Bijapur, Shah Tahmasp did not respond. This diplomacy of the Shah towards Bijapur, a Sunni State at that time, is significant, even though there existed community of faith between Iran and Ahmednagar. Probably for the good of the Shi’ah population in Bijapur the Shah of Iran did not like to take sides; moreover, practically it was not feasible to render any help[20].

With the accession of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I, in 1557 and reintroduction of Shi’ism at Bijapur diplomatic ties with Iran were resumed. It is not known when the first embassy from Bijapur was sent to Iran by ‘Ali I. But Iskandar Munshi’in ‘Alam Ara-I ‘Abbasi, records that the second embassy from ‘Ali I came to Shah Tahmasp in 984/1576. Thus the first embassy must have gone to Iran between 1557 and 1576; that is, after the accession of Ali I in 1557 and before the death of Shah Tahmasp in 1576.

Through his ambassador ‘Ali I communicated to the Shah that in his kingdom Khutbah of Twelve Imams is recited and that the name of Shah Tahmasp is also mentioned in the sermon[21].

Even though Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah-II, who ruled from 1580 to 1626, was a devout Sunni, yet he maintained cordial diplomatic relations with Iran. As a

tolerant ruler Ibrahim proved that Perso-Bijapur relations could be friendly on a more or less permanent basis, irrespective of the Shi'ah ideology[22].

Mir Khalilu'l-lah, a stipendiary preceptor and guide of Shah 'Abbas I, was a Persian immigrant at Bijapur, where he rose to eminence as calligraphist and became a close associate of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II. Later on Shah 'Abbas I sent for Khalilu'l-lah. Ibrahim readily sent off Khalil'l-lah as his plenipotentiary to the court of Shah 'Abbas in 1613. Iskandar Munshi mentions this embassy in the following terms : "as the rulers of the Deccan had great sincerity and friendship with the Safawi monarchs from very old times, some time prior to this date 'Adil Shah, the ruler of Bijapur sent Mir Khalilu'l-lah." The purpose of this embassy is wrongly attributed as 'Adil Shah being "alarmed at the growing friendship between the Shah, their natural ally, and Jahangir, their old enemy, and hearing of Khan 'Alam's reception in Persia and his influence over the Shah," immediately sent his ambassador. According to Futuhat-i 'Adil Shahi, it was when Shah 'Abbas-I sent for Khalilu'l-lah that Ibrahim 'Adil Shah-II took the opportunity to send him as his plenipotentiary and 'Adil Shah did not send him at his own initiative[23].

The outcome of Khalilu'l-lah's embassy was Shah 'Abbas-I's intercession in the Bijapur-Mughal affairs and 'Adil Shah's successful intrigue in the Perso-Mughal conflict over the Qandhar.

Role of Shah 'Abbas-I in the Bijapur-Mughal Conflict:

But for the diplomatic and moral pressure exercised by the Safawids in favour of 'Adil Shahs, the Bijapur kingdom would have been very likely wiped out much earlier then the time of Aurangzeb. Shah 'Abbas-I was greatly interested in the preservation of the independence of Bijapur kingdom. And due to obvious reason he did not like the extinction of the Shi'ite Kingdoms of the Deccan[24].

After Akbar's death and on Jahangir's accession the latter demanded 'Adil Shah to sent an envoy to the Mughal Court offering condolences on the demise of Akbar and congratulations on his Coronation. 'Adil Shah, instead of dealing with the matter himself wrote to the Shah of Iran for advice, as to whether a Bijapur envoy should be sent to the Mughal Court or the one from Persia was sufficient

To Jabangir's request, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah gave an arrogant reply which enraged him and he decided to annex the Bijapur Kingdom. Consequently, he dispatched a large army to the Deccan. At this critical juncture, alarmed of the situation, 'Adil Shah sought the assistance of Shah 'Abbas-I in the following terms: "Although we on our part are fully determined to defend our countries and could not allow the Mughal ruler to occupy an inch of them, it is necessary that His Majesty (Shah 'Abbas-I) should un-hesitantly come forward to help us in this vital matter[25]." Further, 'Adil Shah pleaded help from the Shah on the ground that "the inhabitants of these regions had a peaceful life under the protection of His Majesty's ancestors, our request is that His Majesty should

not leave as undefended." There were two possible ways in which the Shah could render any help to Bijapur. One was obviously that 'Adil Shah wanted the Shah to act as a arbitrator between him and the Mughal Emperor and exercise diplomatic and moral pressure in restraining military expedition on Bijapur. The other alternative was the creation of a diversion in favour of Bijapur, by way of an attack on Qandhar, a Mughal possession in the North West[26].

The Shah preferred the first course and recommended the case to Jahangir for a peaceful settlement, through the embassy of Muhammad Rida and by writing three letters to Jahangir. Regarding this embassy, Sir Thomas Roe cynically observes: "It is pretended that he comes only to treat a peace for the Deccanis whose protection (Shah) 'Abbas taketh to heart, envying the increase of the empire." There is no reference to such recommendation in the letters of the Shah preserved in Tuzuk-i Jahangiri. But three letters of the Shah and relevant to the affairs of Bijapur are preserved in the Munsha'ts of 'Abdul Husain Tusi and in Majma'ul-Insha of Qasim Aiwaugli Haidar.

In the first letter the Shah very politely pleaded for the "noble rulers of the Deccan high in rank and position," who had the claims of being "neighbours" (Jawari) of Jahangir and requested him "to pardon the faith of the erring Deccanis and open the doors of mercy and favour to them for the sake of the writer in viem of the concord, amity and friendship existing for such a long time between their royal house." As this letter failed to produce the desired effect, a second letter followed[27]. In this, the Shah not only reiterated the

previous plea but also gave his own assurances for the good behavior of the Deccan rulers in the following terms: “For the sake of the well wishing writer the fault and short-comings of the Deccan rulers should be forgiven and over-looked. In case anything happened from their side in future which went against the wishes of the addressee of the family of Sahibqran, the work of reprimanding them might be left to the writer so that people might talk about the strong ties of alliance and friendship which made one king excuse big offences and abandon big conquests only on the receipt of letters and messages of another king.”

From the above two letters of Shah ‘Abbas it is quite evident that he emerged as the champion for the cause of the preservation of the Bijapur. He requested Jahangir to leave the affairs of the Bijapur at his discretion and not to take any action against ‘Adil Shah. He even took the responsibility of reprimanding ‘Adil Shah. The second letter had its desired effect and the request of the Shah was “Virtually accepted” and royal favours” were shown towards ‘Adil Shah. Sometime later when “the news of the renewal of ‘regardlessness’ (by Jahangir) to ‘Adil Shah came to the knowledge of the Shah (of Iran), he again pleaded with Jahangir, this time on the ground that ‘Adil Shahi Sultans were “bound by strong ties of loyalty and submission and did not possess the might and power to display an attiude of opposition[28].”

Again, on the decision of Jahangir to annex Bijapur Kingdom, Shah ‘Abbas advised the former that it would make little difference whether ‘Adil Shah was allowed to remain “submissive and tribute paying vassal,” or other

were made to ask his place. He further suggested that if ‘Adil Shah was left in his possession, it would cause no harm to the Mughals. The letters of the Shah concludes with a very strange offer to Jahangir, that if he is bent upon conquering Bijapur for the sake of territorial gains, then in that case the Shah wrote “this well-wisher would be happy to give up an equivalent or even a larger territory from his dominions[29].

These correspondences clearly manifest the role of Shah ‘Abbas-I as the “preserver” of Bijapur Kingdom. He was even prepared, and in fact offered, to Sacrifice his own territory at North West frontier of Mughal Empire. But, he wanted Bijapur (and Golconda) to remain independent, acknowledge theoretical sovereignty of the Shah and legal sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor, like a Mughal vassal. As an arbitrator in the Bijapur-Mughal relations, he did succeed in evolving a solution to their conflict and effected temporary, if not permanent, peaceful settlement. And to a certain extent the diplomacy of Shah ‘Abbas I, shaped the Deccan policy of Jahangir in general, and Bijapur-Mughal relations in particular. The Shah interprets the peace treaty of 1617 between Deccan Kingdom and Mughals as a result of his recommendation and pressure on Jahangir[30].

Intrigue of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II in Perso-Mughal Qandhar Affair

In the year 1022/1613, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II in a personal letter, sent through Khalil-lah to Shah ‘Abbas-I, tried to enlighten the Shah about the recent political developments in India Though the letter is written in a humble tone it is highly diplomatic. The salient features of its contents are: to create

animosity in Perso-Mughal relations; inducement to the Shah to attack and conquer Qandhar; and the readiness on the part of Deccan Sultans to collaborate in this venture against the Mughals, by creating diversion in the Deccan in favour of Iran. It was a proposal for a Perso-Bijapur alliance against the Mughals. Obviously, this diplomatic maneuver of ‘Adil Shah was in order to counter balance the constant Mughal pressure over Bijapur.

It is quite evident from the letter that it was ‘Adil Shah who at his own initive was intriguing in the Qandhar affair and not Shah ‘Abbas, with a covetous eyes on the Trans-Indus portion of the Mughal Empire. However, the Shah was tempted by the proposal of ‘Adil Shah and came to a secret understanding with Bijapur, through the embassy of Shah Quli Beg, who came to Bijapur in 1614-15, as an special envoy of Shah ‘Abbas. Shah Quli was accompanied with his counter-part, Khalilul-lah. The whole scheme seems to have been finalized during the second mission of Khalilullah to Iran in 1618 when he carried a personal letter from ‘Adil Shah to the Shah of Iran. And the intrigue materialized on Khalilul-lah’s return to Bijapur in 1621-22 along with his Persian counter-part, Talib Beg. Soon after their arrival at Bijapur[31], hostilities commenced in the Deccan against the Mughals. Shortly after, an attack on Qandhar was launched by the Shah, obviously after the dispatch of the best Mughal generals to the Deccan. Thus the intrigue proved to be successful as, Jahangir was outwitted by the Shah of Iran who recovered Qandhar in 1622. And the Mughals were unable to cope up at two fronts.

After the death of Shah ‘Abbas-I and accession of Shah Safi in January 1629 there seems to be an interruption of a few years in the diplomatic exchanges between Iran and Bijapur. The initiative, to resume the ties, seems to have been taken by Shah Safi. Probably the Shah of Iran was guided by Shah Jahan’s imperialism. In late 1046/1637, Shah Safi appointed Ahmad Beg Qurchi to proceed on a mission to Muhammad ‘Adil Shah[32]. Through Ahmad Beg the Shah sent a formal letter to the ‘Adil Shah. The letter began with the expression that it was a great pleasure to write a letter to ‘Adil Shah, with the usual words of compliments and reminding him the old friendship and attachment subsisting between the two dynasties, which he calls as a family of “Tayyabin” and “Taherin” and strengthened by religious tie of Iyma-i Masumin. Then he goes on to give datails of the political developments in central and western Asia and concludes with a request to maintain regular diplomatic correspondence, with an offer to come forward unhesitantly for help he may require.

Muhammad ‘Adil Shah reciprocated this gesture by sending in the same year, his envoy Rahim Muhammad to the court of the Shah Safi gave an early conge in 1637 to Rahim Muhammad and entrusted him a letter. Muhammad ‘Adil Shah, like his predecessors, looked for help to Shah Safi. The latter was too weak to exert any pressure on Shah Jahan to check his imperialism in the Deccan[33].

The Mughals suspected that the diplomatic missions between Iran and the Deccan states were directed against them, and they strongly objected to

dispatch of any embassy from the Deccan to Iran. Muhammad ‘Adil Shah could not send the usual congratulatory embassy on Shah ‘Abbas-II’s accession, in 1642.

Intrigues against the Mughals

One of the causes, which prompted Shah ‘Abbas-II to take sides with Murad against Aurangzeb in the War of Succession, was to avoid the possibility of extinction of the Deccan Kingdoms, as a result of the success of Aurangzeb. The Shah was not slow to seize the opportunity, offered by the War of Succession to inflame Ali ‘Adil Shah II (and ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutb Shah) against the Mughals[34].

The Shah sent his envoy Mirza Muqim Kitabdar, with a letter to Muhammad ‘Adil Shah. In the letter the Shah, after reminding him of the old ties of friendship and religious affinity which bound the two houses, makes a gentle complaint against the temporary interruption in correspondence and lack of unity between the Deccan States, which encouraged the ‘evil-minded’ and ‘faithless’ enemies to gain upper hand. As there was still time to make amends, he urged ‘Adil Shah to sink his differences with Qutub Shah and emphasized their sectarian solidarity in order to take the utmost advantage from the confusion arising from the civil war among the Mughals. He further says that, Mirza Muqim would communicate what the writer (the Shah) had in his mind. Muqim was to communicate the secret coalition between the Shah and Murad on the one hand and the Shah and the rulers of Deccan on other hand[35].

In another letter, the Shah, while advising ‘Adil Shah (and Qutub Shah) to initiate hostilies against the Mughals, assured them that he too was preparing to move his own forces against the Mughal empire. The rapid victories of Aurangzeb over Dara Shikoh (April and May 1658) sufficed to keep the Deccan rulers from acting upon the Shah’s counsel. And the accession of Aurangzeb to the Mughal throne in 1658 altered the whole course of Perso-Bijapur diplomacy.

Soon after Aurangzeb’s accession, ‘Adil Shah-II and Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah approached Shah ‘Abbas-II to save them from the threatened extinction. Shah ‘Abbas-II sent Budakh Beg in 1660 to congratulate Aurangzeb. The Shah not only verbally communicated his desire for the preservation of the Deccan states but sought the latter’s assurances. Aurangzeb resented this interference, and this was one of the main causes of the subsequent misunderstanding in Perso-Mughal relations. Following this, there seems to be a diplomatic lull between Iran and Bijapur. Probably, ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah-II realized the futility of persuing Shah ‘Abbas-II to champion his cause. This lull continued after Shah Sulaiman’s accession to the Safawid throne in 1666, who was an utterly incompetent and weak ruler[36].

Persian Impact:

Though Yusuf ‘Adil Shah was a Turk yet, before coming to India, he had been completely Persianised. He was educated in Persian and brought up at Sawa (in Persia) under the guidance of ‘Imadu-ddin Mahmud, a Persian

merchant. Further, his travel to famous places like Kashan, Isfahan and Shiraz, totally Persianised his thought and behaviour. The spirit of Persian renaissance, though a spent up force in the fifteenth century, had so much captivated his imagination that after he become ruler of Bijapur, he showed anxiousness to recreate and revive as much of Persian culture and traditions of Sassanids as possible. As such Yusuf ‘Adil Shah was “more Persian than Turk by training and culture.” His strong leanings towards Shi’ism, completed his Persianisation by its adoption at Bijapur as a State religion[37].

Yusuf had segregated his son Isma’il from the Indian environment and entrusted him to Persian and Turkish teachers, Muhammad–e-Kashi and others. Likewise, successive ‘Adil Shahi Sultans appointed Persian scholars as tutors to their children. For example, Ibrahim ‘adil Shah I in spite of his anti-afaqi policy, appointed firstly Khwaja ‘Inayatullah Shirazi and then later on, Mullah Fathullah Shirazi, as tutors to Prince ‘Ali. These Persian scholars completely Persianised ‘Ali in all spheres of life. He was not only given coaching in Persian language, but through the medium of Persian, into various branches of learning-syntex, logic, theology, philosophy etc. He became master of Persian calligraphy and penned in Naskh, Thulth and Riqa styles[38].

Though Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah-II received his early education through the indigenous languages, yet from his twenty-fourth year of life (1954) he was taught Persian literature by Shah Nawaz Khan, the Jumdatu’l-Mulk. Ibrahim-II attained very shortly the requisite command over Persian literature and was a great admirer of Makhzanu’l Asrar of Nizami and Rawzatu’s Safa of Mir

Khwand. Shah Nawaz Khan actively facilitated Ibrahim-II's liking for Persian by arranging to place a number of standard Persian works of prose and poetry within the easy reach of the Sultan who was naturally tempted to read them in leisure hours. Shah Nawaz Khan's plan worked admirably and within a short period Ibrahim II could speak fluently in Persian, and his study of literature and history considerably advanced[39].

Persian Element in Administration:

Several factors contributed to the making of 'Adil Shahi administrative system. The heritage, race and creed of its rulers and the nobility had a profound bearing. 'Adil Shahis were successors of the Bahmanis, and thus inherited all the Persian element and culture already existing in the Bahmani administration. The 'Adil Shahi administrative system was "faithfully modeled on that of the Bahmani's." The 'Adil Shahi administration took its colours from the race and creed of its rulers. Though they were of Turkish origin, but were Persianised. Then, the bulk of the afaqi nobility and ministerial staff, brought with them to their new home, as model, the type of administration which had long been prevalent in their native places. This was later modified in certain cases to suit the local environment and objectives. Thus, the 'Adil Shahi administration presented a combination of Perso-Arabic and Turkish system in the Deccani setting[40]. The Bijapur system of government became more or less replica of the Persian system, from the theory of kingship to the nomenclature of institutions and offcers, court etiquette and army organization on mansabdari

system, every detal of ‘Adil Shahi organization breathed the Persian atmosphere. The Persian language was adopted as the official language for all administrative purposes. It became the language of the cultured elite.

Like the Sassanids, ‘Adil Shahi ruler was the supreme power in the State; he was the ruler, judge, administrator, military leader, sometimes even preacher and leader of public worship. The court ceremonies and social etiquette at Bijapur was mainly drawn from Sassanian traditions. Shi’ism was declared several times as the State religion of Bijapur. Moreover, on the model of the Persian national army of the Safawids, a uniform of the scarlet cap of twelve gores was introduced by Isma’il ‘Adil Shah in the Bijapur army and it was strictly enforced. This was in imitation of Qizilbash’s of Persia. The Shi’ah ideology penetrated in all walks of both official and private life and its influence was felt even during the period when the ‘Adil Shah was not a Shi’ah. The Shi’ah legends: “Ali Ibn-i Abi-Talib” (‘Ali son of Abu ‘Talib), “Ghulam ‘Ali” (Slave of ‘Ali), “Ghulam ‘Ali Murtaza” (Slave of Ali the chosen) were incorporated on the ‘Adi Shahi coins. Similar inscriptions are found on the mosques built during the reign of the Shi’ah rulers. Likewise the words-“Naib-i ‘Ali” (Viceroy of ‘Ali) adopted by the Shi’ah rulers is found on all the ‘Adil Shahi Farmans, of both the Shi’ah and Sunni periods, irrespective of the ruler being a Shi’ah or a Sunni[41].

Persian coins called Lari, originally minted in the district of Lar at the head of the Persian Gulf was adopted by ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II, who issued a silver Lari. Bijapur embraced a large portion of the Konkan littoral, where the traders

from Persia often landed and hence to meet the local demand for the Laris the ‘Adil Shah caused them to be struck in his name. It seems that the Laris were current only in the coastal areas of the kingdom. And it seems that the Persian coin “Abbasi” of Shah “Abbas II’s time was also a legal tender at the Bijapur ports.

Likewise, in all the departments of the ‘Adil Shahi organization, Persian impact was dominant. A comparative study reveals many features in common between the two states.

The Role of Persian Nobility in Deccan:

The Persian nobility played a major role in shaping the external and internal policies of Bijapur and in shaping the destiny of the kingdom itself. It was the image of the Persian system in the minds of the ‘Adil Shahi nobles that prevented the Bijapur Kingdom from ruins. The Persian nobles-Mustafa Khan Ardistani, Shah Adu Turab Shirazi, ‘Inayatullah Qazwini, Qasim Beg Tabrizi, Husain Inju and Shah Ja’far (a brother of Shah Tahir) had before them the ideal of a United Persian under Safawid (Persia which as a nation once again self-contained, centripetal, powerful and respected) made efforts to shun the personal rivalries among the Deccan Sultans and to form a political alliance amongst the rival kingdoms. This eventually brought about the overthrow of the mighty Vijayanagar kingdom[42].

Throughout the history of Bijapur, Persian nobles enjoyed ‘Adil Shahi patronage and exerted influence in the polities of Bijapur. The names of some

eminent Persian nobles may be mentioned here: Shah Tahir and Asad Khan Lari who brought about peaceful peaceful pact by their efforts between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar ; Afzal Khan Shirazi, Wakil-us-Saltanat and Mir Jumla, was the savior of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II (1580-1627) from the treachery of Kamal Khan and Kishwar Khan ; Shah Fathu’l-lah Shirazi-renowned doctor of the learning and philosophy of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I’s reign was known as “Ten Intellignces” (Dih Aql), because of his versatile genious ; Hakim Ahmad Gilani and ‘Ainu’l-Mulk Shirazi were two scholars who were accorded a grand reception on their arrival at Bijapur and were liberally rewarded ; Mir Shamsu’d-din Muhammad Isfahani was the Sadrul Jahan ; Shah ‘Abdul Qasim Anju and Murtaza Khan Anju were the companions of the king; Rafi’ uddin Shirazi, the author of Tadhiratu’l Muluk, come to Bijapur in 1560, remained in royal service for several years; Mustafa Khan Ardistani and Shah Abu Turab Shirazi featured conspicuously in the political events of ‘Ali I’s reign. Abu Turab was instrumental to a temporory amelioration between Bijapur and Ahmadanagar; Sadruddin Muhammad Shirazi (later known as Shah Nawaz Khan) Prime Minister of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II, and then Jumdatu’l-Mulk of Bijapur commanded reverence and devotion in every class, under the aegis of his enlightened administration, Bijapur revived the traditions of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah-I’s period[43].

Perso-Mughal-Bijapur relations:

Patronage of Persian Scholars and Literature:

With the Mongol cataclysm in ‘Ajam, the Persians and their culture suffered a severe blow. With the deterioration of the political situation in Persia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries due to the intense military activity, thousands of peace loving Persian scholars fled to Delhi and the Deccan, where they found a welcome patronage. In some cases the ‘Adil Shahs sent for the poets and scholars from Persia and some were exchanged between the two States. Yusuf ‘Adil Shah was a liberal patron of learning and invited Scholars and poets from Persia to partake of his munificent patronage. Likewise, all the ‘Adil Shahs (except Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I : 1541-57), patronized Persian scholars and they flourished at Bijapur.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah-II was a liberal patron of letters, and a brilliant galaxy of divines, poets minstrel, musicians, painters, illuminators, historians and traditionalists from Iran adorned his Court. Thus Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah-II’s reign “may be regarded as the golden age for Persian literature in Deccan” which in pageant of the prodigies of art and exudation surpassed the splendour of the court of Shah ‘Abbas-I of Iran[44].

Under the ‘Adil Shahi rulers Persian literature flourished at Bijapur, and they established schools specifically for the teaching of Persian studies, where Persian was the medium of instruction. Pupils were provided with every comfort; they were supplied lodging, board and pocket money. Poems were compiled not only in Persian but in Dakhni-Urdu with the adaptation of Persian

metres and cannons of versification. The literature produced at Bijapur had far reaching cultural values. As the Shi'ah religion influenced Deccan poetry by turning the thoughts of the local poets in the channels of the lives of the Imams and the tragedy of Karbala, lament for the murdered Husain and his elegies (Marthiyah) become the universal poetical type. Under 'Ali 'Adil Shah II, one poet bore the title of Mirza 'Marthiyah Khan' or the chanters of elegies. Another poet Hashim 'Ali compiled Marthiyahs under the title Diwan-i Husaini. Likewise, scores of literary works and histories were compiled both at the court under the patronage of 'Adil Shahs and privately.

Persian Art and Architecture at Bijapur

The art of the Bijapur School owes much to Persian influence. The paintings of Bijapur can be traced from the third quarter of the sixteenth century onwards. This school was patronized by 'Ali 'Adil Shah-II who was a adept in the art of painting and varnishing[45].

The Persian element entered largely in the paintings of the Bijapur school. The Nujumu'l-Ulum ("Star of Sciences") painted in 1570, during the reign of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I is in part local adaptations of the early Safawid tradition and made of painting. Especially the 36th Chapter "On the subjugation of the fairies and super-natural things, according to Indian and Khurasani method" is illustrated with power and logic. Upto folio 240, the illuminations of the Nujumu'l 'Ulum obviously endeavour to be Persian. But whatever reference they bear to Persian painting does relatively little to connect them with contemporary Safawid work. It contains the bundles of grass or plants of

different size, culled from Persian painting of Safawid traditions. The costumes are mixed Perso-Deccan. Their trim outlines hold clear and contrasting colour surfaces, more familiar with the Persian palette, then are the outlines with those of Persian figures. Their flux they convert into a staid solidity, ponderous in the horizontal. The downward gliding ease of the Persian line they transmute into amplitude to the right angle and changed with a movement as much banked as it is fierce. In these illuminations, the work of artisans, impoverished in their means and provincial form a Safawid point of view, a determined movement is unmistakable and this is a most vital feature of these painting. Further, the placing of coloured massives accurately outlined with a propelling power had a surface sprinkled with delicate Persian motives. The distinguishing feature in book illustrations of the Bijapur paintings was the Persian type of making the ground vibrant, around the determined movement of the leading figure.

The seventeenth century paintings of Bijapur display settings similar to the Safawid miniatures (established as a type of Sassanian Art). We find the figures of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II and the attendants with a gold ground, pited level with the eye and a slanting ground. The incorporation of Safawid traditions in Bijapur paintings is attributed to Mulla Faruq Husain, a painter from Shiraz, who was attached to the court of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II. In the “landscape” painting of Bijapur of the seventeenth century also, we find the Safawid trend of flowering trees with branches curved in three dimensions. And the scattering of the motives on the ground with foliage are after the Persian pattern[46]. These are some of the illustrations of the Bijapur paintings,

full of Persian motives, traditions and technique, besides having Mughal and local incorporations.

Persian calligraphy had also entered Bijapur through various ways in many forms. Masterpieces of Nasta'liq style, evolved by the Persians, was adopted in Bijapur for all purposes. All Persian manuscripts are in this style. Another style of writing Persian was Shakistah which is found mostly in official documents. Persian calligraphy is also preserved in the inscriptions of scores of 'Adil Shahi monuments.

The 'Adil Shahs were great builders and have left behind them more monument of note than all the rest of the Deccan Kingdoms put together. The architectural buildings of Bijapur comprise mosques tombs, and palaces. In Bijapur architecture, the Iranian element is so predominant that the whole architecture looks Iranian in style. The domes of all the 'Adil Shahi monuments are of Persian orign. Likewise if we study in detail the plan and elevation of various monuments they reveal Persian origin. However, besides Persian the monuments in its design are mixture of Syrian, Byzantine and Egyptian styles. The cause was that the 'Adil Shahs wanted to imitate the architecture of Turkey, Iran, Iraq etc., and as such the engineers employed were chiefly Turks and Iranians. Masons were Indians and even the calligraphist and artists were afaqis[47].

Turkey, Egypt and Arab States:

Relations with Turkey:

Deccan Sultanates diplomatic relations were mainly concentrated with ; and there seems to be hardly any diplomatic relations with other Islamic countries of Asia and Africa.

There were racial, cultural and commercial relations with the Ottoman Turkey. The continuous stream of Turkish immigrants to Bijapur formed an important percentage of the ‘Adil Shahi nobility. The afaqis dominated the Bijapur court. Their demography played a role in the external relations of Bijapur. As for example, the number of Turks, in the small Bijapur port of Dabhol, was about fifteen thousand. This was a strong inducement to the Ottoman Sultan I to join the alliance against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. The Turks of Dabhol were mostly merchants and had trade relations with their counterpart in Turkey.

While the Arab States of Asia and Africa, in a sense were intimate neighbours of Bijapur, only the ocean between them separated them as a broad highway. The intercourse between Arab States and South India dates back to pre-medieval times. Their relations during the medieval times were motivated by mutual commercial gains, reinforced by the common bond of Islam[48].

There was hardly any ground for Bijapur or Arab States to maintain diplomatic relations between them. Only on few occasions the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt and Arab States came in diplomatic contacts. But there were constant

commercial inter-course between them. Continuous groups of merchants, travelers and pilgrims of the Arab States visited Bijapur and vice-versa.

Religio-Political Relations with the Ottomans

Some of the ‘Adil Shahi Sultans were Sunni, followers of Abu Hanifa School. They owed their allegiance to the four Caliphs the success to Prophet Muhammad, a practice adopted by the Ottoman Sultan. The Sunni ‘Adil Shahi rulers got the Khutbah read in the name of the Caliphs. As the Sultan or a king in an independent Muslim State was regarded as the viceroy of the Caliph, so were the ‘Adil Shahi rulers.

The Ottoman Sultan Salim conquered Egypt in 1517. At this time, AlMutawakkil was the last of the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt. About 1520, when Sulaiman was the Ottoman Sultan, Al-Mutawakkil resigned his rights of Caliphate and ceded his title to Osmanli or Ottoman Sultans of Turkey. By virtue of this, the Ottoman Sulans claimed not only “the sovereignty of the Muslim world” but the right to the Caliphate itself. That is, they claimed the spiritual, as well as political power held by the successors of the Prophet.

The ‘Adil Shahi Sultans, who professed Sunni faith and got the Khutbah read in Bijapur in the name of the Caliphs were virtually covered by the jurisdiction of Ottoman Khilafat. The rulers of Bijapur who professed the Sunni faith, during the times of Turkish Caliphate were : Isma’il ‘Adil Shah (only during the regency of Kamal Khan (1510-15), Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I (1535-57), Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II (1580-1626) and Muhammad ‘Adil Shah (1626-56)[49].

The founder, Yusuf ‘Adil Shah though got the Khutbah read alternately in Sunni and Shi’ah fashion; yet he was Shi’ah at heart and owed allegiance to the Safawid house. The last of the ‘Adil Shahi rulers, Sikandar got the Khutbah read in the Sunni fashion from 1680 onwards and in it included the name of Aurangzeb. Thus the nominal Caliphal allegiance was transferred from the Ottoman to the Mughals. Thus, during the Sunni period (up 1680) of ‘Adil Shahi Sultanate, the Sultans of Turkey may be said to have assumed the theoretical sovereignty-temporal as well as spiritual of the Bijapur Kingdom.

It seems that Bijapur and Ottoman Turkey probably never maintained any diplomatic relations. But, the Turkish national symbol-the Crescent was adopted by the ‘Adil Shahi rulers, as the royal emblem on all the public buildings in Bijapur This symbol was not the religious symbol of the Muhammdans. Evidently, the ‘Adil Shahs tried to preserve their racial link with the Ottomans, in spite of their allegiance to the Safawids, due to political reasons.

Relations with Egypt:

Egypt’s contact with Bijapur was a reaction to the Portuguese challenge in the Indian ocean. It was a common menace to the commercial and navigational interest of the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, ‘Adil Shah of Bijapur and other rulers of western India[50].

Before the advent of the Portuguese, the Arabs, Persians, Turks and Indians exercised complete authority of India’s overseas trade. The Portuguese

supremacy at sea paralysed the seaborne trade of the Muslims in the Indian Ocean, the Read Sea, Persian Gulf etc. The Red Sea merchants lived in Jedda and had their factors at the important ports of western India. The rulers of Arab States and Egypt who controlled the important ports levied duties on Indian goods passing up the Red Sea, across the Egypt on their way to Alexandria. The advent of the Portuguese deprived these rulers of their income from the sea.

When the Portuguese captured the important port of the island of Socotra, which controlled the entrance to the Red Sea, it arose the jealousy of all the concerned States. Further, the news that the Portuguese had decided to appoint a resident viceroy and to keep a standing fleet in Indian waters, impelled Yusuf ‘Adil Shah and Mahmud Shah I of Gujarat to negotiate with the Sultan of Egypt for a joint action against the Portuguese. The Ottoman Sultan Salim I was also requested to join the league, but he did not take part. Ahmadnagar and the Zamorin of Calicut joined the league, at the request of ‘Adil Shah.

It was arranged that a fleet should be equipped at Suez and sent to India to cooperate with the light craft. Assistance and cooperation was to be given by Gujarat, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur ; and information as to the movements of the Portuguese fleet was to be furnished by the Zamorin of Calicut in order to enable the Egyptian fleet to work out its strategy[52].

The Egyptian fleet was placed under Amir Hunain, a naval Commander of the Mamluk Sultan, Qanswah-al-Ghuri. While the Gujarat fleet was

organized by Malik Ayaz, Governor of Diu, and Bijapur also sent a small fleet, at its disposal at Dabhol, to join the Egyptian fleet. The allies gave a crushing defeat, in 1507, in a naval battle to the Portuguese fleet, commanded by Lorenzo, off Chaul.

But with the capture of the Bijapur port of Goa by the Portuguese on 25th November, 1510, the league of Bijapur, Egypt and others was broken. And with the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517, the alliance become obsolete.

Religio-Political Relations with Egypt

After the sack of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongol conqueror Hulagu and the death of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustasim the centre of Caliphate shifted to Cairo. The succession of the Egyptian Caliphs was maintained unbroken in the same line till 1517. During this period of Egyptian Caliphate, 'Adil Shahi rulers professing the Sunni faith were obviously under its nominal spiritual leadership and guidance.

In 1512-13, the Qadi of Cairo sent rich presents and his special blessings with encouragement to carry on the religious struggle against the Portuguese. The sending of special blessings was not without significance. It may be argued that the Qadi of Cairo had, to a certain, extent, spiritual leadership of the Muslim world[53].

Relations with Arab States:

Bijapur's relations with Arab States of Asia and Africa was mostly commercial and cultural and there were hardly any diplomatic relations. Moreover there was no common ground to maintain any diplomatic relations. However, there was constant flow of scholars and other religious persons to Deccan[54].

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CHAPTER – V

Relations with Europeans

Relations with Portuguese:

The Portuguese rise to power in India is attributed to their capture of the port of Goa and its cession to them by Bijapur. in this study the relations with Portuguese beginning from 1508 to 1686.

The Portuguese were the first European nation to establish overseas commercial intercourse with India during the Medieval period of Indian History. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Portuguese were keenly desirous of bringing Christianity to "vast tribes lying under the myth of God." Inspired by religious fervor and fired with the crusading spirit, the Portuguese, during the closing years of the fifteenth century, attempted to drive all Muslim shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea[1]. The next hundred years were occupied in establishing factories on the west coast of India and in waging wars with the Indian rulers. With the landing of Vasco da Gama on 17th May, 1498, near Calicut, the Portuguese became the first Christian nation of Europe to acquire power in India, and they maintained it by the policy of "dvide et impera"-by playing off one Indian State against another, They succeeded in achieving their goal and in obtaining foothold in western India, only after several determined naval attacks on Muslim traders, their fleet and their States.

A new phase in Luso-Indian relation began from1508 with the dispatch of Francisco de Almeida with the title of Viceroy and authorization by the King of Portugal, to consolidate Portuguese commerce with the east on imperial lines. Almeida was instructed to conclude alliances with the Indian rulers and to interrupt Muslim spice trade by the control of the Red Sea. Portugal thus pitted herself against the commercial organization of the Muslim world. By a system of licenses (Cartaz) he sought to control all oriental trading-ships. This system threatened immediate ruin to his commercial rivals and it was not long before the struggle began, especially after the conquests of Socotra off the Red Sea by the Portuguese.

The rulers of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Calicut were astir, and they were induced to take a concerted action. The allies gave a naval battle to the Portuguese, off Chaul on the western coast of India in 1508. Bijapur joined the allies in fear of the loss of its trade, revenue and monopoly over the seas. The Portuguese, with a re-enforcement retaliated and gave a crushing defeat to the allies on 2nd February 1508, off Diu. This assured the Portuguese of sea power in the Indian Ocean[2].

Commercial motives incited Yusuf 'Adil Shah to join the allies. But there was neither any political nor diplomatic reason for Bijapur to join against the Portuguese. The Portuguese on their part had not done any hostile act against Bijapur. This was the first indirect between the two States. This involvement of Yusuf 'Adil gave an opportunity to the Portuguese to declare hostilities against Bijapur. The Portuguese suspected that Yusuf 'Adil Shah

was trying to reconstruct the confederacy recently collapsed at Diu. This furthered the cause of the Portuguese as they could hardly expect better justification, to declare open hostilities against Bijapur with a possibility of making some gains.

In December 1508, on his way to Diu, Almeida took “revenge at Dabhol (a Bijapur port) for the assistance which had been given there to the Egyptian fleet. The Bijapurs were driven out and the Portuguese occupied the harbor on 30th December 1508. Next day the victors set the buildings of the town on fire and returned to their ships. The Bijapurs did not retaliate. This action of Almeida was only a reprisal and he did not desire to establish a factory at Dabhol nor did he wish for any territorial gains. Almeida was guided by the directions laid down for him by the king of Portugal to the extent of hindering the Arab trade and of assuring Portuguese commercial preponderance in India. He had decided that the continuance of this preponderance would depend entirely on sea power and held the opinion that numerous fortresses would be a source of dispersion and weakness[3].

The appointment of Afonso de Albuquerque in 1509 as Viceroy of Portuguese India by King Emanuel ushered in a new era in Luso-Indian Polities. In contrast to Almeida, Albuquerque was bolder, more independent and envisaged not only Portuguese sea power, but imperial dominion throughout the known Orient. This policy necessitated a metropolis and Albuquerque choose Goa, which by its island position half-way down the coast

of India, best fulfilled the strategic requirements of the capital of a maritime empire.

A famous pirate Timoja tried to ally with the Portuguese. He gave the intelligence that the time was opportune to make a sudden assault on Goa and capture it. As at that time Yusuf ‘Adil Shah was far away in the interior on a expedition and he Bijapur governor of Goa Malik Yusuf Gurji was powerless to resist. Albuquerque, having collected a fleet, started for the proposed conquest of Goa. He found that the army of Bijapur was absent on an expedition and he captured Goa with little effort, on 3rd March 1510. Soon Yusuf ‘Adil Shah returned with a large army. Before attacking Goa he made overtures to Albuquerque for a peaceful settlement. He also sent Mustafa Khan and endeavoured to arrive at a settlement with the surrender of Cintcora with its islands and revenue to the Portuguese instead of Goa. But when Albuquerque declined this offer, Mustafa Khan suggested that Goa itself would be surrendered, if Albuquerque handed over Timoja to the Bijapur. This proposition was also rejected by Albuquerque and he challenged the conquest of Goa. Eventually, Yusuf ‘Adil Shah's army made its way into the island of Goa on 17th May 1510 and re-conquered it[4].

The policy adopted by Yusuf ‘Adil Shah in the conquest of Goa needs special mention as he exhibited unusual and surprising attitude towards the enemy. It seems that the Portuguese fleet remained at anchor at the mouth of the harbor of Goa for nearly three months. During this period the Portuguese in the fleet suffered heavily from sickness and starvation. When this was brought

to the notice of Yusuf ‘Adil Shah by the deserters, he, with true chivalry, offered to send provision to the Portuguese fleet, stating that he wished to conquer them not by starvation but by the sword. Albuquerque resolved to receive no such assistance from the enemy and made a show of enough food and wine in front of the ‘Adil Shah’s messenger. Throughout the siege the two generals vied with each other in generosity.

Another fact is that Yusuf ‘Adil Shah, at the request of Albuquerque, refused to allow the Portuguese deserters, who had joined him, to continue going down to the banks of the harbor to invite other soldiers and sailors to desert. This honesty of Yusuf ‘Adil Shah, conclusively proves that he wanted to defeat his enemy by fair means and not by unfair means.

Albuquerque was forced to retire to Cochin, after the defeat. But as the Portuguese were seized with great indignation, they made great preparations and attacked Goa again. The time was also more opportune. Timoja gave information to Albuquerque that Yusuf ‘Adil Shah had left Goa for Bijapur, and that there was a general insurrection at Goa against the Bijapur army. He therefore pressed him for a second attack. On 25th November, 1510, the Portuguese assaulted Goa successfully in three columns. The Bijapurs fought desperately but the Portuguese recaptured and sacked Goa[5].

Isma’il ‘Adil Shah received a personal letter from Albuquerque. It was a surprising diplomatic move on the part of Albuquerque to extend an offer of peace and friendship to ‘Adil Shah after capturing the latter’s territory. The

letter was both curious and characteristic. It throws a flood of light on Albuquerque's policy which he was to adopt in future in relation to Bijapur. It laid the foundation of Portuguese empir in India. Albuquerque wrote to 'Adil Shah: "-I wish most sincerely that your father had been living, that he might know me to be man of my word ; out of regard for him, I shall be ever your friend, and I will assist you against the king of the Deccan and against your enemies, and I will cause all the horses that arrive here to be carried to your stations and your marts, in order that you may have possession of them. The merchants of your land bring their merchandize of the sea, and of the land, and horses, and I will give them a safe conduct. It you wish for my friendship, first, your messengers come to me with your communizing and I will send you others on my part, who shall convey to you my communications ; if you will perform this which I write into you, by my aid shall you be able to gain possessions of much land and become a great Lord among the Moors. Be desirous of performing this, for thus, it shall be well with you, and you shall have great power; and for all that the Sabio (Yusuf 'Adil Shah), your father, be dead, I will be your father and bring you up like a son[6]."

After the recapture of Banestarim, Albuquerque ordered, in May 1513 Garcia De Sousa to cruse off Dabhol and not to permit a single vessel to go into, or out of the port. For Bijapur this created a serious problem. Bijapur now had no other alternative but to sue for peace. Kamal Khan sent an envoy to Goa to propose peace. Albuquerque professed friendship and peaceful relations to Bijapur envoy, but demanded certain rare articles and deputed his own envoy

to Bijapur to fetch them. On the request of the Bijapur envoy Albuquerque ordered his men to open the naval blockade of Dabhol, with free ingress to the ships, pending negotiations of the treaty. It was a gesture to establish friendly relations. Ambassadors were then exchanged between Bijapur and Goa. Diogo Fernandez was the Portuguese ambassador, and he accompanied the Bijapur envoy to Bijapur. The former was accompanied with over two dozen persons.

Though Albuquerque himself offered in a letter to Isma'il 'Adil Shah that he would allow free import of horses into Bijapur, he soon changed his mind on receipt of a proposal from the Raya of Vijayanagar. The Raja proposed to Albuquerque to join a war against Bijapur. Albuquerque first gave a diplomatic reply to this proposal; but upon being again pressed on the matter he agreed to join the Raja in a war against Bijapur[7].

The news of this projected alliance perturbed Kamal Khan at Bijapur. He sent an envoy to Goa with instructions to say that Bijapur desired to maintain friendship with the king of Portugal and to arrange the trade in horses and that the Portuguese ought not to favour the Raja of Vijayanagar in that respect. Albuquerque delayed giving reply to the Bijapur envoy. He was expecting confirmation to the Raja's genuineness about the alliance. As he had no reply from Vijayanagar he hastened to change his mind again, this time in favour of Bijapur. He dispensed with the Bijapur envoy and sent with him Jao Goncalves de Castillo Branco as his envoy to Bijapur. Through him, Albuquerque expressed that out of a desire to maintain friendship he would let Bijapur have all the horses that might arrive at Goa but on condition of Bijapur

surrendering the mainland adjacent to Goa as far as the ghauts, in order to render Goa more secure. Albuquerque also promised that the king Dom Manoel of Portugal would give all assurances of no war with him, nor thwart his policy to the dvantage of Vijayanagar. Albuquerque further demanded the surrender of some Portuguese personnel. By the time the envoys returned, with replies from Bijapur, Albuquerque was dead.

In 1545, Asad Khan having entertained designs to depose Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I, prevailed upon by means of presents the Portuguese governor to espouse the cause of ‘Abdullah, brother of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah was very indignant, but endeavoured to gain the Portuguese governor to his side by liberal offers. Martin Affonso de Sousa, the governor was not interested on who was the rightful success to the throne ; but he was interested in who ever offered greater advantages to the crown of Portugal in return for sponsoring the cause. From this point of view de Sousa was disposed rather to favour Asad Khan who offered the territory of Konkan the revenue of which was over a million ; and he prepared to support ‘Abdullah by force of arms. However, at the instance of Pero de Faria, who pointed out the gross injustice of such a course of action, de Soisa changed his policy and secured the person of ‘Abdullah. But soon with the death of Asad Khan the prime mover of the intrigue was removed from the scene[8]. Still Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I offered to make over the lands of Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese, if de Sousa would deliver ‘Abdullah to him. Notwithstanding the action against the man whose cause he had so recently proposed to support, de Sousa promised that in

consideration of these lands being made over to him, he would send ‘Abdullah away where he should not again disturb ‘Adil Shah. To the latter agreed and having fulfilled his part of the contract by making over Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese de Sousa sent ‘Abdullah to Cananore, but shortly afterwards brought him back openly to Goa. This was a breach of the agreement by the Portuguese. ‘Adil Shah in addition to making over Salsette and Bardes to the crown of Portugal, had also gifted de Sousa with vast treasures, estimated at one million of ducats which Asad Khan had collected for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy.

Being thus deceived, ‘Adil Shah pressed de Sousa either to fulfil his promise of sending ‘Abdullah away, or to restore what had been made over to him on that condition. The governor, endeavoured to temporize and sent Joso Fernandez de Negreiros as an ambassador to treat with him on the subject. But ‘Adil Shah seized him and all the Portuguese personnel that aacompanied him and put them in prison. They were retained as hostages for the due fulfillment of the agreement by the Portuguese. De Sousa was thus forced to comply and gave an assurance that as soon as the season should permit he would send ‘Abdullah to Mallacca. De Sousa did not keep up the Agreement and he sent Galvao Viegas to ‘Adil Shah, demanding payment of a sum of 50,000 parades in gold in exchange for which he undertook to hand over ‘Abdullah, who was then at Goa[9].

De Sousa was succeeded, in 1546, by Dom Joao de Castro as governor. The new governor did not agree to the contract made by de Sousa with ‘Adil

Shah. On account of these differences when ‘Adil Shah sent for ‘Abdullah, de Castro refused to oblige. ‘Adil shah broke off relations with the Portuguese. De Castro feared lest matters might culminate in hostilities, he made his soldiers go through their drills in sight of the ‘Adil Shah’s forces on the main land. He greatly increased and improved the army and sent a message to ‘Adil Shah to the effect that if he was determined to come against Goa, he would have the roads cleared and have bridges constructed in order that his passage might be facilitated.

Anti-Bijapur Alliances of Portuguese with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar

To check Bijapur’s longing eyes on the Portuguese possessions and in order to prevent any coalition between Bijapur, Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar against the Portuguese, de Castro concluded in 1547, separate treaties with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar kingdoms, the two adversaries of Bijapur. This strategy maintained balance of power and forced ‘Adil Shah to be at peace and friendly with the Portuguese. Any hostility with the Portuguese meant the opening of hostilities on two other fronts, with Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar; and Bijapur could not fight at three fronts simultaneously with three powerful adversaries[9].

In the treaties provision was made to check Bijapur’s military power. The terms of the treaties directly affecting Bijapur were:

“The Portuguese and Vijayanagara were to be friend of friends, and enemy of enemies of the other. And when called upon, to help the other, with their forces against all the rulers in India, the Nizam Shah always excepted;

“the Governor of Goa will allow all Arab and Persian horses that land at Goa to be purchased by the king of Vijayanagara on due notice and proper payment, none being permitted to be sent to Bijapur;

“The king of Vijayanagara will compel all merchants in his kingdom trading with the coast to send their goods through ports where the Portuguese have factors permitting none to proceed to Bijapur ports;

“The king of Vijayanagara will forbid the importation of saltpeter and iron into his kingdom and any Bijapur port and will compel its purchase from Portuguese factor ; and

“The king of Vijayanagara will also allow no Moorish ship or fleet (obviously implying of Bijapur) to stop in his port and if any army should come, he will capture them and send them to Goa. Parties agreed to wage war on ‘Adil Shah, and the territories captured shall belong to Vijayanagar except lands on the west of the ghats from Banda on the north to Cintacora, on the south which lands shall belong to the king of Portugal[10].”

In the treaty with Ahmednagar too, there were similar terms. Those relevant to and directly affecting Bijapur were:

"There were to be friendship between Ahmednagar and the Portuguese, who were to help each other, when necessary against all the kings of India (obviously Bijapur was not mentioned specifically), with the exception of Vijayanagara ; and

"the Portuguese governor bound himself to not to make peace with the 'Adil Shah without previously giving notice of the same to Nizam Shah."

These two treaties signed with Vijayanagar on 19th September 1547 and with Ahmednagar on 6th October 1547, resulted in a tripartite alliance against Bijapur. This triangular league was in contravention and in supersession of the peace treaty which the Portuguese had signed on 26th February 1546 with Bijapur. The Portuguese failed to keep up the terms of the treaty and changed the whole course of their relations with Bijapur[11].

When in November-December 1570 'Adil Shah marched to besiege Goa other members of the league too made simultaneous attacks. The Bijapur is commenced attack on Goa by a furious bombardment with more concentration on the port of Goa and works of Banestarim, which suffered sevely. The Portuguese, while defending Goa, sent de Vasconcellos to Dabhol, to destroy the port. The Viceroy used every possibly means of securing intelligence from the Bijapur camp. He bribed some of the renegade Portuguese in the Bijapur camp. He succeeded in obtaining information regarding secret designs and intentions. When Bijapur's strategy leaked out, 'Adil Shah found it impossible to continue war[12]. He again made proposals for peace; but the siege was

continued. With the re-inforcement in the Portuguese army, the Bijapur is retreated. ‘Adil Shah however resolved to make another vigorous attempt to invade the island. In spite of stiff resistance the Bijapur is succeeded in crossing over the Mercantor pass. In a day long battle on 13th April, 1570, the forces of ‘Adil Shah was defeated. ‘Adil Shah was furious at this defeat and openly vowed that he would not stir from before Goa until victory. Nevertheless he could not but recognize the difficulties of the situation and secretly desired for a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. At last ‘Adil Shah himself offered terms for the conclusion of a treaty. One of the terms was that the Portuguese should surrender Goa to ‘Adil Shah. It was an unacceptable condition by the offer failed. The Portuguese unable to check ‘Adil Shah unilaterally, conspired to murder ‘Adil Shah. Dom Luiz de Atayle entered into negotiations with Nuri Khan for killing ‘Adil Shah. The conspiracy did not materialize[13].

The proposed terms of the treaty of peace having failed, the siege of Goa continued but could make little advance. ‘Adil Shah in order to divide and weaken the Portuguese camp, again persuaded the Rani of Gersoppa to attack Onor. She did oblige ‘Adil Shah by collecting a large army and besieging the fort. With the reinforcement coming from Goa, the besiegers were put to flight. In retaliation, the Viceroy endeavoured to create a diversion in his favour by secretly stirring up other neighbouring rulers to invade Bijapur and by that means he thought of compelling ‘Adil Shah to raise the siege. Nothing appears to have come out of this project. Both the Viceroy and ‘Adil Shah were equally

anxious for peace; but neither desired that the other should be aware of it. To all outward appearances, the siege and defences were carried on as before without any spirit or vigour. The siege prolonged for ten months and finally the Bijapurs retreated without effecting any treaty or settlement.

In retaliation, the Malik at the port of Dabhol captured one hundred and fifty Portuguese men, including their chief officers and brave soldiers. He put to death many of them and sent some of them to ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah took measures to blockade Goa and also dispatched in 1578 messenger with letters. and presents to ‘Ali Adhiraja of Malabar, the Samri (Zamorin) of Calicut and the Kolattiri of Malabar, seeking in Vain their assistance against the Portuguese. A fierce naval battle took place in which the Portuguese were successful[14].

In 1581, King Philip-II of Spain also became King of Portugal, under the title of Philip I. Portugal owed allegiance to the King of Spain on 3rd September 1581. The Portuguese possessions in India came under the suzerainty of the King of Spain.

On 29th January 1582, a treaty was concluded by which all the previous treaties between Bijapur and the Portuguese were renewed and affirmed. Peace was established between the two states.

In 1584 ‘Adil Shah sent an envoy to Goa for negotiating an alliance and joint expedition against the Nayak of Sanguicer to punish him for causing the death of Dom Giles Yanez, and to put down the piracy that existed on that

coast. It was agreed that the governor of Ponda should attack by land while De Mascarehans to attack by sea. The strategy worked successfully. The allied army attacked the town and laid waste the territory. The Nayak who had fled for the safety, sent an envoy to implore mercy, promising to submit on any conditions, provided he was restored to his power and his territories were spared. A settlement was effected and the allied armies retired.

Even though there existed treaties of firm friendship and alliance, yet the governor and the king of Portugal expressed grave concern over the expansion of 'Adil Shahi territory in the Kannara. In view of the existing treaties between Portuguese and 'Adil Shah, this concern of the Viceroy and King Philip II apparently raises doubts over their true friendship and integrity towards 'Adil Shah[15].

Triple alliance of 'Adil Shah, Portuguese and Nizam Shah

In 1595 Maties de Albuquerque sent an embassy to Bijapur with the intention of forming a triple alliance between 'Adil Shah, Malik 'Ambar of Ahmednagar and himself in order to defend the growing imperialism of the Mughals. Approving this proposal of Albuquerque, King Philip II of Spain wrote to the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco de Gama, on 25th February, 1596 to continue to adopt the policy of Albuquerque and to help in achieving the goal by way of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, one after the other, to form an alliance.

‘Adil Shah tried to foster the triple alliance for his own benefit. King Philip II too continued to persuade, by recommending again on 5th Februagry, 1597, the Viceroy to form an alliance. King Philip II of Spain wished to maintain cordial relations with Bijapur as is evident from his letter to the viceroy, dated 21st November 1598 from Lisbon. The king wrote- “I approve of your interest in keeping the king of Bijapur on good terms – although he ordered no visit to be paid to you until now, as is customary. Treat him always, remembering how necessary is the alliance with the neighbouring kings to defend us all against the Mughal (Emperor). Obviously the king of Spain wished to preserve the independence of the two barrier states – Bijapur and Ahmednagar in order to prevent the direct onslaught of the Mughal imperialism on the Portuguese possessions on the west coast of India. This is evident from another letter of the King Philip II of Spain to the Viceroy, Ayres de Saldanha, dated 25th January, 1601. King Philip wrote: “---since that king (Akbar) is very powerful and suspicious and desirous of approaching to that island of Goa, I recommend you to keep your eyes open on his designs and intentions to prevent them with the necessary remedies[16].”

In spite of seven years of negotiations (1595-1601), the triple alliance did not materialize. This was partly due to the fading off of the danger for which the coalition was negotiated. Alarmed at the defeat of Malik ‘Ambar at the hands of the Mughals in 1615 the Portuguese once again directed their efforts to bring about the alliance by initiating negotiations of peace with ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah. ‘Adil Shah played a major role in establishing cordial

relations between the Portuguese and Nizam Shah. On 9th October 1615, at Nauraspur (near Bijapur) the Treaty of defensive alliance was signed between 'Adil Shah, the Portuguese and the Nizam Shah. Malik 'Ambar sent his ambassador Kashi Pandit with the authorization that – "Whatever agreement is entered into by Ibrahim 'Adil Shah and Shah Nawaz Khan of Bijapur with the Viceroy shall be signed by our ambassador, Kashi Pandit; this will be observed by us." Likewise Portuguese envoy Antonio Master had obtained authorization to sign the treaty from king of the Portugual as early as 13 May, 1615.

Slight modification was made in the above treaty by the addition of the condition for the institution of a Board of arbitration for disputes regarding the disputed ownership of coconut gardens and groves. The modified treaty was signed at Goa on 1st January 1617 by the Viceroy and the Bijapur envoy.

Sharif Malik the commander of Ponda was giving some trouble to the Portuguese. The Viceroy Dom Hisrome suspected that 'Adil Shah was supporting the Malik. He therefore sent Antonio to Bijapur with a request to check the Malik of Ponda and expel the Dutch, who were attempting to establish a factory at Bijapur. 'Adil Shah accepted these demands. For this purpose the Portuguese bribed a favourite courtier of Bijapur, through Vicente Ribeiro, who was residing at Bijapur and had close connection with the Bijapur nobles[17].

Portuguese assistance to 'Adil Shah against the Mughals

During the siege of Bijapur by the Mughal commander Asaf Khan in 1631, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Conde de Linhares, helped 'Adil Shah secretly with bombardiers, power and munitions. Linhares was tempted by greedy offers of the Mughals and he soon changed his allegiance and thus wrote to the King of Portugal on 16 November 1632 that – "I was obliged to help him (Mughal General) to gain the kingdom of 'Adil Shah and that they would give me as my share almost all the low lands (Konkan) of these surroundings." The Portuguese adopted duel and flexible policy to suit their own purpose and the exigencies of the time. They failed to keep up their treaties with Bijapur. They even deviated from their own proposals. The Viceroy, on the basis of the resolution passed by the Portuguese Council of State on 3rd April 1632, offered all help and favour to 'Adil Shah against the Mughals. This offer was made by virtue of a command of the king of Portugal. It was decided that "in case the Mughals pressed 'Adil Shah too much, when his Excellency (Viceroy) would arrange to come to his help in order that the Mughals should not prevail in destroying him and taking from him his kingdom." And the Viceroy expressed his pressing anxiety in a report to the king of Spain that "should 'Adil Shah lose his kingdom to the Mughals, the Portuguese territories would be placed in a position of greater danger of the direct onslaught of the mighty Mughals[18]."

Naval Hostilities – 1636

Early in 1636 the Portuguese attacked an outgoing ship from the Bijapur port of Dabhol on her way to Persia and Mecca and "shamefully murdered the Moors." The Viceroy had tried to execuse this iattack and the massacre of the people by sending an envoy and some presents to 'Adil Shah. In retaliation, the Bijapurs attacked a Portuguese ship coming from Muscat to Rajapur. The goods amounting to about 6000 ducates were confiscated and the Portuguese were imprisoned. This action of the Portuguese was due to the violation of the terms of the treaty by the Bijapurs. According to the treaty the Bijapurs were bound to ship their pepper only to Portuguese ports[19].

Friendly attitude of Muhammad 'Adil Shah towards the Portuguese

Early in the year 1654 Muhammad 'Adil Shah sent an ambassador, Malik Yaqut, to Goa to settle the old dispute about the territories of Bardez and Salsette. Malik, Yaqut carried a Farmanr of 'Adil Shah in the name of the Portuguese Viceroy asking the latter to allow the Jesuits Fathers of the College of St. Paul, to reside at his Court at Bijapur. The Viceroy De Castro did not object to this proposal. When Yaqut returned to Bijapur, a Jesuit Father Antonio Betelho accompanied him. The Father brought a present for 'Adil Shah on behalf of Viceroy and informed 'Adil Shah of the favourable disposition of de Castro towards Bijapur. The Jesuit Father carried a letter of de Castro for 'Adil Shah. Yaqut induced 'Adil Shah to favour the Portuguese and he obtained from him two Farmanr, which were favour able to the Portuguese.

The first was addressed to Shivappa Nayak, the chief of Ikkeri, commanding him to raise the siege of the fortress of Onor (Hanovar) at once and to retire to Ikkeri as ‘Adil Shah exercised the sovereignty of the whole Kanara. The Nayak defied the Farmanr and continued the siege. Another Farmanr issued by Muhammad ‘Adil Shah was addressed to the governor of Goa.

Dom de Castro, on receiving the Farmanr of ‘Adil Shah, called the Council of State and informed the counselors of its contents. They decided to send a gift as a sign of their gratitude for the issuance of the two Farmanrs. Fr. Martins was sent to Bijapur in April 1654 but not as an official envoy with some secret message. Martins was given two documents by de Castro. One was the credential letter declaring him as the envoy of the governor to treat with ‘Adil Shah about the business and settlement of the Jesuit Mission at Bijapur Court. The other document contained the secret instructions suggested by the Portuguese Council of State. The letter of the Viceroy to ‘Adil Shah contained the Counsel of States’ decision, which expressed indebtedness to ‘Adil Shah and professed cordiality and friendship[20].

War and Peace (1654-55)

One of the instructions given to Fr. Martins by de Castro was to prevent any war between the Bijapurs and Portuguese in the border provinces of Bardez and Salsette. In fact war had broke out there even before Martins reached Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah without any sufficient cause declared war in August 1654

and marched against Bardez and Goa with a large army. The Portuguese who were in Bardez surrendered. In October 1654 ‘Adil Shah invaded Salsette and capture Sarzora and Cutuly.

In the meanwhile Fr. Goncalo Martins arrived at Bijapur and by the favour he enjoyed he easily induced ‘Adil Shah to stop the war. ‘Adil Shah ordered the retreat of his troops from the Portuguese territory. The reply of ‘Adil Shah to de Castro throws light on the friendship and intimate relations between the two states. ‘Adil Shah explicitly declared that he did not want any war with the Portuguese. Embassies were exchanged between Goa and Bijapur and from December 1654, trade was resumed between Bijapur and Goa. To strengthen the bond of friendship, Muhammad ‘Adil Shah and de Castro entered into a new treaty. On 7th March, 1655, the treaty was signed by the Bijapur envoys, the governor, and other eminent persons. The Council of State decided upon ratifying the former treaties of peace with Bijapur viz., the treaty of 3rd April 1633, that of 1576 and that of 29th January 1582. Malik Yaqut and Fr. Martins accepted the decision of the Council[21].

After the treaty the envoys returned to Bijapur and Muhammad ‘Adil Shah ratified the treaty in May 1655. When this news reached Goa, de Castro sent another gift to ‘Adil Shah. It was a beautiful ring enriched with a precious stone.

The new Viceroy, de Silveira, in a letter of 15 December 1655 refers to de Castro’s relations with Bijapur and wrote to the King of Portugal that: “I

found this business in such a state that the Dialxa (‘Adil Shah) seemed to wish to receive tribute from us and I feel sure this would have happened if my coming had been postponed. Probably this appreciation is an exaggeration. It was perhaps partly influenced by hatred towards de Castro and partly due to the letter of ‘Adil Shah, addressed to de Castro, but reached after his fall in the hands of de Sarzeda.”

The letter of ‘Adil Shah contained proposal for help against his rebels in the form of duty and command to obey the Bijapur ambassador. This annoyed the new Viceroy. The latter apparently suspected the desire of ‘Adil Shah to make the Portuguese a tributary to Bijapur. The tone of the letter itself shows that ‘Adil Shah considered the Portuguese as his tributary. De Sarzedes misunderstood the letter and arrived at a wrong and hasty conclusion. ‘Adil Shah wrote that letter on the basis of friendship and alliance that subsisted according to the existing treaties. ‘Adil Shah being the sovereign head of the State his tone was slightly dictatorial. More so because the viceroy was not considered as equal to the Sultan, as the former was not the sovereign head of the State[22].

De Sarzedas was not on good terms with the Malik Yaqut who was still at Goa. He desired to dispose him off.

After 1656, the Bijapur were busy in dealing with the Mughals and had therefore no opportunity to renew hostities with the Portuguese. Hence from

1656 to 1686, nothing special happened to disturb the peaceful relations between the Portuguese and Bijapur.

Commercial rather than political factors determined the Bijapur – Portuguese relations. The Portuguese sovereignty of the seas compelled Bijapur always to adopt conciliatory policy even at the cost of territorial losses. Import of Persian, Arabian and 'Iraqi horses and foreign emigrants were the main causes which made Bijapur to yield and adopt a weak policy towards the Portuguese. These factors dictated Bijapur to put an end to the hostilities abruptly in peaceful settlements. The Cartaz System also governed the Bijapur-Portuguese relations over the seas[23].

Portuguese Sovereignty of the Sea – 'The Cartaz System'

The Portuguese policy in the Indian Ocean aimed at a monopoly of the Eastern trade with Europe by exercising a command over the sea-routes. King Emmanual of Portugal offered his merchants the privilege of trading with India in their own ships, provided they paid a fourth of the profits to the King's treasury and under took not to deal in spices which was a Crown monopoly. The Portuguese achieved their objective by the help of their powerful navy. Their victory over the combined fleet of Bijapur, Ahmednagar, Gujarat, Egypt and others established their supremacy over the seas. They claimed the sovereignty of the sea and compelled all powers, to seek their express permission for navigation. Such a permission had to be purchased by every

trading vessel. Even vessels of the Indian sovereigns were not exempted from this acknowledgement of the Portuguese naval supremacy.

The system of licensing the ships of all oriental trade was started by Almeida, and was perfected by Albuquerque and his successors. Bijapur was no exception; It too had to obtain Portuguese cartazes to a specified number. But these permits were accompanied, by vexatious conditions. Bijapur was not allowed to import or export specified articles mentioned in the cartaz. They were prohibited from visiting the port of Imam of Muscat and of other enemies of the Portuguese. They were not allowed to carry any Christian's slaves. To ascertain the implementation of their conditions the Portuguese claimed and exercised the right to search; in cases of any violation of the rules penalty was imposed by the Portuguese. The Portuguese assumed the right of exclusive possession of the trade initially of two essential commodities pepper and ginger. Gradually they added to the list Chinnaman, clove, spices and several other articles which yielded large profits. The Muslims were forbidden business in all these articles and were not allowed to under take sea voyages for trade to the neighbouring countries[24].

Early in 1513 Albuquerque sent Gracia for the naval blockade of Dabhol. This strategy made Bijapur to come to a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. Pending the negotiations of the treaty, the Bijapur ambassador requested Albuquerque to open or suspend blockade of Dabhol. Albuquerque complied immediately this request under the following conditions: true ingress to the ships which were thither bound with merchandise and provisions;

provided “no prohibited merchandise” were carried. ‘Adil Shah had to apply and seek permission of the viceroy or governor at Goa for the free navigation of Bijapur ships.

The blockade of Dabhol and its opening by the Portuguese meant the destruction of Bijapur’s sovereignty over the seas and their oceanic trade. The Portuguese compelled Bijapur to obtain cartazes for their ship under vexatious conditions. They exercised the sovereignty of the sea in a high handed manner. They jealously guarded their interest, maintained the sovereignty, initially through mutual negotiations, by agreements and finally through specific clauses of treaties or ‘Contracts’. Treaties signed between the Portuguese and Bijapur, had stringent clauses regulating the oceanic trade. They imposed a duty of one per cent on the merchandise carried by the Bijapur ships. This was on the pretext of defraying the expenses of the fleets that were guarding the Bijapur coast for the safety of Bijapur ships[25].

A very peculiar feature of the terms of the Treaty of 1576 was that they were applicable to Bijapur ships originating from Bijapur ports, and destined for non-Portuguese, as well as Portuguese ports. This reveals the magnitude of illegal sovereignty of the seas the Portuguese claimed and enjoyed. Even though the Portuguese had no jurisdiction over the Bijapur ports they exercised illegal sovereignty and guarded them in their own commercial interest but at the expense of Bijapur and also by exacting duty on the merchandise. This was due to their maritime supremacy. The number of cartazas to be issued annually was regulated by the treaties, but on special demand by ‘Adil Shah, additional

cartazas were issued. The study of the system throws considerable light, as to how systematically the Portuguese destroyed Bijapur's oceanic trade and rights over the seas.

Relation with British:

The success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce with the east excited a desire among other nations of Western Europe to follow the example. England was not an exception, and it too awakened and showed signs of inspired interest in the eastern trade. English merchants began to dream of wealth to be gathered in the East. A merchant adventurer Ralph Fitch, with official permission of Queen Elizabeth, made a tour of enquiry in India, bringing home golden reports[26].

During 1585, Ralph Fitch visited Bijapur city and several places in the Kingdom of Bijapur. He did some business in diamonds. Ralph Fitch, accompanied by John Newbery, William Leedes and James Storey, when reached Bijapur in April 1585, they were cast into prison on suspicion of being spies. They were examined before the justice and demanded for letters. They were in prison till 22 December 1585 when they were released on the surities of two thousand ducats, which Fr. Stevens an English – Jesiut, paid. Fr. Stevens was at that time residing at Bijapur.

The East India Company (1612-37)

The out came of Ralph Fitch's tour of Bijapur was the founding in 1599 of an association in London for eastern trade. It was mainly an expression of the growing national desire in England for the trade with the east. The bells which rang out the year 1600 rang in the first East India Company, which was incorporated by a Royal Charter of 31 December 1600 from Queen Elizabeth, under the name of the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies." The Charter granted the Company "whole, entire and only trade and traffic to the East Indies forever[27]."

In February 1612, Sir Henry Middleton visited the Bijapur port of Dabhol. He was assured of friendly relations and help in trade by the Governor of Dabhol. However, the latter secretly prevented the merchants from business with the English. This action of the governor was interpreted as a mark of a sympathy with the Portuguese and a sufficient cause for the English to retaliate. The English were waiting for an opportunity, which they got five years later in 1617. Writing to Pepwell on January, 1671, Roe advised him to endeavour to make prize of the Bijapur vessel that yearly traded between Dabhol and the Red Sea. As a pretext for interfering with the vessel, Roe recalled the incident at Dabhol and 'made stay' of the ship of Bijapur; but the governor of the port, induced him tactfully to release the ship. These fresh overtures of friendship, league and a promise to procure a Farmanr from 'Adil Shah in favour of the English, 'granting privileges to trade at Bijapur ports, brought to nought the whole plan of Roe to avenge the governor's action of 1612. Some

correspondence ensued between Roe and the governor, on the subject of concessions to be granted for trade in Bijapur.

Sir Thomas Roe advised on 27 April, 1617 to the governor of Dabhol appre hending the overtures made by him to trade and seeking further assurances. Roe undertook "on behalf of the King of England a good and firm peace towards his master, his subjects free passage in the seas from any oppression by our fleets, and that yearly I would either send a ship to his port for trade or (if it so required) leave and establish a residence in his Government."

The Bijapur governor's reply was received by Roe in June, 1617. In this he reiterated the promises made to Pepwell but he would not commit himself to buy any specified quantity of goods yearly. As for the desired Farmanr of 'Adil Shah, the governor sent Roe's letter to 'Adil Shah and said that he would communicate the decision to the British ambassador[28]. The governor's reply seemed to Roe sufficiently encouraging, to follow up the matter; and he arranged in the following February (1618) for the 'Anne' to call at Dabhol on her way to the Red Sea. This, however, was found to be impracticable and nothing more was done till the sailing of the fleet in 1619. However, it seems that 'Anne' under the captain Andrew Shilling did sail to Dabhol in August, 1618. Edward Heynes was one of the Englishmen on board of 'Anne'. Heynes further informs us that on 11th August, 1618, the captain of of Dabhol, Malik 'Morvet' (Muhammad), sent to them his letter of recommendations to 'Adil

Shah, regarding the freedom of trade, friendly usage at Dabhol and promise to defend the ships home-wards bound from pirates etc.

In 1619, Captain Bonner, at Roe's suggestion, called at Dabhol. No sales were affected. But the Bijapur authorities were so lavish in their promises that the English forebore to enforce a trade; and sent a word to Surat advising a further attempt in sending cargo to Dabhol in the following year. With this beginning British ships stared calling at Bijapur port, and import of British goods and export of Bijapur merchandise started.

In March 1623, Captain Michael Green reported to President Rastell at Surat that they had received a letter from Ibrahim 'Adil Shah. 'Adil Shah desired firm friendship and amity with the English, and wished to conclude a peace treaty. He desired help and alliance of the English to drive out the Portuguese from all his territories (both present and former lost territories of Bijapur Kingdom). 'Adil Shah sought the assistance of the English by sea, while he himself wished to operate from land. To these desires and demands of 'Adil Shah, Captain Michael sent conciliatory and encouraging replies through the former's messenger, and adviced 'Adil Shah to wait till the opportunity permits to execute the said desires and wished to continue and maintain the amity just began. This cold reply of Captain Michael for 'Adil Shah's proposal of an alliance against the Portuguese was guided by the policy of non-interference formulated by Sir Thomas Roe for the East India Company[29]. Sir Thomas Roe's policy was "unaggressive and wholly mercantile." Roe disliked the military-commercial policies of the Portuguese and the Dutch which he

believed to consume all their profits. This policy of Roe was adopted by the Company for about seventy years from 1615 onwards, but with an exception, when the British allied with Bijapur against the Portuguese in October, 1637.

By 1635, the English trade at Dabhol had increased considerably. This necessitated the establishment of a factory at Dabhol. For this purpose the Company requested ‘Adil Shah to grant a license to establish a factory at Dabhol. On 3rd December 1635 President Methwold and the Council at Surat passed instructions to William Pitt to proceed to Dabhol in the ‘Francis’ and deliver letters to the Bijapur governor of Dabhol. The governor was given other letters and presents for passing on to Agha Raja at Bijapur, with a request for a speedy action for obtaining from Muhammad ‘Adil Shah a Farmanr to establish a factory at Dabhol. The ‘Adil Shahi Farmanr was so essential for the British that William Pitt wrote from Dabhol to the President and Council at Surat on 17th April, 1636 that: “The King’s Farman is expected daily[30].”

At last the long awaited Farmanr was issued by ‘Adil Shah in August 1636. It was not very much to the liking of William Pitt; and he expressed his dissatisfaction over it.

On 27th January, 1637 when Captain Weddells fleet anchored at the Bijapur port of Bhatkal, the Shah Bandar and ‘king’s merchant’ came on board and assured the Englishmen of a welcome, offering to provide pepper and made an agreement for the barter deal of lead for pepper. They sent a letter and a present to ‘Adil Shah, who replied promising all reasonable concessions. The

Englishmen also sought permission to establish a factory or a 'settled residence."

During February 1637, the Bijapur governor of Rajapur desired Englishmen to trade there and promised all freedom and undertook to furnish 3000 candys of pepper yearly and buy large quantities of English commodities. Though the Englishmen traded at Dabhol and Rajapur they also travelled down to various places in the interior of Bijapur kingdom for the purchase of commodities and for selling English goods-coral, broadcloth, lead etc. As some of the ports viz., Rajapur had neither goods or merchants and everything had to be obtained from markets in the interior of the kingdom[31].

British Alliance against the Portuguese

Contrary to Roe's non-aggressive policy and in furtherance to the reply to Captain Michael to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah in 1623, the Englishmen took initiative in 1638 to collaborate with Bijapur in a military expedition against the Portuguese. In October William Jacobszoon Kester left eleven vessels in Goa Road, where they were to remain throughout the monsoon to prevent the sailing of ships of the Portuguese; and if possible, to attack on the city of Goa, in conjunction with 'Adil Shah Preceding to this naval action there must have been some preliminary dealings leading to an understanding to collaborate. Though the English vessels got ready and waited to attack the Portuguese

possession jointly with ‘Adil Shah’s help. As ‘Adil Shah was forced to stay at Bijapur on account of impending Mughal attack on Bijapur.

British Factories at Deccan Ports:

In 1639 the English sent a mission to Muhammad ‘Adil shah with rich presents consisting of several articles valued at 2500 pagodas. In return the English demanded a Farmanr for trading in his dominions. Permission was granted to the English to trade at Karwar and Rajapur. The English built a house at Karwar to serve as a factory, but were unable to carry on any business there. They next contemplated building factories at Rjapur and Raybagh. At Karwar they stationed a few English factors.

In October 1648, the governor of Rajapur, Muhammad Qasim, broke open the English Company’s warehouse and carried away the stock of cloth, under pretence that it belonged to Courteen, another Englishman who was operating in Bijapur and owed custom dues to the governor. The governor imprisoned Gowton, Oxidion and Captain Blackman on their arrival at Rajapur. They tried in vain to settle the matter and get release of the Englishmen. Later Blackman sailed for Kharepatan (Carapatan), another Bijapur port. Here he was received well by the governor with promises of all possible assistance for the restitution of the cloth confiscated by the governor of Rajapur. The governor of Kharepatan granted a “cowle or warrant for free trade at that port;” and gave a list for the payment of customs upon easy terms[32].

At Kharepatan, Blackman threatened the governor that the English would take their revenge upon the shipping of the port of Kharepatan. This threat worked effectively. The governor wrote to the Court at Bijapur, urging that the English goods should be returned to the owners. The Rajapur merchants who had falsely certified in writing that the goods were there of Fourteen now confessed that they did so under compulsion and that the statement was false. Though the English threatened retaliation yet they were unwilling to use force against Bijapur as this would hinder their investments on that coast. The English stopped issuing passes to the ships belonging to the port under 'Adil Shah. This caused all the Bijapur merchants of those ports to solicitate satisfaction in favour of the English. The English, in September,1649 seized two Bijapur junks and carried them to the bar at Goa where they held them as security for the return of their men and goods by the Bijapur authorities[33].

The Company's Agent Beni Das was deputed to the Court at Bijapur for pleading the cause of English for the release of the cloth, which had been confiscated at Rajapur. On his arrival at Bijapur, Beni Das met the Queen-Mother of 'Adil Shah, and leading noblemen, for influencing the Sultan to favour the Englishmen.

By September 1649 the differences between the English and the Bijapur authorities were settled. The new governor of Rajapur invited the English to resume their business at that port. 'Adil Shah promised satisfaction for the cloth seized by paying one-half of its worth in ready cash and the other half to

be deducted in customs. The Sultan directed the governor to assure the English of "free and un-interrupted trade." On 18th September, 1649, Beni Das was dispatched to Rajapur, carrying letters from the President in answer to those received from the governor of Rajapur. But nothing came out of this mission. In March 1650 Beni Das reported that 'Adil Shah offered to compensate, by the adjustment of custom. The English rejected this as inadequate and ordered Beni Das to return to Surat, after intimating to the governor of Rajapur that the English would right themselves by seizing Bijapur ships. Still the English wished to settle peacefully, without resorting to reprisals under orders of the Directors of the Company at England[34].

The dispute was further widened by another incident which took place in October, 1650, at Rajapur. On return of an English factor, Morse from Combroon to Rajapur, a dispute ensued. Whereupon Morse, with some of his men assaulted merchants' house, killing three persons and wounding many others. There upon governor collected some men and took away from them the money they were carrying off and put them in irons. He seized everything that was in Morse's house, to the value of 5000 pagodas and reported the whole matter to the Sultan of Bijapur. The latter directed that the money and goods be sent to the Court and that the prisoners should be transferred to a fort. Morse himself escaped, and re-quitioned Surat to rescue his men. Morse took revenge by attacking and burning the Bijapur junks, returning from the Red Sea.

Grants privileges to the British

In March 1659, Revington came to Rajapur and obtained grant of privileges from Rustum-i Zaman. On 24th July, 1659, Agha Murshid, governor of Karwar, granted to Randolph Taylor and Philip Gifford, the following previleges, on behalf of 'Ali 'Adil Shah for the port of Karwar: guarantee given to the English for free trade; the customs dues were fixed at 1½% on imported goods; treasure was exempted from duty; the governor of Karwar was to assist the English in the recovery of debts; the English were permitted to administer justice to their own servants; the English were permitted to build a new house, with the permission of Rustum-i Zaman; and other 'usual privileges'. Later these privileges were confirmed by the Court of Bijapur.

Though Lari was in use along the Bijapur coast, due to the absence of silver coinage in Bijapur, great inconvenience was caused to the traders. To get rid of this trouble, Revington proposed to Rustum-I Zaman to procure permission for the English to establish a mint at Rajapur, and strike silver coins, similar to that of the Mughal. Rustum-I Zaman agreed and recommended for a license to the Court of Bijapur for permitting such an undertaking to the English. This proposal only materialized thirteen years later, and a mint was established at Bombay. The coins minted at Bombay were also intended partly for circulation in the Bijapur Kingdom[35].

Revington then proceeded to Hukkeri, to meet Rustum-I Zaman and negotiate with him regarding payment of customs on the portion of the pepper

which had been sent to Karwar for shipment. After smoothing the way by the presentation of articles valued at a hundred pagodas, Ravington obtained a grant. The privileges which Rustum-i Zaman granted were: “The English could buy pepper at Hubli; without paying any customs there. They were to pay the customs only at Rajapur, from where it was exported. Nor they were to pay at Karwar but only at Rajapur.”

Revington had a scheme for the development of trade in the Bijapur Kingdom. In his dreams of the future, he saw Rajapur the centre of a large trade in saltpeter, pepper, calicoes, and cotton yarn; the site for a mint providing coinage for use all along the west coast; and the headquarters of the Presidency coinage for use all along the west coast; and the headquarters of the Presidency in place of Surat. He also planned to built a fort near the mouth of the river. To achieve his dream he developed and maintained good terms with Rustum-i Zaman. And he was awaiting for an opportunity to oblige Bijapur. This came in 1660 and Revington was quick to seize the opportunity of offering to sell his mortars and shells to Siddi Johar (Salabat Khan) for the reduction of the fortress of Pandhalla held by Shivaji[36].

In 1661 Shivaji took revenge over the English for their help to Bijapur, by imprisoning their President, Revington and a few other Englishmen. In retaliation to this action the English ordered for the siezure of Bijapur ship along the western coast. For their release the English tried to intercept the Queen of Bijapur on her way back from Mecca at the end of August, 1662. For their release the British President at Surat also wrote a letter to ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah

to use his good offices. The English wrongly believed that Shivaji was ‘Adil Shah’s “subject” and Rajapur still a port of Bijapur. In response to President’s letter, ‘Adil Shah replied that it would be of no avail to write to Shivaji for releasing the Englishmen. ‘Adil Shah said that an army of his was proceeding against Shivaji, and if successful, he hoped to accomplish his and their (Englishmen’s) desires. The English played mischief and they robbed and plundered a squadron of Bijapur vessels. This led to the closure of the Rajapur factory for a few years.

The English demanded a Farmanr from ‘Adil Shah for the security of the Englishmen and their goods in the Bijapur Kingdom.

In 1663 there was a conflict between the governor of Karwar and the English over the payment of custom duty at Shiveshwar port. The governor seized the English goods. The English left the port of Karwar and stopped all trade at that port. When the matter came to the notice of ‘Adil Shah, he issued a Farmanr in July, 1663 in favour of the English. Assuring security he directed the English to return to Karwar to re-establish their trade, without fear of any molestation. He likewise wrote to Rustum-i Zaman to give orders to his men at Karwar to use civility and be good in their relations with the English and not to trouble them. Through the above Farmanr and letter the English obtained the following privileges[37].

The governor of Karwar was directed to behave gently and to not to exact any unreasonable customs, besides what had been already agreed with the

English; the governor of Shiveshwar was commanded to not to make any unjust claims from the English and not to levy any new customs; the governor of Cuddera was commanded to maintain the previous abatement of the customs of two pagodas per 100 oxen from the English; and the English were assured security for themselves and their property.

By August, 1663, the English factors started returning to Karwar. The Directors of the East India Company in London observed that “Trade should be maintained at Karwar and a ‘faire correspondency’ kept with the ‘king of Deccan (Bijapur) by all possible means.” However, with all the good gesture of Bijapurs towards the English, the latter, refused to issue a pass for the ship of the dowager Queen of Bijapur for Basra and Bughdad. The English demanded specific Farmanr from ‘Adil Shah himself for the issue of a pass[38].

By 1665, Rajapur once again coming in the possession of ‘Adil Shah, the governor of Rajapur invited the English to re-establish their factory and trade which was closed down due to the capture of Rajapur by Shivaji. In spite of the English being reluctant to return to Rajapur the Bijapurs refused permission to the Dutch to establish a factory at Rajapur on the grounds that “the place was at the English’s refusal.” Implying that the place was at the disposal of the English and they (Bijapur) could not permit the Dutch to establish factory there unless the English refused to re-establish it there.

Due to wars between Bijapur and the Marathas the English factory at Karwar was closed down temporarily from March 1666 and the factors left for Hubli for safety.

In spite of the agreement, differences and disputes did arise. In 1670, the Desai of Karwar demanded half-percent separate duty on goods. This claim he put forward after the factory was resettled by Randolph Taylor under the agreement. The agreement provided a comprehensive duty of one and half per cent; and the Desai sought to get half-per cent either out of this, which the governor refused or from the factory. The English refused to comply the demand and the Desai caused some trouble by preventing them from building the factory house. However, the Desai gave license and the building of the new house, for which the governor of Karwar laid the foundation stone, came up. At the opening ceremony in 1674, the same Desai was present[39].

Until 1673 relations with the English were restricted only to the factories and trade in the west coast. On 10th March, 1673, Nadhir Muhammad, Bijapur governor of Ginji, invited them to settle a factory on the Coromandel coast, at or near Porto Novo and at Valudavur near Pondichery. The governor offered the English all possible facilities and suggested construction of forts for their own defense with promises of grant of privileges. He extended a friendly invitation for the deputation of an English Agent to him and sent a present. The English welcoming the invitation, sent a formal reply with a handsome present through Elihu Yale to the Khan. They initiate negotiations for the acquisition of a port in Bijapur territory. The Khan advised the English to send their men to

take the possession of the port and set up the English flag there, in order to free him from the importunities of the Dutch and the French. The proposed project to acquire the port was confirmed by the Directors of Company at England, who instructed the Agent at Fort St. George that – "we approve of the settlement you have made in the Ginji country and would have you nourish it by all means possible."

Concessions to the British

During 1675, the English factor Child established good relations at Raybagh. He got a remission of half the custom duty, usually charged at Raybagh, from Bahlol Khan, Commander-in-chief of Bijapur.

In April, 1678 the governor of Hubli, Antaji Pandit, forced the English to pay a part of the chouth, which he had to pay to Shivaji for the safety of that town. The governor sent 20 peons and forced open the Company's warehouse at Hubli and, took 25 per cent of broadcloth and put them to sale in the bazaar to realize partly the wealth tax of 500 pagodas and partly the contribution for chauth. For satisfaction and peaceful settlement, the English factor wrote to the Court of Bijapur. He requested the appointment of a new governor and implementation of 'Ali 'Adil Shah's former Farmanr which granted privileges to the English[40]. Pending the decision from the Court, the English factors were directed by the Council to sell the remaining goods at Hubli and then retire to Dharwar, another Bijapur town of trade, where 'Adil Shah granted them,

through a Farmanr, exemption of two years customs and permission to build a warehouse. They were also advised to seize the two ships belonging to deceased Bahlol Khan as retaliation for the action of the governor of Hubli.

Courteen's Factory at Karwar

Sir William Courteen, a Cornish gentleman was the first Englishman to establish a factory at Karwar in Bijapur territory in the year 1639. Muhammad 'Adil Shah granted to him a piece of land, where Courteen established a factory and carried on the trade under the banner of Courteen's Association. "Later on this Association founded factories at Rajapur and Bathicola. The Association was afterwards styled as "The Assada Merchants".

Earlier in 1636, Sir William Courteen had obtained from Charles I a license to engange in Indian Trade. Mountney and Captain Weddel were dispatched to Surat, on behalf of the new Company of Merchants Trading to the East[41]. "The King (Charles I) received a share in the venture" of the Courteen's. This move was a violation of the Charter granted to the London Company. It was therefore necessary to find an excuse and it was duly set forth in the preamble of the grant that "the East India Company had neglected to establish fortified factories, or seats of trade to which the King's subjects could resort with safety – that they have consulted their own interests only, without any regard to the King's revenue – and in general, that they had broken the

conditions upon which their charter and exclusive privileges had been granted to them."

King Charles I assured the East India Company, on the word of a 'Christian King', that the new Courteen's Association will not complete the Company and directed them to render assistance to the new Association.

When in 1639 Sir William Courteen died, his license for trade in Bijpaur Kingdom was renewed in the name of his son and his associates.

In 1639-40 Leonard Woodman of the Courteen's Association was permitted by the Rajapur governor to trade at Rajapur. He presented to 'Adil Shah costly articles of various description, valued at 2535 pagodas. He presented to Muhammad 'Adil Shah a petition desiring freedom of trade throughout his Kingdom paying usual customs, as other Bijapur merchants do. He further requested the issuance of a Farmanr for the recovery of 12000 pagodas, imprested in 1639 by Mounteny to the chiefs of Karwar for the supply of pepper which was till then not delivered. It seems that 'Adil Shah granted the petition[42].

By 1646 the Association sank into bankruptcy. They submitted a piteous appeal to the East India Company to take over the Karwar factory. The Company declined the offer. In 1647, the House of Lords gave Courteen three years time to withdraw.

Srizure of Karwar Factory by Bijapur

On 13th Jaunary, 1649 the governor's brother sent for the factor Lloyd to his house at Shiveshwar. About 50 soldiers seized the factory. Daniel Mason and others in the factory were taken by surprise as they never expected such an action by the Bijapurs. Daniel and other were brought as prisoners to Shiveshwar. Lloyd sought an interview with the governor, why they had been thus treated. But his request was refused and he was told that the reason for his imprisonment was that four year's rent amounting to 800 pagodas principal, with compound interest at 25% making 1500 pagodas in all was due to the governor. The governor complained that Captain Durson had given him no satisfaction for an adventure sent by him to Ormuz, for which 1700 pagodas were claimed, reckoning cent per cent gains at Ormuz and as much for the returns with interest at 25% The matter was settled when they signed a declaration of owing large sum to the governor[43].

The Association lingered on till 1657, when Cromwell renewed the Charter, and the East India Company absorbed Courteen's bankrupt Association and resumed its monopoly.

The original English settlements in India were merely emporia, bazaars, places of commerce and no more. The original policy of the Company was to avoid acquiring real property, which could be taxed or which might have to be defended, but this was found to be inevitable. Then the element of security that the warehouse must be protected. The traders became armed traders. The next

step was to employ soldiers to defend the settlement; and then to establish 'spheres of influence.'

The year 1661 ushers in a w era in the relations of Bijapur with the British. By the Royal Charter, the East India Company's servants in India were authorised to make peace and war with any prince or people, not being Christian; and to administer justice for themselves and their dependents. These privileges transformed a body of Ware-house men into a political corporation, which might almost be called a Government[44].

From the very beginning the Britishers adopted a policy of friendship and amity with Bijapur, non-interference in the affairs of Bijapur and a policy of non-align-ment (with one or two exceptions) Roe adopted an "unaggressive wholly merchantile" policy. He disliked the military – commercial policies. When in 1623, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II sought British alliance and collaboration against the Portuguese, the English gave a cold reply to wait for appropriate time with a view to divert and postpone the idea. In 1637, one exception to the non-alignment policy was made when the English took the initiative to make naval attack on the Portuguese, in favour of Bijapur.

It was their non-aligned policy which failed to appeal the English, the invitation in 1659 of Rustum-I Zaman to assist Shivaji in taking the fort of Danda-Rajapuri and become partner in the share of rich treasure in that Bijapur port. In 1674, when Rustam-i Zaman came back to Bijapur service, he requested the English to spare him guns and 'bullions' in his conflict with

Shivaji. The English factor at Karwar, Bandish refused to comply pointing out that "they were merchants, who had come to Karwar to trade and not to fight." Sometimes the Englishmen assisted Bijapur secretly.

The Britishers were directed by their Directors of the Company in England to adopt peaceful and reconciliatory measures with Bijapur. The gestures of friendship, amity and help rendered by Bijapur and his governors to the English, doubted their integrity, when the question of their favouring the Dutch along with the English came up. On 10th January 1666, the President and Council at Surat advised the factor Robert at Karwar to "not to trust to the favour of the king of Bijapur or Rustum-i Zaman,' for they are all the slaves of bribes, and money will incline them any way[45]."

British relations paved the way for building up British power in south India.

Relations with Dutch:

The Dutch came to trade with India towards the close of the sixteenth century. For the Dutch Lisbon was the market from where they purchased Indian merchandise. In 1580, the Spanish and Portuguese dominions were united under the Spanish Crown. King Philip II closed the harbours of Spain and Portugal to the commerce of the Dutch in 1585 and they were thus deprived of Indian goods. The Dutch then decided to engage directly in the Indian trade. The conflict between Spain, Portugal and Holland grew. Dutch

ships were confiscated and their owners were imprisoned. This rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese continued between them and their possessions in India.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch had determined to take full advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese and oust them from their eastern trade. The Dutch having command of the seas in the East, hindered and interrupted communications between the Portuguese ports. They even prevented the sending of reinforcements from the mother country. Their cause was further strengthened by the agreement between the English and the Dutch in 1619. The Dutch being fully aware of the chronic enmity between the Portuguese and Bijapur, took advantage of seeking an alliance with Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II against the Portuguese. They gained several other favours from ‘Adil Shah on the pretext of helping him against the Portuguese. In 1637 the Dutch adopted the policy of annually blockading Goa. They wanted to build a port and a fortified factory at Vengurla to serve as a point d’appui for blockading Portuguese fleets and as a port of observation during the months when they were not there[46].

ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDIAL RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE

Dutch Embassy

With this background and motives, the Dutch Governor-General and the Council of the Dutch sent Juan Van Twist as ambassador to Bijapur. In

January, 1637, Van Twist Chief Factor for the Dutch at Surat landed at Dabhol, on his mission to ‘Adil Shah. The purpose of the mission was partly ascribed to procure trading at Dabhol, but mainly to seek the assistance of Bijapur against the Portuguese at Goa. This is evident from the letter of Commander Jacob Cooper, addressed to ‘Adil Shah which throws considerable light on the Dutch diplomacy. The letter which is dated 31 December, 1636 reads: “Very mighty king, the much esteemed Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, Governor-General and the Councillors of India, who rule the United States in the East and the illustratious and very mighty members of the Privy Council of the free Netherlands and his Royal Grace Fredrik, Hendrick and Prince Orangic etc., and the rulers of the general East India Company have been pleased to send me with a big fleet of well 14 equiped warships to these districts, not only to do as much harm as possible by land and at sea to the Portuguese, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty (‘Adil Shah), but also to enter into a closer contact with your Majesty and other princes and friendly rulers, and to give them every help and assistance against, the said Portuguese and their allies. For that purpose, we arrived about two months ago safely with our fleet on the Indian Coast and in the roadstead of Goa…..[47]”

“With the remaining ten ships, we are lying in the bay and roadstead of Goa in the range of vision of the Portuguese castles and their galleons, which we expect at sea every day to give us battle…… And in order to show your Majesty the good intentions which the illustrious Governor-General and the Councillors of India, have always had to please and serve your Majesty, these

gentlemen have ordered me to offer your Majesty their friendship and assistance as much as possible, not only to the glory and prosperity of His Majesty's kingdom and subjects, but also to the prosperity and rest of the whole coast of India against the insatiable imperialism of the Portuguese and their allies, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty; and they promise that just as we have closed Goa now from the seaside with our fleet, they intend to continue this practice every year, so that we dare assure your Majesty that if your Majesty (who has got many soldiers) is willing to bring his land forces before Goa and to cut off the supply from that side, Goa will soon be forced to surrender to your Majesty. For this purpose and in order to close a good treaty, of peace with your Majesty in the name of our principals, and to obtain free entrance in all the countries of your Majesty, we have agreed to send over special ambassador with proper orders and full authority to the Court of your Royal Majesty[48]. As per the instructions of the Governor-General and the Council of India, we have therefore committed our brave and beloved Joan Van Twist, Fiscal of the fleet and the first man in our secret Council, to bring this letter. We respectfully request your Majesty to believe our said ambassador and brother in everything which we will propose in the name of us and our principals, and to let him enjoy the favour of your Majesty, in which we trust. Sire, we kiss the hands of your Majesty, and pray the Almighty to protect the throne of Your Majesty in happiness and beatitude for many years and also the person of your Majesty."

On Van Twist's arrival at Bijapur, the above letter was read out to 'Adil Shah by an interpreter. 'Adil Shah, after hearing the contents of the letter and understanding the commission of the Prince of Orangil, he uttered "Bahot Khub". 'Adil Shah immediately granted permission for the Dutch for the free trade in his kingdom, and ordered his minister, Mustafa Khan to issue a Farmanr in favour of the Dutch. 'Adil Shah also agreed for joint attack on Goa. For the service and help of Dutch ships at sea, 'Adil Shah granted the Dutch freedom from tolls; and promised to pay half the tribute of the "afandigos" and of the revenues of Goa and booty, after its conquest[49].

Dutch Alliance

Van Twist's mission was successful and 'Adil Shah issued a Farmanr granting the desires of the Dutch with the sole intention of meeting the challenge of the Portuguese on the seas. The Farman of 1046/1637 reads:

"To the esteemed and highly respected lion of the sea, Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, Viceroy of the Dutch in India. I should like very much trust that during the September monsoon you will send a strong fleet before Goa. At the same time, I shall send support of horsemen and footmen from the land side, and I hope that they will fight with courage against the Portuguese and seize the town of Goa and the surrounding countries; and that they will deliver the town and countries to my governor and Captains".

“And I shall order to give a place in my country to the Dutch, where they may come and go for trade purposes without having anything to ask for any person When the Dutch arrive in my harbours, I shall order my governors and captain that they must favour them and help them and give them everything they want, viz., food stuffs, drinks and other things they want in connection with the war.”

“And because the Portuguese have broken the peace contract and the old friendship we had with them, I give permission to the Dutch to come in all my countries and if the Dutch deliver to me the said town of Goa and the surrounding countries, I undertake to give them half of the revenues and of the tributes and also a place where they like to establish themselves either in Goa or in other ports of mine wherever they will like[50].”

They may be assured of this my promise and may trust me; and when they come next year before Goa, this contract, which I have made with them, will be in force just the same as the contract I made with King Sicander, I shall never act against it but always live up to it.”

Dutch activities against the Portuguese

On the advice of Van Twist, Mustafa Khan gave orders for the fortification of Vengurla, and for its reinforcement to help the Dutch. For the Dutch, Vengurla, and for its reinforcement to help the Dutch. For the Dutch, Vengurla was of prime importance and they considered that “without it, it

would be impossible to continue the siege before Goa." Mustafa Khan adviced Van Twist to appoint a Dutch Agent at the Court of Bijapur. This was in order to prevent the Portuguese factions who were out to obstruct the Dutch-Bijapur alliance. Van Twist wished to send a permanent ambassador to Bijapur. This proposal seems to have materialized as in one of the dispatches Van Twist writes on his arrival again at Dabhol, that he was "greeted by Mr. Ramadhan, ambassador of your Royal Majesty in the empire of Visiapour." This person does not seem to be a Dutch national.

The Dutch continued the war with the Portuguese with increased vigour and almost with unvarying success. The blockade of Goa was resumed and fierce naval fighting took place between the Dutch and the Portuguese at Sea, near Karli river, south of Malvar[51].

After the war misunderstanding started between 'Adil Shah and the Dutch. 'Adil Shah demanded from the Dutch all the booty, especially the artillery. The Dutch refused to send the booty, 'Adil Shah caused the Dutch factors at Vengurla to be apprehended and imprisoned. The chief of Dutch merchant, resident at Vengurla, Peter Paets, presented to 'Adil Shah two very large pieces of brass ordinance and several other valuable things and offered continued assistance of the Dutch at Sea, if 'Adil Shah sent his forces by land. 'Adil Shah expressed his inability to send land forces, as they were busy in the Karnatak.

During the naval blockade of Goa by the Dutch in 1638-39, the Portuguese Viceroy felt hopeless to compete with the Dutch signle-handed; he dispatched and embassy to ‘Adil Shah with a view of inducing him to help them to turn out the Dutch. The Portuguese were unaware of the Bijapur-Dutchalliance. Portuguese ambassador, met with but little encouragement and entirely failed to accomplish his object. And during 1640-41, Bijapur-Dutch relations were friendly and peaceful[52].

THE DUTCH ON COROMANDEL COAST

By 1649, the whole of the district of Ginji, including the sea board Tegenapatam was conquered by Bijapur. The Dutch promptly obtained from the Bijapur Commander in charge of Ginji and Madura a reassuring “Kaul”, for trade and other facilities in the Bijapur Kingdom. In 1650 the new governor of Bijapur gave further assurances that the trading rights of the Dutch in Ginji and further south would be duly respected. In August 1651, Farmanrs from ‘Adil Shah, formally guaranteed the Dutch trading rights at the Bijapur ports as well as the Coromandel coast, and fixed the tolls for Tegenapatam at two and a half per cent, which was only about half the previous rate.

With Thanjavur Nayak’s acceptance of Bijapur’s suzerainty, the Dutch factory at Karikal also came under Bijapur’s suzerainty. The Bijapur governor granted ’Kauls‘, to the Dutch in 1649 and 1652, with the same conditions as formerly granted in ‘Adil Shah’s Farmanr of 1651.

Though it was Khan-i Khanan, commander-in-chief of the Bijapur army, who gave the ‘Kaul’ to the Dutch to trade and got them Farmans from ‘Adil Shah, yet in 1652, the Dutch refused passes for his ship to proceed to Achin and Queda. Instead of these places, the Dutch offered him passes for Tenasserim and Pegu. This did not satisfy the Khan and he decided to send one ship to Achin without a pass. In 1655, one of the Khan’s ships, while returning from Achin without a pass, was attacked by a Dutch ship cruising in the Bay. Such incidents were a source of continuous tension despite Khan’s generally friendly and helpful attitude towards the Dutch Company. The nobles of Bijapur wanted to develop trade relations with the eastern countries and this clashed with commercial interests of the Dutch[53].

During the Bijapur-Golconda conflict in 1652 over the partition of the Karnataka the Dutch adopted a neutral policy and was endeavouring to live as peacefully as possible with both the contenting powers. In August, 1654, the Dutch obtained another Farman of ‘Adil Shah, granting them privileges at Tegenapatem and neighbouring ports.

Diplomatic endeavours and Peaceful Relations

By 1659, the Portuguese were successful in their endeavour to instigate the Queen of Bijapur against the Dutch. The Portuguese sent an envoy to Bijapur with very costly presents valued at 100,000 pagodas, and a further promise of offering 10,000 Pagodas annually if amicable relations between

Bijapur and the Portuguese were restored; and if the Dutch were expelled from the Bijapur territory. The Portuguese obtained nothing more than a renewal of former treaties. This animated the Dutch. But for the diplomacy of the Dutch, relations would have strained. No sooner did the Portuguese envoy left Bijapur, the Dutch supplanted favour of Bijapur by offering 'peshkash' and got cancelled the Portuguese proposal of sending Bijapur's army against the Dutch. Due to the diplomacy of the Dutch, the Queen was induced to send an army against the Portuguese to claim Bijapur's rights over the territories of Bardes and Salsette. She demanded 20,000 pagodas as yearly payment for claim over these territories[54].

In 1660 the young 'Adil Shah granted the Dutch exemption from tolls on the cows purchased at Vengurla. In the following year the Dutch showed their friendly gesture by providing a ship to the Queen-mother of Bijapur for her pilgrimage to Mecca. Later when visited Persia, the Dutch even carried her letters to Bijapur. They loaned money to her in Persia, while 'Adil Shah was directed to pay the amount to the Dutch Company at Golconda.

In January, 1663 Dutch solicitations for permission to establish a factory at Karwar was granted by the Bijapur governor of that place.

In February 1661 Shivaji secured possession of Porto Novo and Tegenaptam but, in 1662, the Bijapur commander Bahlol Khan recaptured it. During the siege of the fort of Tegenapatam, the Dutch trade was completely disturbed and all the merchants, flew to neighbouring towns. After the capture

of the fort, the Dutch governor Pit sent Pieter de Lange and Francois Thivort, to the Bijapur Commander with the object of restoring normalcy in the town and settling the dispute with the merchants. It was agreed that the amount of 250 pagodas, which the Bijapur soldiers had exacted, from the Dutch soon on their arrival at Tegenepatam, to be adjusted against the tolls they were to pay. The Bijapur commander, Sher Khan Lodi promised and assured the Dutch that during the reign of his brother, Bahlol Khan the Farmanrs would never be exacted from the Dutch both, at the port of Porto Novo and Tegenapatam; except in extraordinary circumstances[55].

In August, 1669, Sher Khan, the Bijapur governor of Ginji entered into an agreement with the Dutch at Tegenapatam to suppress the revolt of the craftsmen and weavers Sher Khan sided with the Dutch on account of heavy losses he was suffering in the revenue due to the revolt.

The growing wealth and prosperity of Pondicherry, a French port, made the Dutch jealous of the French. The Dutch, in 1674, stationed a war-ship off San Thome to prevent the ingress of foodstuffs to Dela Haye. They also mobilised the garrisons at their factories at Porto Novo, Devanampatnam (later Fort St. David) and Negapatnam for the purpose of attacking Pondicherry. The Dutch approached Nadhir Muhammad, the Bijapur governor of Ginji who agreed to dispatch a body of cavalry to lay waste the region of Pondicherry.

Dutch Treaty, 1676

Ekoji, commander of Bijapur, conquered and occupied Thanjavur in 1675. The Dutch approached him for confirmation of their trading rights on the Coromandel Coast. After negotiations between Ekoji and Peter Verwer, they agreed and signed a treaty in 1676.

From the study of the Treaty the following facts emerge:

That this Treaty was variously called an 'alliance', 'contract', 'kaul', 'agreement';

That the previous privileges enjoyed by the Dutch, unhindered trade and half toll on imports and exports were accepted and confirmed by Bijapur;

The ten old villages in the possession of the Dutch were to remain with them; the Poyyur garden to the south of the fort of Negapatam and the garden to the west of the new Veligopuram were also to remain with the Dutch; and the Dutch were to pay annually 1200 pon as rent for the ten villages to Bijapur[56].

Bijapur agreed to surrender all claims over Negapatam, ten old villages, Poyyur and Veli gardens. Ekoji was to hand them over to the Dutch by the 13th of the month of Purattasi in the Ananda Year, (A.D.1674). In return for territorial cessions, the Dutch Company agreed to give Ekoji one tusker elephant and cash as detailed below, viz., 1200 pon per annum fortheen old

villages of the Company at 10 panams of 3½ mattu per pon; 300 pon for Negapatam; making in all 4200 pon and one tusker elephant to be handed over by the end of the year.

Ekoji approved and authorised the Dutch to establish a mint at Negapatam for the minting of panam, varahan and pagoda. The profits earned after meeting the expenditure of the mints were to be divided equally between the Dutch Company and Ekoji. Further, one of the representative of Ekoji was to stay in the mint for the verifications of accounts and profits[57].

Ekoji undertook to offer protection to the Dutch possessions (mentioned in the Treaty) wherever necessary. If he failed, then, the Dutch were to do themselves at the cost of Ekoji;

The devadaya, brahmadaya, manya and madappuram in Negapatam were to be continued as before.

Differences over the parts of Karikal and Tirumalai Raja's pattanam, in the possession of the Dutch were to be settled by a treaty on the arrival of Signor Governor from Ceylon to Negapatam. Ekoji was to continue to told the two parts under him till final settlement.

The sum of 3150 pon (detailed above) which the Dutch Company had to pay to Ekoji for the period of a year and a half from A.D. 1676 Rakasa year, Tai month to A.D 1677, Pingala Year, Ani month viz., at the end of Tai, in year Nala, A.D. 1677.

The Dutch Company was to conform to the terms of this agreement.

This treaty was friendly and peaceful in nature, safeguarding commercial interests of the Dutch and did not had any provision for military alliance nor did it involve other European Companies nor other Indian rulers. It was merely a treaty involving cessions of Bijapur territory and its claims to the Dutch.

Though relations begin from 1637, as early as 1615 the Dutch made an attempt to establish commercial ties with Bijapur. In September 1615 the factor Leonard Wolff was sent to Bijapur to obtain the right to trade in diamonds in Bijapur kingdom. But Wolff's mission failed. Pieter Gilliaz, who was sent to replace Wolff, did not achieve anything[58].

The Dutch Company shifted involuntarily from a commercial to a territorial and political basis as the Company had to compete with other European companies established in India. The first move was naturally to establish factories, forts etc. They took interest in the affairs of Indian States; and this encroached in the native politics. Since from its foundation on 20 March, 1602, the States-General of Holland endowed the Dutch Company with a strong military power, we find them seeking commercial ends through militant and diplomatic channels. Their relations with Bijapur were both militant and commercial. Their militant policy with Bijapur was to gain alliance against the Portuguese and the French, in order to safeguard their commercial interest and to achieve monopoly. They approached 'Adil Shah, in

1637, to form an alliance against the Portuguese. The Dutch were aware of the age long enmity between Bijapur and the Portuguese. They fully utilized the opportunity, on the one hand to gain favour of ‘Adil Shah and on the other to increase the animosity between the Portuguese and Bijapur. By making tempting offers of naval attacks on Goa, the Dutch got sanctions for trade and establishment of Dutch factories in the Bijapur kingdom. On the basis of military assistance they sought exemptions and concessions from customs and tolls. The militant-relations with Bijapur were only restricted to the Portuguese and the French; in relation to other Indian powers, they did not side with or against Bijapur. This attitude is evident from an incident of 3rd October 1664, when the Bijapur governor Rustum-i Zaman asked the Dutch resident Leendersz, where the Dutch friends of Shivaji, to which the Dutch replied, “not only with him but also with all other Rajas there about it[59].”

Except for a few minor incidents, the Bijapur-Dutch relations throughout from 1637 to 1686, were friendly. There was never any war or hostility between the two; as was the case between Bijapur-Portuguese relations.

Relations with French:

Sher Khan grants Pondichery to the French – Helps them against Golconda and the Dutch.

In 1670, Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapur Governor of the Province of Valikondapuram of Ginji, sent to Francois Martin (one of the French Directors in India) a proposal to settle a factory in his territory. The adviser of de la Haye, Francois Caron prevented Martin from replying to Sher Khan.

Francois Baron and Francois Martin sent Bellangarde Lespinay, in November, 1672, to Sher Khan, seeking from him the provisions needed by the defenders of St. Thome. Caron was not in India, Lespinay was free to act. He obtained from Sher Khan not only munitions and victuals, but also a site for a factory at Pondichery. Just as Lespinay was about to take leave on 2nd January, 1673, an agent of the Dutch Company arrived in order to prejudice Sher Khan against the French. The Dutch Agent said proudly "those merchants were not soldiers, and that the he knew the difference between the Dutch and the French." Sher Khan to the great surprise and joy of the Dutchman, declared that "as the Dutch and the French were neighbours in Europe, so they should be in India[60]." Sher Khan granted Pondicherry to the French for a factory. The young Vendomois performed the first diplomatic mission of the French to Bijapur with much skill. By the order of the French Directors in India, Lespinay established himself at Pondicherry on 4th February, 1673.

Factors determining the Relations – French – Dutch-English rivalries:

The French-Dutch rivalry on the Coromandel coast and the fear of Dutch attacks and provocations compelled the French to establish relations

with Bijapur, with a view, to provide themselves with a place of refuge in case of evil days, the two French Directors Baron and De La Haye ordered Francois Martins to place himself in communication with Sher Khan Lodi for the grant of a piece of land which they might call their own. Martin obeyed, found Sher Khan accessible and was allowed to purchase a plot of ground at Pondicherry. In April, 1674, some sixty French men went to the site and took charge of the plot of the land, which later on became Pondicherry.

Besides the French-Dutch rivalry, competition with the English was also one of the causes which led to the establishment of French factory at Pondicherry, and necessitated contacts with Bijapur. As early as 1673, Nadhir Muhammad, the Bijapur governor of Ginji, offered the English to establish factory and fortify it either near Porto Novo or at Valudavur near Pondicherry. The English, considering the dangers they were exposed to from the Dutch and the French and disturbances in the trade, wished to avail this offer; and the directors at England too approved the proposal. Elihu Yale was sent to the Khan for further negotiations. The French sensing the danger they would be exposed to, must have arranged to establish relations with Bijapur and a factory in the Bijapur Kingdom[61].

Founding of Pondicherry and Establishment of close Friendly Relations:

From 21st September, 1674, Martin was left at Pondicherry and he became founder of Pondicherry as he developed it, transformed and made it the

capital of the French settlements in India. Besides Lespinay and Martin, to whom the credit goes for establishing Pondicherrry, credit also goes to Sher Khan who went even to the extent of advancing loan to the French to establish their factory at Pondicherry.

On 26 February, 1675, Sher Khan sent one of his cavalry captains at Pondicherry to Baron. The latter reciprocated the courtesy by sending Deltor to Sher Khan. On the request of Sher Khan, Baron sent some French solfiers to join Sher Khan's contingent at Cuddalore and to proceed to Porto Novo. This gesture was for the show of friendship between Bijapur and the French.

The accounts of the amount advanced by Sher Khan to the French in 1673 were still unsettled. On 17th April, 1675, Martin left Pondicherry to meet Sher Khan in order to settle the account and the differences. Baron advised Martin that "the settlement arrived at should be favorable to Sher Khan" – "because of the services rendered" to the French by him[62]."

After the settlement of the accounts, Martin and Sher Khan discussed "an enterprise" – probably the conquest of Ginji and Golconda kingdom; and in the words of Martin, it "had every chance of succeeding, provided, Sher Khan received assistance from the Court and the powers in France seconded our efforts by sending out troops and money to these quarters."

French Alliance 1675

Martin writes that in April, 1675 Baron was very anxious to secure an interview with Sher Khan and the latter too appeared as eager for the meeting. After envoys had been exchanged between them it was decided that Baron was to go to Cuddalore to meet Sher Khan. During the interview plans about the 'enterprise' were framed and discussed. Sher Khan entered into a 'pact' with Baron, who in the first instance, was to advance for his ally five lakhs of pagodas and send one hundred Frenchmen. With this French aid, the Khan wished to fulfil his ambition of becoming master of the whole of South India. After consolidating his authority in the newly acquired territory, his plan was to conquer the kingdom of Golconda – 'an enterprise' for which Baron promised to obtain 5000 cavalry and 20,000 French soldiers[63].

Baron's correspondence with the French minister Cobert shows how very serious he was about the 'enterprise'. And for the success of his ambitious 'enterprise', Baron wanted de La Haye to come back to India. The project did not materialize. As the French, King Louis XIV was completely absorbed in continental wars and was temporarily disheartened by the failure of the French at St. Thome. Martin, considered that the plan would have surely materialized had the Bijapur Court given a helping hand to Sher Khan. It implies that the Bijapur Court did not approve Sher Khan's scheme.

In the meanwhile, Baron tried to tap other sources. In 1675, he approached the Maratha Prime Minister. Baron tried unsuccessfully to forge an

alliance between Shivaji, Bijapur and the French. Even as late as February 1676 Baron was still busy discussing the project with de La Haye. Even though his efforts as a whole did not materialize still he was able to achieve part fulfillment of the project. The French successfully helped Sher Khan in crushing Nadhir Muhammad, Bijapur governor of Gingi. It was the first stage of the grand project, which was achieved by Bijapur-French alliance.

Sher Khan called the French to capture Valudevur. On 9th September, 1676, he sent a Brahmin as his envoy to Martin with full credence to negotiate. The background is the mutual conflict for supremacy between Sher Khan and Nadhir Muhammad. The envoy informed Martin that Sher Khan had appointed mediatars to settle the differences between him and Nadhir Muhammad and the proceedings were going on very slowly. Sher Khan was unable to take any action against Nadhir Muhammad. He advised Martin to initiate hostilities with Nadhir Muhammad by attacking Valudevur. On the mid-night of 23rd-24th September, 1676, Martin received a letter from Sher Khan in which he requested him to siege Valudevur "on behalf of the king of Bijapur, for his rebellious subject" Nakhir Muhammad. Sher Khan also assured Martin that he would send to him reinforcement of troops. On the morning of 24th September Muhammad Rada was sent by Sher Khan to guard Pondicherry and was Placed at the disposal of Martin[64].

The whole affair was very delicate; Martin could not take any steps on his own responsibility. He convened a meeting of the French Council at Pondicherry to discuss the proposal of Sher Khan. The Council considered that

“Sher Khan had not only given us valuable assistance during the siege St. Thome, but also without his support it would be impossible for us to maintain ourselves in Pondicherry. For our sake he was on the point of rapture with the Dutch, as they were refusing to provide passports to his ships --”. The Council therefore decided to help Sher Khan by attacking Valudevur. A French force under Martin stormed Valudevur. By November 1676, Nadhir Muhammad was forced to make peace and ceded most of the territory to Sher Khan[65].

Sher Khan was very grateful to the French for this service. He promised them a large sum as the price of their help and kept up a close alliance with them thereafter. For these services rendered by the French and to keep them under friendly obligation, Sher Khan offered to cede the fortress of Devi Kottah, near Pondicherry. The French however did not have sufficient resources at that time to maintain a new possession, and being disinterested, they did not take any decision. Sher Khan wrote a letter to the French to take charge of the possession on 15th April, 1676. As Martin was getting ready to start with his men, he received another letter from Sher Khan, offering the French only the fort of Devi Kottah, while he himself wished to retain its surrounding territory. This condition was not favourable to the French; they did not avail the opportunity and allowed the proposal to lapse in course of time.

Afraid of Shivaji’s expedition and levying of Chauth, Martin realized that a handful of Europeans in his contingent would not be able to meet any eventuality. In 1676, he applied to his friend Sher Khan for permission to entertain and recruit some Indian soldiers. Sher Khan willingly assented and

made over to Martin three hundred of his own men. Martin used them not only as soldiers but as colonists. He gave each a piece of land and encouraged them to build houses, and to employ themselves profitably in the manufacture of tissues and other articles for export. Thus, Pondicherry grew to prosperity.

French Neutrality in Shivaji's Campaign against Bijapur:

The campaigns of Shivaji in the Madras-Karnatak pleaced the French in an embarrassing situation. Martin sent an envoy to Sher Khan to enquire about the measures he intended to take in order to defend himself. He also sought Sher Khan's permission for the French to retire to Tegnapatam (Fort St. David), from where they could only escape to their ships in case of an attack. Sher Khan assured the French envoy that there was nothing to fear from Shivaji; since he had sufficient forces to defend. He offered Palamcotta to the French as a place of retreat instead of Tegnapatam. Martin interviewed Sher Khan's son Ibrahim Khan, on 22nd May, 1677 in regard to the measures to be taken to meet the situation. He also inspected the fort of Valudevur for retreat in case of emergency[66].

Sher Khan appealed to Martin for help. But the latter "deserting the cause of Sher Khan actually sent an ambassador to Shivaji." The French envoy met Shivaji near the walls of Vellore fort; Shivaji was surprised to learn about the shift in French attitude towards Sher Khan.

After the fall of Ginji on 31st May, 1677 Martin sent his agent Antonio to Shivaji with a letter to the following effect. "Our Company is established in

your territory at Rajapur and we beg of you to be protected in the same way on this Coast.” The French envoy had three interviews with Shivaji. In the second audience, Shivaji espousing the cause of Bijapur governor, Nadhir Muhammad, directed the French to return the fort of Valudevur to Nadhir Muhammad. The French envoy replied that the French were under the obligation of Sher Khan and therefore, could not draw sword against him. Shivaji assured safety of the French provided they maintained neutrality. When Shivaji was “assured of the defection of the French” to Sher Khan he returned to South to attack the Khan.

Sher Khan owed money to the French Company. With the change in political situation and visualizing the defeat of Sher Khan at the hands of Shivaji, Martin became anxious to get back as much money as possible. He sought interview with the Khan. During the interview, Sher Khan asked for French help. But in view of the assurance given to Shivaji, of maintaining neutrality, Martin diplomatically avoided the issue. This neutrality and attitude of the French changed the whole course of Bijpur-French relations and the politics of South India. Had the French allied with the Khan, Shivaji would not have attacked Sher Khan[67].

After Sher Khan’s rout at Tiruvadi, early in July, 1677 he sought refuge in the woods of Ariyalur. Even in this precarious situation, Martin sent several times messengers to Sher Khan, demanding repayment of money he owed to the Company, but each time he expressed his inability to pay. At last due to constant persuation he handed over to the French some very costly emeralds.

With the signing of the Treaty on 17th July, 1677 between Sher Khan and Shivaji, the French and Bijapur relations came to an end; as Pondicherry was now ceded by Bijapur to Shivaji.

French Desertion

Throughout the brief span of eight years of Bijapur-French relations, Sher Khan proved to be friend, helper, financier and an ally of the French. French. Owed much to Sher Khan or Bijapur than what Bijapur or he owed to the French, Sher Khan helped and allied with the French at the cost of the enmity of the English Dutch, Golconda, and even of Nadhir Muhammad. At one time, in 1676, the Dutch threatened Sher Khan from issuing passports to his ships, unless he expelled the French from Pondicherry. Sher Khan replied that "he owed us (French) protection no less than the Dutch themselves, As for the navigation on the sea, he had no comments to make. He however, wrote to the French to not to provoke the Dutch as they were strong at sea. He also warned them to be on guard as a contingent of Golconda horse was awaiting near Pondichery." In the time of need the French left their friend and benefactor in the lurch and sided with his opponent Shivaji. Had French sided with Sher Khan, that would have changed the whole course of politics of South India[68].

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CHAPTER – VI

Relations with the Mughals and Five Off-Shoots of the Bahmani Sultanates

Inter-statal Relationship

The dismemberment of the Bahmani Kingdom and the establishment of the five Sultanates; Ahmednagar, Bijapur, Golconda (Tilang) Berar and Bidar created an unprecedented political situation in the Deccan. Above everything else it introduced the idea of division and partition fruitful of discord and strife. The inter-state relationship of these five Sultanates is a record of almost continuous strife. The kingdoms being contiguous, frequent disputes were routine matter between them, mostly in a bid to possess the border lands. Thes border areas, became bone of contention leading to internecine wars. Thus the sultans always entertained bitter animosity against one another and waged protracted wars throughout their existence. One of the causes of the incessant internecine wars may be attributed, as a result of the disintegration of the Bahmani Kingdom into improper linguistic divisions, which kept the balance between the elements inhabiting the tableland[1].

At first the rival sultans were absorbed in consolidating their hold over the territory they had seized from the tottering Bahmanis. Then mutual intrigues among themselves and against each other engaged their attention.

Some times Bijapur, Golconda and Berar allied in a triple alliance against the dual alliance of Ahmednagar and Bidar. Soon, on some pretext or the other, a reshuffling of powers was effected and a new grouping of the alliances emerged. Thus the mutual alliances among and against themselves became a regular feature. Only on one occasion, in 1565, the sultans kept aside their mutual conflicts and united in a joint front against the Vijayanagar. From these competitive struggles emerged out the principle of the balance of power, which the sultans consciously or unconsciously formulated. Throughout their history, the relationship between the five succession Sultanates was marked by Kaleidoscopic alliances and almost continual war in the course of which Berar was absorbed by Ahmednagar in 1574 and Bidar by Bijapur in 1619.

Bijapur's relations with the Deccan Kingdoms were so much inter-woven mutually that it is impossible to mention the relations with one kingdom without the mention of the other kingdom.

Bahmanis and Barids – Adil Shahi Relations:

Bidar occupied strategic position in the central Deccan. It was contiguous with the four kingdoms and maintained the balance of power in the Deccan politics. It acted as a buffer between Bijapur and Golconda.

Bijapur-Bidar relations from 1528 were guided by the bitter animosity that existed between 'Adil Shah and the Baridis from 1492 onwards[2]. The Bahmani Ministers, Qasim Barid from 1492 and 'Ali Barid from 1505 utterly

disliked the autonomous rule of ‘Adil Shahis. Hence, each tried to overpower the other. The Baridis ruled the tottering Bahmani Kingdom with Bidar as its capital. And after the extinction of the Bahmani rule ‘Ali Barid became independent ruler of Bidar.

Due to the previous discord and bitterness between Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah and Amir Barid, the latter allied with Burhan Nizam Shah and invaded Bijapur in 1528, but the allies were defeated in a battle that ensued at 20 kos from Bijapur.

Again during the same year, Amir Barid tried to corrupt the fidelity of the Bijapur forces to revolt and join him in an attack on Bijapur. He promised to reward them with a share of territory. ‘Adil Shah justly incensed at this treachery, resolved to punish Amir Barid. Thus, in 1529, ‘Adil Shah after obtaining neutrality of Burhan Nizam Shah in this expedition, arrived before Bidar and blockaded the city. After some time, a very severe action ensued, in which the Bijapur gained a upper hand. Then ‘Adil Shah intensified the siege operations, reducing Amir Barid to great distress. Amir Barid sought mediation of ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah of Berar for effecting peace. ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah personally came and persuaded ‘Adil Shah to end the hostilities. But ‘Adil Shah was adamant for the absolute submission of Amir Barid. Amir Barid on hearing the failure of ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah’s peace mission, left for Udgir and came to the camp of ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah again entreating him to effect a settlement[3]. But being informed of ‘Adil Shah’s terms for peace as actual surrender of the city of Bidar, Amir Barid returned in disgust to his own

camp. The Baridi troops were much harassed by the Bijapur and became careless at night, so that evev the outposts lay down to sleep, while many, following the example of their leader, had recourse to wine.

Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah having heard of the arrival of Amir Barid ordered Asad Khan, to surprise Amir Barid’s camp. Asad Khan went uninterrupted right upto Amir Barid’s personal tent and carried him asleep with his cot to Bijapur camp. Asad Khan presented his important prize to ‘Adil Shah, who was overjoyed at the success of the enterprise. Next day the captive Sultan was presented at the Court to ‘Adil Shah. Amir Barid was placed opposite of ‘Adil Shah, with this head bare and his hands tied behind his back, and exposed to a hot sun. When he had stood for two hours in this situation, ‘Adil Shah gave orders for his being put to death, and an executor advanced to do his duty with a drawn scimitar.

Amir Barid, perceiving his helpless condition, condescended to beg his life and pardon from ‘Adil Shah on promise of surrendering the city of Bidar and the treasures of the Bahmani rulers. ‘Adil Shah consented to spare his life on these terms. Amir Barid sent orders to one of his sons, acquainting him with the situation, and the agreement he had made. His son returned for answer, that as he was very old, and the period of his existance drawing to a close, it would be a folly to surrender such a fortress for a few remaining days of life. The object of this message, however was only in hope of getting assistance from the allies[4]. At the same time, the sons sent secret instructions through a confidential person to agree to the terms of their father if he was in real danger. Amir Barid

affected to complain the cruelty of his sons; but ‘Adil Shah who suspected the diplomacy, gave orders for Amir Barid to be trampled to death by an elephant, and ordered his army to make assault on Bidar. Amir Barid again had recourse to entreaty, and begged that he might be carried before a certain tower of the fort, in order that his sons might behold his condition and he thus moved to save his life. This being done, the sons seeing no other means but submission to save the life of their father, offered surrender on condition that they and their own families would be allowed to depart with the clothes on their persons without search. This being agreed upon, they loaded themselves and their women with as many of the valuable ornaments and of the Bahmani rulers as they were able to conceal and retired to the fortress of Udgir[5].

The Bijapur now occupied Bidar. Adil Shah entered the palace and ascended the throne of the Bahmani Sultanate.

After the fall of Bidar, Darya ‘Imad Shah again interceded for Amir Barid. ‘Adil Shah at length consented to enrol him among his officers, on. Asad Khan becoming security for his fidelity. Kalyani, Udgir and some other districts, together with the revenue derived for the city lands, were allotted for Amir Barid’s support on condition of his attending ‘Adil Shah’s army with three thousand horse.

This great victory was celebrated by a splendid festival. During this festival, ‘Adil Shah promised to Asad Khan that on his return to Bijapur he would restore Bidar to Amir Barid. But on return ‘Adil Shah agreed to restore

Bidar to Amir Barid in six months, provided the latter should, deliver the forts of Kalyani and Qandhar to Bijapur, to which purpose, he was permitted to quit Bijapur. When Amir Barid neglected to send the keys of the fortress of Kalyani and Qandhar, 'Adil Shah resolved to reduce them by force.

In the meanwhile, Amir Barid applied to Burhan Nizam Shah for aid. The latter sent his ambassadors to 'Adil Shah with a request to forego his designs against Bidar. 'Adil Shah turned down Nizam Shah's request. In spite of it Burhan Nizam Shah again sent a message, acquainting 'Adil Shah to comply with his request for the good of Bijapur and be content to remain at home. 'Adil Shah having already marched from Bijapur, received this communication at Bahmanhally in the evening. He was so indignant that he moved with only a small force to Naldurg by the evening. He then dismissed the ambassadors of Nizam Shah, telling them, he had done all that was incumbent on him to avoid a war. Consequently, due to Bidar, Bijapur and Ahmednagar came to direct clashes. And Burhan Nizam Shah along with the Amir Barid marched to the frontiers of Bijapur, to meet the challenge of 'Adil Shah. A great battle ensued in which the Bijapur emerged victorious and Amir Barid reconciled to 'Adil Shah[6].

In 1534 Isma'il 'Adil Shah and Amir Barid together marched to Golconda and laid siege to Kovilkonda. Though the campaign was successful still due to the illness and death of 'Adil Shah it ended abruptly in September 1534.

During the period of political instability at Bijapur from 1534 to 1542, the relations between the two states were peaceful.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I and Amir Barid,

In 1542, following a breach between Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I and his minister Asad Khan, Amir Barid and Burhan Nizam Shah circulated insidious reports that Asad Khan had promised to deliver Belgaum to them, whenever they approached. Accordingly they invaded Bijapur, wresting the five districts dependent on Sholapur. After this they proceeded to Belgaum. Asad Khan though originally not a party to the invasion, deemed it prudent, in order to save his estates from plunder, to join them on their approach with six thousand horse. The allies, inspired with fresh coverage by this accession of power, spread desolation through the country to the neighbourhood of Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah, unable to oppose them in the field, retired with his family to Gulbarga[7].

Asad Khan, still loyal to ‘Adil Shah, sought secretly assistance of ‘Imad Shah of Berar. The latter promptly complied with the request and moved to Gulbarga. The allies-Amir Barid and Nizam Shah, then lying before the citadel of Bijapur, raised the siege and after devastating the suburbs of the city, marched for the purpose of preventing the junction of Berar army with that of Bijapur. But when the combined armies of Bijapur and Berar got ready to give battle, Amir Barid and Nizam Shah retreated towards Daulatabad. The expedition came to an end due to the death of Amir Barid.

After the death of Asad Khan in 1549 ‘Adil Shah agreeably to his last will, gave the former’s daughter Mahtab Bi in marriage to ‘Ali Barid Shah, and sought an alliance.

In 1549, when Burhan Nizam Shah effectually blockaded Kalyani, ‘Ali Barid sought Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah’s assistance. The latter marched with an army to the rescur of Kalyani, and encamping within sight of the enemy, threw up an entrenchment around his army, not choosing to risk a battle on the plains. The Bijapur and Ahmednagar armies now came to direct clash.

In 1564 ‘Ali Barid joined ‘Adil Shah, along with Qutub Shah and Nizam Shah in the battle of Banihatti against Vijayanagar. After which battle, the rival kingdoms of Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Golconda became too powerful for the Sultan of Bidar.

In 1569, ‘Ali Barid, on being persuaded by Ibrahim Qutub Shah, joined the confederacy against Bijapur and they, decided to attack Bijapur. This design did not materiallise owing to Nizam Shah’s sudden desertion.

In 1570 ‘Ali Barid and ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah joined the confederacy, initiated and planned by Ibrahim Qutub Shah, against Nizam Shah. The tripartite alliance was never realised due to the advance diplomatic strategy of Nizam Shah[8].

In 1572, ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah agreed with Murtaza Nizam Shah to allow the latter to have a free hand in the latter’s conquest of Bidar.

During the rest of the reign of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and the early period of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II’s reign there was lull in the Bijapur-Bidar relations, as these Sultans were busy in their compaign in the south.

In 1619 Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II marched against Bidar to punish Amir Barid who had maintained the family tradition of hostility to Bijapur. Bidar fell and was annexed to Bijapur.

Adil Shahis – Qutub Shahis Relations:

Bijapur-Golconda (Tilang) relations begin from 918/1512 when Qutubu’l-Mulk seems to have shown signs of independence.

Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah and Sultan-Quli Qutubu’l Mulk

In the beginning of his reign, Qutubu’l-Mulk-remained at peace and friend-ship with Isma‘il ‘Adil and the latter reciprocated similar gesture.

The first conflict came up in 1514, when Qutubu’l-Mulk joined arms with Amir Barid and invaded Bijapur. Again, fifteen years later, in 1529, Qutubu’l-Mulk repeated his anti-Bijapur activity by sending Golconda cavalry to the aid of Amir Barid against Bijapur[9]. The Bijapur emerged victorious and the Golconda forces escaped. Now was the turn of ‘Adil Shah. He began to plan aggressive design over Golconda. And in 1533, at the instigation of Burhan Nizam Shah, ‘Adil Shah attacked and laid siege to Kalyani, which was

a fort of Golconda. Qutubu'l-Mulk unable to cope with the Bijapur, sent a detachment of cavalry to only cut off their supplies. In the meanwhile, after consultations with the nobles Qutubu'l-Mulk ordered as mall garrison of the fort to defend it. At the same time he tried to bring about a peaceful settlement by sending his envoys to 'Adil Shah, requesting him to desist from any further fratricidal hostilities. But Isma'il would not even hear of peace. Thus, there was no alternative left for Qutubu'l-Mulk except to fight.

The Bijapur and Golconda forces met at Kovilkonda. After a prolonged fighting lasting for a year to possess Kovilkonda, without any hope of success, Isma'il died in September, 1534. Following this, Asad Khan, as a protector of Bijapur, raised the siege of Kovilkonda and moved to Gulbarga. Qutubu'l-Mulk, by sending an envoy to Burhan Nizam Shah, succeeded in seeking former's mediation for concluding peace with Bijapur[10].

Ibrahim 'Adil Shah I and Sultan-Quli Qutubu'l-Mulk

But the peace was not maintained for long. In the following year 1535, when Qutubu'l-Mulk was engaged at Kondavidu, 'Adil Shah joined hands with 'Ali Barid and began to lay waste Golconda territory. On being informed of the further inroads by Bijapur troops, Qutubu'l-Mulk advanced westwards and laid siege to Udgir. The campaign came to an end with the settlement of a treaty between Burhan Nizam Shah and Qutubu'l-Mulk. Qutubu'l-Mulk agreed to

send 5,000 fully armed soldiers to Ahmednagar in order to help Burhan, against the pretentions of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah, regarding Sholapur.

Thence forward for about a decade ‘Adil Shah and Qutubu’l-Mulk maintained peaceful relations.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I and Jamshid

During the Bijapur-Ahmednagar conflict in 1543 Jamshid, at the request of Burhan Nizam Shah, came to the rescue of the latter against Bijapur. While the confederate forces were encircling Sholapur, ‘Adil Shah and ‘Ali Barid marched on Parenda, a Nizam Shahi fort, by way of diversion. The two armies came face to face at the village of Khaspuri near Parenda. The battle raged the whole day, and when Jamshid was tired of the stalemate, he recklessly jumped into the thick of the battle and by sheer hardihood broke the army of Bijapur. The Bijapur fled away during the night. Jamshid pursued them as far as the gates of Bidar and then returned back[11].

Now it was the turn of ‘Adil Shah to reciprocate the attitude of Jamshld during the Bijapur-Ahmednagar conflict. ‘Adil Shah rendered military assistance to ‘Ali Barid against Jamshid in the latter’s conflict with ‘Ali Barid.

Again when hostilities were renewed between Bidar and Golconda, ‘Adil Shah at the request of ‘Ali Barid, rushed a contingent under Ikhlas Khan Habashi. Prolonged hostilities were disconcerting to ‘Adil Shah, who was now

at a loss to act, sent for Asad Khan Lari from Belgaum for advice. Asad Khan exhorted him the futility of fighting a powerful coalition which was hemming in the Bijapur territories from all sides. On Asad Khan's suggestion the coalition of two potent members was maneuvered by allowing some concessions. The strategy worked out quite successfully and the coalition broke. But, the intrepid and daring Jamshid, aware of the ruse Ibrahim 'Adil Shah had prepared, decided to face the challenge single-handed. 'Adil Shah made Asad Khan sole commander of his army and ordered him to march into Golconda territory. Jamshid was now compelled to raise the siege of Udgir and retreat. Asad Khan chased the fugitive, and in an encounter Jamshid was disfigured forever. On his return to Golconda, Jamshid sent ambassadors to Bijapur and concluded peace[12].

This established friendly relations between Bijapur and Golconda. Ibrahim had high opinion and regards for Jamshid, and when 'Ali Barid came personally to poison his mind against Jamshid and sought an alliance against Golconda 'Adil Shah declined the proposal. But when 'Adil Shah, in order to conquer Bider, confined 'Ali Barid at Bijapur, the magnanimous Jamshid intervened for the latter and sent a warning to the former to refrain from casting envious eyes on Bidar. 'Adil Shah for the good will of Jamshid forthwith released 'Ali Barid. As a token of sincerity, 'Adil Shah sent Jamshid costly presents amounting to one lakh dinars and a rare royal horse.

But, in spite of all friendship and cordiality Jamshid adopted anti-Bijapur policy in 1548 by promising help to ‘Abdu’l-lah, in gaining the throne of Bijapur.

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Ibrahim Qutub Shah

In 1557, Ibrahim Qutub Shah joined an alliance with Husain Nizam Shah against Bijapur. It was agreed that the former should wrest Udgir, from Bijapur and the latter Gulbarga. The allies now invested Gulbarga. ‘Adil Shah was greatly perturbed at the turn of the events and sent an appealing letter to Qutub Shah. At the same time, ‘Adil Shah tried to exercise diplomatic pressure of Ramaraj of Vijayanagar over Qutub Shah, as the latter was under the obligation of the former. Qutub Shah tried to adopt neutrality in this conflict and wished to establish peace. The appeal of ‘Adil Shah was held in high esteem and the Bijapur envoys were given assurances of peace and friendship. Qutub Shah broke the alliance with Nizam Shah and returned to Golconda. This dual diplomacy of Qutub Shah in favour of Bijapur, was indirectly and attempt to maintain the balance of power between the Deccan states[13].

But Qutub Shah soon changed sides, by accepting the offer of Husain Nizam Shah to enter into both matrimonial and military alliance. The latter alliance was directed against Bijapur. In 1564 the two Sultans marched to reduce the Bijapur fort of Kalyani. ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah had in the meantime allied with Vijayanagar. This strategy proved beneficial as it compelled the besiegers

to raise the siege and retreat. Then ‘Adil Shah and his ally encamped at the town of Urgy, on the Golconda frontier for nearly six months, during which period they plundered parts of Golconda. This compelled Qutub Shah to send an envoy to Bijapur and sue for peace.

In the same year 1564, ‘Adil Shah, to take revenge upon Ramaraj, sought an alliance with Qutub Shah by sending Kishwar Khan. Qutub Shah eagerly acceded to the proposed alliance and offered to mediate a union between ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah and even promised to obtain for the former the fort of Sholapur, which was the bone of contention between Ahmednagar and Bijapur. Qutub Shah deputed Mustafa Khan to ‘Adil Shah to negotiate the proposed league. The outcome of Mustafa Khan’s diplomatic mission was the confederacy of the Deccan Sultans against Vijayanagar and the battle of Banihatti in 1565. Indirectly, its impact was coming closer of Qutub Shah and ‘Adil Shah.

However, when the purpose of confederacy had been achieved, the allies forgot the fine principles and benefits accruing from the policy of friendly co-existence. Once again the internecine wars among the Deccan Sultanates were the order of the day. Their mutual jealousy once again arose them to form alliances and counter alliances against their own brothern sultans.

In 1568 when ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah was making territorial gains in the Karnataka : Qutub Shah formed an alliance with Nizam Shah and ‘Imad Shah. The allies attacked Bijapur[14]. ‘Adil Shah, unable to cope up the sudden attack,

fled away to the Konkan, leaving a considerable army for the defence of the city. The allies laid siege to Bijapur and laid waste the surrounding country. Qutub Shah changed his diplomacy when he realized that Nizam Shah would gain large tract of territory. Thus envious he persuaded the other allies to raise the siege and to return.

In 1569 during the conflict between Ahmednagar and Bijapur, both the antagonistic parties sought the help of Qutub Shah. The Golconda forces came to the help of Murtaza Nizam Shah but due to the sudden change in the latter's strategy, they returned without helping any one.

By 1570 Bijapur had achieved excessive increase in power and territory, This was the cause of jealousy to Ibrahim Qutub Shah, who considered that Bijapur' ex-pansion would upset the balance of power in the Deccan. He therefore joined hands with Nizam Shah and worked out the strategy against Bijapur. Qutub Shah, Nizam Shah and Tirumala met on the banks of Krishna. The three potentates considered 'Adil Shah to be their common enemy and decided to march forthwith into the Bijapur territory. Before the plans of the common strategy against Bijapur could materialise, the allies dispersed, due to lack of understanding among them[15].

Ibrahim Qutub Shah had been adopting a policy to maintain balance of power among the Deccan Sultanate. Contrary to his policy of preventing aggrandisement of one ruler at the expense of another, he wished in 1572 to join hands with 'Ali 'Adil Shah to stop Murtaza Nizam Shah from further

territorial conquests in Berar. However, the dream of triparti-alliance of Bijapur, Bidar and Golconda was shattered to the ground due to Ahmednagar-Bijapur coalition. On the contrary, Bijapur-Ahmednagar forces first began attacking Golconda territory under the commands of ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah. In spite of the sudden onslaught of the allies, the Golconda forces were successful in pushing back the invaders. ‘Adil Shah retreated into Bijapur territory.

In 1573, when ‘Adil Shah was busy making a sweep over the western districts of the Vijayanagar, Qutub Shah being jealous of Bijapur’s inordinate expansion in power, helped Sri Ranga against Bijapur. Qutub Shah sent Shah Muhammad Anju, with an army across he Bijapur border in order to weaken ‘Adil Shah’s rear guard and at the same time he sent Fadl Khan to Penukonda to ask Sri Ranga to meet him on the Golconda border. This help of Qutub Shah to Sri Ranga resulted in ‘Adil Shah’s defeat, who was compelled to raise the three months old siege of Penukonda in December, 1576[16].

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II and Muhammad Qutub Shah

In 1580, the death of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah changed the nature of inter-state warrelations in the Deccan. Though his successor, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II believed more in peace than war, yet in the beginning of his reign he too followed in the foot-steps of his predecessor.

Qutub Shah adopted an anti-Bijapur policy in the Bijapur-Ahmednagar conflict and supplied re-enforcement to the Ahmednagar forces which were besieging Bidar in 1579-80. The Golconda forces laid siege to Naldurg, which was a Bijapur fort and then they headed for the actual capture of Bijapur city. Early in 988/1580, the hoodwinked Bijapur had recourse to new strategy of guerilla warfare with the help of ten thousand light Maratha cavalry. This machination successfully retrived the position of Bijapur, and the Golconda and Ahmednagar forces were compelled to raise the siege of Bijapur. While reatreating they ravaged, plundered and played havoc at Miraj, Raibagh, Satara, Gulbarga and a number of other places and again laid siege to Naldurg. However, the Golconda forces, in expectation of the collapse of the military structure of Bijapur, intensified the campaign and implored Ibrahim Qutub Shah to come to Naldurg and direct the operations[17]. The strategy failed due to the demise of Qutub Shah in June 1580.

The new Sultan of Golconda, Muhammad Quli Qutub Shah, on receiving firsthand knowledge of the siege operations at Naldurg proceeded to the scene of operations in person. But when the besiegers came to know about the internal troubles and commotion brewing at Bijapur, they decided to leave a small contingent at Naldurg and the main army moved to besiege Bijapur itself. It was defended boldly by a small contingent. It was an ill omen for 'Adil Shah when two of his commanders crossed over to the Golconda side, with their contingent of eight thousand horse. The Bijapur adopted guerilla tactics, and at one stage the besiegers were forced to face near famine situation. A Council of

War of Golconda and Ahmednagar commanders decided to raise the siege of Bijapur and retreat. Qutub Shah, who was thoroughly disgusted and disappointed by the out come of the year long campaign returned back to Golconda, leaving Mustafa Khan to continue the campaign. But later on Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah, who loved peace and wished to avoid blood shed, appealed to Qutub Shah and his ally to renounce hostility and come to peaceful terms. The appeal was welcomed and fully reciprocated by the allies and the siege was lifted forthwith. Peace was concluded, putting to an end the age-long conflict between the two states[18].

The Naldurg episode may be regarded as the last phase of the inter-state conflicts among the Deccan Sultanates. Its outcome was establishment of political equilibrium in the Deccan and peaceful relations between Bijapur and Golconda for the next twenty-eight years.

Some skirmishes on Bijapur-Golconda border took place. Hence, Dilawar Khan, the regent at Bijapur, during the infancy of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II, prudently thought that nothing would so effectually preserve the dominions of his master than an alliance with Golconda. He sent Khwaja ‘Ali as an envoy to Golconda, seeking the matrimonial alliance of Malika-i Jahan, sister of Qutub Shah with ‘Adil Shah. Qutub Shah readily agreed. The bridegroom and the bride came to the fort of Naldurg for the nuptial ceremonies in 1586. After the celebration of marriage, a treaty of perpetual amity and friendship was settled, as a result of which the relations between the two States were peaceful for about forty years.

Early in 1626 when ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah became Sultan of Golconda, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II was among the first potentates who had sent a special envoy, Shah Abu’l-Hasan to condole the death of the late Sultan and to congratulate the new Sultan.

Muhammad ‘Adil Shah and ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah

After nearly four decades of friendly and peaceful relations between the two kingdoms, the dynastic union was further strengthened by the marriage of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah to ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah’s sister, Khadija Sultana in February, 1633. These unions were not merely marriages de convenance but were in a way, natural; as both were the only remanent of the five Bahmani succession States and both were the bulwarks of the Shi‘ah persuasion. Further, there was a lateral relationship between the ancestors of the two dynasties. As Chand Bibi, wife of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I, was the direct descendant of Qara Yusuf’s son, Jahan Shah, while the Qutub Shahis traced their descent from his other sons Mirza Sikandar[19].

The extinction of Ahmednagar and the fear of the Mughal invasion brought Bijapur and Golconda close to each other. And since on previous occasions, they had united against the common enemy, notwithstanding their dissensions and quarrels the Mughals tried to alienate them as far as possible. Thus, in the Inqiyad Nama or the “Deed of Submission” of 1636 between the Mughals and Golconda, Shah Jahan to control the Bijapur-Golconda relations,

had provided that "if 'Adil Shah were to try to conquer the Qutub Shahi territory, Qutub Shah was to seek the help of the Mughal Viceroy to drive him out. But if the Viceroy or any representative of the Mughal Emperor in Deccan did not oblige, then Qutub Shah was to manage himself. And if he had paid any war indemnity to 'Adil Shah, then Qutub Shah could deduct the same amount from peshkash to the Emperor. It meant Mughal-Golconda alliance against Bijapur. Shah Jahan had thus swed the seeds of dissensions between the two kingdoms.

Treaty for the Partition of Karnataka a

Both Muhammad 'Adil Shah and 'Abdu'l-lah Qutub Shah realised the futility of conquering Karnataka single-handed. For its effectual conquest they wisely thought that mutual co-operation of the two states was essential. They agreed mutually in March-April 1646, for the conquest and partition of Karnataka in the proportion of two thirds falling to 'Adil Shah and one-third to Qutub Shah. Though the outcome of the partition agreement proved highly satisfactory in the beginning to both the rulers, but at a later stage misunderstanding and disagreement led to conflict and hostilities. Both Bijapur and Golconda with-drew their contingents almost simultaneously in June 1646. Mustafa Khan from Bijapur and Mir Jumla from Golconda started for the campaign of Karnataka[20]. While marching towards Ginji, Madura and Thanjavur, on the way Mustafa Khan captured some forts. Mir Jumla also over-

ran the entire Coromandel coast and occupied the territory round the Fort St. George (Madras). He also took Pulicut and St. Thome. Then the combined forces of Bijapur and Golconda laid siege to Vellore. The Raya was defeated and submitted in April 1647, promising payment of 50 lakhs of huns and 150 elephants as war indemnity. But Bijapur's appropriation of the entire amount proved to be a cause of discord with Qutub Shah.

The interests of both Bijapur and Golconda also clashed in the conquest of Ginji. Both were interested in its possession. As the Bijapur advanced to invade Ginji, its Nayak appealed to Golconda forces for protection. With the clash of interests, Qutub Shah represented to Shah Jahan that the Nayaks of Ginji and Thanjavur have come under his protection and that 'Adil Shah should be advised to refrain from invading those places. While to 'Adil Shah this coalition of Golconda with the Nayaks appeared forboding. He considered that machinations of Mir Jumla with the Nayaks, as directed against Bijapur and in great wrath he swore to take vengeance on Qutub Shah. To chastise him, Muzaffaru'ddin Khan Muhammad was called to the court and ordered to plunder the country of Golconda and demolish its forts. However, the campaign was delayed owing to the representation of Mughal envoy, Muhammad Husain, to 'Adil Shah. He expressed that Mir Jumla was acting on the directions of Qutub Shah and the Mughal envoy promised to 'Adil Shah that he would mediate for the adequate compensation to Bijapur and to obtain first hand information regarding the dispute[21]. And as a pretention Qutub Shah immediately settled a compensation, by sending rich and costly gifts and

presents to ‘Adil Shah. At the same time he sought Shah Jahan’s intervention for settling the dispute. Qutub Shah represented in 1648 to Shah Jahan that the Nayaks of Ginji and Thanjavur had sought his help, as such he wanted Shah Jahan to partition those places in the proportion of one-third and two-thirds according to the ‘ahed namah between the two Sultans. At the same time Qutub Shah expressed his doubts about the integrity of ‘Adil Shah and requested the Emperor to appoint an amin to ascertain the facts. Qutub Shah also requested the Emperor to modify the terms of the agreement, as follows : that the ‘Adil Shah may be allowed to take whatever goods, cash, jewels, elephants and other articles of plunder, seized by his men from the Raya and zamindars of the Karnataka ; and that the conquest made by Golconda forces in the Karnataka may be divided equally between the two Sultans[22].

Qutub Shah agreed to obey Shah Jahan’s orders. Evidently Qutub Shah played dual diplomacy to gain a major share in the spoils of the Karnataka on the one hand ; and on the other he tried to bring Shah Jahan to his side by playing false. Each Sultan began to express distrust of its partner in their whining letters to Shah Jahan.

Race for the conquest of Ginji and Mir Jumla’s diplomacy

Both Muhammad ‘Adil Shah and ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah were anxious to occupy Ginji. ‘Adil Shah, on his part, commissioned in January 1648 Mustafa Khan for the invasion of Ginji. For this he had to trespass through the

territory of Mir Jumla, for which he sought his permission. But before he could reach Ginji Mir Jumla was already there. The Nayak of Ginji came out of the fort and reiterated his allegiance to Mir Jumla and joined his army, while the Nayak of Madura allied with Mustafa Khan. The combined armies of Bijapur and Madura marched to retrieve Ginji from the forces of Mir Jumla. In the meanwhile, Qutub Shah considered the arrival of Mustafa Khan on the scene to extricate Ginji from the Golconda forces as a direct violation of the partition treaty. But both Mustafa Khan and Mir Jnmla came to an understanding that after the conquest of Ginji, the former would take charge of it, while the latter would possess Gandikota; and both agreed for mutual co-operation and share equally the spoils of the war.

However, Mustafa Khan could not carry out his agreement due to his sudden death on 9th November 1648. Now Mir Jumla boycotted the Bijapur and wished to occupy Ginji himself. But Malik Raihan, who took the command after Mustafa Khan decided to fight in order to enforce the agreement. Thus threatend, Mir Jumla withdrew. Obviously Mir Jumla tried to avoid direct clash with the Bijapur[23]. This helped in reducing the differences between the two states and facilitated in the implementation of the partition-treaty. The Bijapur conquered Ginji at the end of December, 1649.

On the fall of Ginji to Bijapur, Qutub Shah, keeping aside all jealousy and animosity, congratulated ‘Adil Shah, through a personal letter and sent along with it, a present of four lakhs huns and four jewels. Qutub Shah in a letter to ‘Adil Shah suggested that the forts of Malnad and Karnataka had not

been conquered by the Bijapur and sought consent of ‘Adil Shah to conquer and use them as bases for further conquests in the south. ‘Adil Shah readily agreed to Qutub Shah’s request and the forts of Gandikota and Kokkanur were left at the disposal of the Golconda forces.

Thus the partition treaty worked apparently more to the advantage of Qutub Shah than of ‘Adil Shah, at least ‘Adil Shah thought it to be so. The agreement from its very nature turned out to be unstable owing to the fluctuating Deccan politics, mutual jealousy and uncompromising attitude of the two partner-Sultans.

However, the crack over the possession of Gandikota could not be averted. Both the Sultans coveted it, due to its strategic value. Khan Muhammad, the Bijapur Minister, made allegations against Golconda of changed relationship, while ‘Adil Shah complained to Shah Jahan that Qutub Shahi army had captured Gandikota without the Knowledge of the Emperor. On the other hand Qutub Shah tried to clear this action by advising his envoy at the Mughal Court that Gandikota was within his sphere and ‘Adil Shah should have no objection to its capture. Qutub Shah also advised his envoy at Bijapur to impress on ‘Adil Shah the wrong that Siddi Raihan had done him by unlawfully attacking the territories of Gandikota and Gutti and he should be properly warned to refrain from such encroachments in future[24].

Both the Bijapur and Golconda forces were in war array, and direct clash was only to be expected at any time. Khan Muhammad besieged Gutti but

soon abandoned it to pursue Mir Jumla at Gandikota, which he had made centre of his Government. It fell to Bijapur general Ghorpare of Mudhol, who dislodged Mir Jumla from it and compelled him to sue for peace. After four long parleys it was agreed that he should pay an indemnity of two lakhs and fifty thousand huns, while on the hand, Gandikota and Kokkanur were to be returned to Mir Jumla. The terms were agreed by Muhammad 'Adil Shah in January-February, 1652. Khan Muhammad got from the Mir Jumla five lakh and fifty thousand huns and four pieces of diamonds, which were sent to 'Adil Shah.

Khan Muhammad on his return marched to Ginji, solicited Mir Jumla's permission to march through his Karnataka territory. Contrary to the expectation, Mir Jumla turned down the request. He was alarmed at the rapid progress of Bijapur's army and tried to animate the Nayak of Mysore against Bijapur and also made overtures to the Raya. This dual diplomacy of Mir Jumla compelled the Bijapur to leave Mysore. To counter-act this dual diplomacy, 'Adil Shah ordered Khan Muhammad to attack the Raya, who was trying to conquer Vellore with the secret help of Golconda forces and to prevent the junction of the two armies under Mir Jumla[25]. After long siege the Bijapur captured Vellore in 1653.

Cordial Relations to counter Mughal Invasion

In spite of the political conflicts, clash of interest and charges and countercharges of ‘Adil Shah against Qutub Shah and vice-versa, the Bijapur-Golconda relations were on the whole friendly and they pretended to be cordial due to the dynastic relations. Both the rulers maintained active diplomatic correspondences through their resident ambassadors at each other’s court.

During the rebellion of Mir Jumla against Qutub Shah, during 1652-55, when the former sought asylum in Bijapur and offered to transfer his allegiance to ‘Adil Shah and to hold the Karnataka as his gift, ‘Adil Shah decline to accept the offer as a gesture of good-will towards Qutub Shah. When Mir Jumla was trying to cross over to the Mughal camp, ‘Adil Shah helped Qutub Shah, by trying to neutralise Mir Jumla’s strong diplomatic position by his counter-intrigues with the Mughals. Thus the joint intrigues of ‘Adil Shah and Qutub Shah, with heavy peshkash to Shah Jahan, resulted in the latter’s refusal to extend protection to the Raya of Vellore as maneuvered by Mir Jumla. The machinations of the two Sultans menaced Mir Jumla’s safety[26].

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II and ‘Abdu’l-lah Qutub Shah

The friendly gesture and assistance rendered on various occasions by ‘Adil Shah to Qutub Shah was reciprocated by the latter during the Mughal invasion of Bijapur in 1665. When the Mughal army was camping within twelve miles of Bijapur city Qutub Shah wished to help Bijapur by men and

material. In a letter to 'Adil Shah, Qutub Shah expressed that "I wish to send a posse of cavalry and infantry under one of our officers in whom I have the greatest confidence so that the enemy may be driven out of the Deccan." This letter was communicated through 'Abdu'l-Muhammad, Prime Minister of Bijapur, who had been to Golconda. 'Adil Shah, in reply, assured Qutub Shah that his army was quite capable to meet the challenge poised by the Mughals and there was no need of any help, but if he wished to send any troops he was at liberty to do so. Thereupon Qutub Shah sent 12,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry under Neknam Khan to Bijapur. The united Bijapur-Golconda forces met the Mughals, but without any major clash, the Mughals retreated in November, 1666, agreeing to status quo ante,.

It is significant that Bijapur and Golconda had unitedly opposed the Mughals. Qutub Shah joined the Bijapur even though he was not involved in the conflict. To check-mate this collaboration, Jai Singh tried to alienate the two Sultans. In spite of the precautions Mughals took to prevent any collaboration between the two states[27], Qutub Shah was not deterred in rendering military help, with men and material to Bijapur. Qutub Shah did not even care for the wrath of Aurangzeb and its consequences. Obviously, he must have realised the reality that if Bijapur-Golconda did not put up joint front, the extinction of both the states was inevitable and only time was the criteria.

Sikandar 'Adil Shah and Abu'l-Hasan Qutub Shah

With the death of 'Ali 'Adil Shah II in 1672 and succession of infant Sikandar 'Adil Shah altered the relations between the two states. Abu'l-Hasan too was a changed man. Though in the beginning Abu'l-Hasan and his Minister Madanna adopted a policy of actively promoting to resuscitate the tottering government of Bijapur, yet within the next few years they changed their policy and started hobnobbing with Shivaji to make territorial gains in the Bijapur Karnataka[28].

By 1676 Qutub Shah forgetting all friendship, amity, alliance and dynastic relations existing between the two states tried to seize the opportunity, due to civil war at Bijapur to conquer Bijapur Karnataka. In this changed policy towards, Bijapur, Qutub Shah was influenced by his Prime Minister Madanna, who was dreaming to restore South India of its Vijayanagar times. For accomplishing these designs, no better person could be found than Shivaji. Madanna induced his master to agree to joint enterprise with Shivaji, in which Qutub Shah, as the sleeping partner, would bear all the expenses and supply the munitions of war, while Shivaji, as the active partner, would do all the fighting with his own troops. Bijapur Karnataka was to be conquered in the name and for the benefit of Qutub Shah while Shivaji for his pains would get all the spoils of war and the territory in the uplands of Mysore. For this purpose, Shivaji came to Hyderabad early in 1677, and made with Qutub Shah a secret anti-Bijapur compact. Qutub Shah paid to Shivaji a subsidy of 3000 huns a day and sent 5000 men for the campaign.

Qutub Shah intervenes in the internal affairs of Bijapur

In 1677, the young Sikandar ‘Adil Shah sent an earnest appeal and sought Abu’l-Hasan Qutub Shah’s intervention to resolve the civil strife at Bijapur. Qutub Shah immediately responded and tried to mediate for the peaceful settlement of the internal affair of Bijapur. Abu’l-Hasan invited Mas‘ud Khan and Abdu’l-Karim, leaders of two Bijapur factions to Hyderabad, for resolving their differences. He exhorted them to compose their internal quarrels, in view of the Mughal danger looming large on Bijapur. Qutub Shah was successful in settling the dispute and imposed conditions on the two parties and granted six lakhs of huns. The salient features of the settlement, was that, Mas‘ud Khan, Prime Minister of Bijapur should in no case bow before Shivaji and that Akkanna was to be permanent Qutub Shahi envoy at the Bijapur Court.

After the agreement had been signed by the concerned parties, Qutub Shah handed over his order for the payment of six lakhs huns to Mas’ud Khan and ordered about four thousand Golconda cavalry to accompany the Bijapur officials as far as the border[29].

This intervention of Qutub Shah to resolve the party squabbles of Bijapur shows the influence and position he had attained in Deccan politics and his close relations with ‘Adil Shah. However, the net effect of Qutub Shah’s mediation was neutralized by Mas’ud Khan’s divergent agreement with the Mughals.

Alliance against the Mughals

During Aurangzeb's campaign against Bijapur in 1684, Sikander 'Adil Shah tried his best to come to some definite materialistc understanding with Qutub Shah, to offer a joint front to the Mughals. In order to decide upon the future policy, 'Adil Shah deputed Shah Hadrat Qadir to Qutub Shah in July 1684 for consultations. After his successful mission, Qadir returned back to Bijapur in August, 1684. This greatly enraged Aurangzeb and he issued definite orders to Qutub Shah to desist from giving any help to Bijapur and to sever all connections with that state. Yet, Qutub Shah was keen on helping Bijapur against the Mughals. He tried to sent a huge army to Bijapur, but the roads were blockaded by the Mughals. Still Qutub Shah wished to render help to Bijapur and tried in vain to send another army in 1686, before the fall of Bijapur[30].

Nizam Shahis – Adil Shahis Relations:

Bijapur-Ahmednagar relations were based on the relations existing prior to 1489 between Yusuf 'Adil Shah and Ahmad Nizam Shah, when they were Bahmani officers under Sultan Muhammad Shah II.

Prior to 1489, Yusuf 'Adil as a Khan was leader of the afaqi party at the Bahmani court and while Ahmad Nizam Shah, as a malik was member of the opposite party–the Dakhni. Thus there existed between them mutual animosity and party strife. In 1482, Ahmad and Yusuf as leaders of two parties, had a

conflict, which lasted for twenty days with much loss of human life and blood. The two rival factions had to conclude peace, and Yusuf evinced cordiality with Ahmad.

When Ahmad was trying to suppress the rebellious activities of Zainu'l-'Abidin in 1486, Yusuf took side with Zainu'l 'Abidin against Ahmad, by sending a large force to the succor of Zainu'l-'Abidin. But when Sultan Mahmud Shah Bahmani sent a farman to Yusuf, the tarafdar of Bijapur, to march with an army to suppress the rising power of Ahmad Nizamu'l-Mulk, Yusuf instead of obeying the orders of the Sultan, sent messenger to Ahmad assuring him of his co-operation and goodwill, and secretly encouraged him to mature his ambitious designs of carving out an independent kingdom. It was on the advice of Yusuf that Ahmad discontinued the names of Bahmani Sultan from the Khutbah and introduced his own name[31].

With the proclamation of Shi'ah faith by Yusuf in 1504, a Sunni confederacy was formed by 'Ali Barid against Yusuf 'Adil, which Ahmad also joined. To initiate hostilities, a pretext was evolved. Thus Ahmad sent his envoy to Yusuf demanding surrender of Naldurg, to which the latter declined. Then Ahmad joined the allies of 'Ali Barid and marched with a large army against Yusuf.

Yusuf resorted to stratagem by diverting the attention of the allies and disuniting them. He attacked the Nizam Shahi possession of Bir, burnt and

destroyed it. Ahmad broke away from the confederacy and marched to the rescue of his pillaged territory. This averted the fighting.

Isma'il 'Adil Shah and Burhan Nizam Shah I In 1514, when 'Ali Barid formed an alliance to crush the power of Isma'il 'Adil Shah, Burhan joined the allies. The allies attacked Bijapur, but 'Adil Shah emerged victories.

Isma'il in order to avenge the defeat, which he suffered at the battle of Raichur, in 1519, sought alliance with Burhan against Vijayanagar and Amir Barid. Consequently letters and civilities were inter-changed between Bijapur and Ahmednagar courts. 'Adil Shah sent Syed Ahmad Harawi as his envoy to Nizam Shah, to cement the bond of friendship. He was accorded a grand reception at Ahmednagar. At the emissary talks it was decided to have a summit meeting at Sholapur between the Sultans of the two States and to form a matrimonial relationship between the two dynasties. The nuptials between Mariam, sister of Isma'il, and Burhan were celebrated with great rejoicing, in May 1524.

It is asserted that in the treaty of alliance formed on this occasion, Isma'il consented to give, as a marriage-dowry, the fort of Sholapur with its five and a half districts. However, this condition of the alliance was not immediately fulfilled; and when Burhan demanded its cessation on the basis of Asad Khan's promise[32], 'Adil Shah refused to comply on plea of being unware of the promise. Consequently the alliance, which had been originated for the conquest of Vijayanagar, was shattered to the ground. Cordiality soon turned

into bitterness and hostileties began. This breach of faith on the part of ‘Adil Shah very much offended Nizam Shah, who to avenge it formed a triple alliance, with Amir Barid and ‘Imad Shah against ‘Adil Shah.

In 1526 the confederate army of Ahmednagar, Bidar and Berar, marched to besiege Sholapur and to occupy the ceded districts. ‘Adil Shah moved to meet the aggression. The encampment of the two armies continued for forty days during which time Bijapur forces hovered round the allies camp daily and cut off their supplies. Though initially the Bijapur were at a loss, but later they gained the upper hand when the Berar army fled from the battlefield. While Burhan, first tried to oppose, later he withdrew to Ahmadnager dejected. ‘Adil Shah returned triumphantly to Bijapur[33].

Adil Shah followed up the victory by successfully instigating ‘Imad Shah of Berar to break-up with Nizam Shah. The two captured the Nizam Shahi possession of Pathardi. Nizam Shah in alliance with Amir Barid re-captured it.

Though in 1528 Nizam Shah showed hostile attitude towards Bijapur but, in the following year, when Ahmednagar was invaded by Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, he appealed for help to ‘Adil Shah. But for ‘Adil Shah’s prompt financial and military help, Ahmednagar would have been over-run and conquered by Bahadur Shah. In the same year Nizam Shah repaid this obligation by agreeing to maintain neutrality during Bijapur’s attack on Bidar.

In 1532, Nizam Shah tried to mediate in the Bijapur-Bidar conflict, and wrote a imperious letter to ‘Adil Shah to refrain from hostilities. ‘Adil Shah gave a haughty reply, saying that he had never interfered in Nizam Shah’s affairs and as such he had no business to interfere in Bijapur’s affairs. This annoyed Burhan Nizam Shah. He marched towards Bijapur and trespassed into Bijapur territory. A battle was fought between the forces of Bijapur and Ahmednagar, in which the former emerged victorious. The two rulers realised the futility of their mutual enmity and quarrels, which only deteriorated their economy and strength. They worked out a mutual strategy to conquer the territory of their weaker neighbours. They concluded a partition treaty defining their respective sphere of military operations. It was agreed that ‘Adil Shah should undertake the conquest of Telangana and Nizam Shah that of Berar. But this project was frustrated by the sudden demise of Isma’il in 1534.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I and Burhan Nizam Shah I

In 1538 the change in the State religion at Ahmednagar created a corresponding change in the external relations. Like other Sunni rulers, Ibrahim joined the league of Sunni rulers of Gujarat, Khandesh and Berar against Ahmednagar, to conquer and partition it among themselves. Nizam Shah resorting to strategem broke the confederacy and assaulted a crushing defeat to Bijapur[34].

In 1542, dissensions arose at the Bijapur court. Nizam Shah, taking advantage of this situation, invited Amir Barid to a coalition against Bijapur. Simultaneously he made a propaganda that Asad Khan, minister of Bijapur, in conformity with his Shi'ah feelings, had invited Nizam Shah and Amir Barid to invade Bijapur and promised to surrender Belgaum. Although there was no truth in this story, yet it was sedulously spread. Nizam Shah marched to Sholapur, captured it and made it over to Khwaja-i Jahan the disputed five and half districts of the dowry. Then he took possession of Belgaum, plundering on the way the towns that did not submit to him. The false hypnotizing propaganda of Nizam Shah proved to be successful. As Asad Khan,having lost the confidence of 'Adil Shah, was compelled to cross over to Nizam shah with his contingent. Nizam Shah then marched to Bijapur city. 'Adil Shah, deprived of his minister, and without confidence in those around him, deserted his capital and took shelter at Gulbarga. But with the arrival of a re-inforcement under 'Imad Shah of Berar, to the rescue of Bijapur, Asad Khan changed sides and came back to the side of 'Adil Shah by joining the Berar army. This compelled Nizam Shah to retreat to Ahmednagar. He was chased by the allies and was compelled to flee from Ahmednagar to Daulatabad. The allies concluded peace and restored the five and half districts to 'Adil Shah, with a promise to not to molest Bijapur again[35].

Nizam Shah being ashamed of the defeat and loss of Sholapur and its dependencies, tried successfully through diplomatic strategy to create animosity between 'Adil Shah and Ramaraj of Vijayanagar. Fuzuni says that

Burhan and Ramaraj met personally at Raichur and it was agreed to remove the barrier, the ‘Adil Shahi Kingdom between them. Then he allied with Qutub Shah, Amir Barid and Khwaja-i Jahan (of Parenda) and sent an army to invade Bijapur. Nizam Shah laid siege to Sholapur and its dependencies, ‘Adil Shah on the other hand, raised an army in self-defence. The Bijapur forces defeated the attacking horde of Nizam Shah.

In the meanwhile, on the request of Nizam Shah, Jamshid Qutub Shah reached the confines of eastern Bijapur, started plundering and occupied the whole country right upto the walls of Gulbarga, while the other ally of Nizam Shah Ramaraj, sent a large army to attack Raichur and Mudgal. Now ‘Adil Shah was in critical circumstances. It was obviously impossible for him to meet the invasion on all the fronts. ‘Adil Shah on the advice of Asad Khan, thought it expedient to make peace by the surrender of Sholapur to Nizam Shah[36].

In 1546, Burhan Nizam Shah, at the instigation of Ramaraj moved again to reduce Gulbarga. Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah marched from Bijapur to oppose him. Upon his arrival on the bank of the Bhima he discovered that the Nizam Shahi army was strongly posted on the eastern bank of the river and found it impossible to cross. Both armies lay in active for three months during the rains. At length, ‘Adil Shah, tired of inactivity, found means to cross and attacked the Nizam Shahis, who were totally defeated. Nizam Shah, in despair, now sent Shah Tahir to beg the assistance of ‘Ali Barid, who, however, declined to help.

In the following year, when Nizam Shah attacked Bidar and laid siege to Aussa on the request of ‘Ali Barid, ‘Adil Shah marched to the help of ‘Ali Barid. The allies then raised the siege of Ausa and in a battle the allies were defeated. Nizam Shah then captured Udgir and proceeded to Qandhar. Here the allies made another effort to raise the siege but, were defeated for the second time and Qandhar fell to Nizam Shah.

While Nizam Shah was returning to Ahmednagar after his success over Bijapur in 1548, on the way, he was approached by the deputies of a political party in Bijapur. They reported to him that the people were so oppressed by the cruelties and maladministration of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah that the nobles were desirous of replacing him by the Prince ‘Abdul’l-lah, younger brother of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah. ‘Abdu’l-lah at that time was seeking asylum at Goa. The Bijapur represented that without Nizam Shah’s help nothing could be effected. Ibrahim Qutub Shah was also invited to join hands with Nizam Shah for this purpose, and the allied sovereigns accordingly moved towards Bijapur. Nizam Shah first invaded Bijapur territory, and failing in an attempt to seize Belgaum, he was compelled to retreat. But soon Asad Khan’s death tempted Nizam Shah to make another attack on Bijapur[37]. He accordingly deputed ambassadors to Ramaraj, inviting him to a confederacy. Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah on hearing these anti-Bijapur moves by Nizam Shah, treated with disrespect the resident ambassador of Vijayanagar at his court. The ambassador quitted Bijapur, without taking leave. Then Nizam Shah, on the advice of Ramaraj moved from Ahmednagar, and blockaded Kalyani. ‘Adil Shah marched to relieve it, and

advancing to within sight of the Nizam Shahi forces, pitched his camp and entrenched himself. Nizam Shah, unwilling to raise the siege, also fortified his lines. The Bijapur blockaded the supplies to Nizam Shahi forces. One fine morning Nizam Shah made successfully a surprise attack on the Bijapur. After this defeat, 'Adil Shah in distress, fled through Nizam Shahi territory, to Parenda. At the approach of Nizam Shah, he retreated to Bijapur. The Nizam Shahi troops occupied Parenda.

In the following year 1549, Nizam Shah again marched his army through Bijapur territory without opposition, and held a conference with Ramaraj in the vicinity of the fort of Raichur. They resolved that they should both aggrandize themselves by attacking Bijapur. It was agreed that Ramaraj should capture Raichur and Mudgal with their dependencies on the south of the Krishna, and that Nizam Shah to capture Sholapur and Gulbarga. Accordingly, Vijayanagar forces besieged Sholpaur and after a blockade of three months, carried it by assault. On hearing that Ramaraj had already reduced Raichur and Mudgal and had returned to Vijayanagar, Nizam Shah also retreated to Ahmednagar[38].

In 1553, Nizam Shah formed an alliance with Ramaraj and marched towards Bijapur. 'Adil Shah unable to cope up, retired to Panhala while the allies besieged Bijapur. But falling ill, Nizam Shah raised the siege and retired to Ahmednagar.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I and Husain Nizam Shah I

On Husain Nizam Shah’s accession in Ahmednagar on 9th February 1554 Shah ‘Ali and Miran Muhammad Baqar fled to their uncle Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah, at Bijapur; and Shah Haidar having gone to his father-in-law Khwaja-i Jahan at Parenda, laid claim to the throne of Ahmednagar. Later on, Nizam Shah occupied Parenda and Shah Haidar with Khwaja-i Jahan sought refuge at Bijapur. Now Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah openly espoused the cause of Shah Haidar and Khawaja-I Jahan for which help he was to receive Sholapur and Kalyani. ‘Adil Shah, declaring war against Nizam Shah, marched to Sholapur. Nizam Shah formed an alliance with ‘Imad Shah of Berar and marched towards Sholapur.

The opposing forces of Ahmednagar and Bijapur clashed and in the conflict the latter met with a few reverses. ‘Adil Shah was forced to take refuge in the citadel of Bijapur, which was ultimately blockaded by Saif ‘Ainul-Mulk of Ahmednagar. Thus pressed hard ‘Adil Shah sought for assistance from Ramaraj. The latter sent an army under his brother Venkatadri. This made ‘Ainu’l-Mulk to withdraw to Ahmednagar[39].

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Husain Nizam Shah I

The internal troubles in Bijapur, arising out of the death of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah I, in 1557, emboldened Nizam Shah in concert with Qutub Shah marched to invade Bijapur. ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah, to avert the defeat, sought help

from Ramaraj. The latter directed Ibrahim Qutub Shah to withdraw. Qutub Shah complied with the request due to personal obligations and quitely deserted his ally, Nizam Shah, after making in vain overtures for help to Darya 'Imad Shah in 1559, withdrew to Ahmednagar.

In the meantime, the allied sovereigns of Bijapur, Golconda and Vijayanagar, invaded Nizam Shahi territories. The forts of Kalyani and Sholapur were bargained for the terms of peace; this being refused, the confederates marched to Ahmednagar, with a large army. Nizam Shah was unable to cope up with these forces and so fled from Ahmednagar to Paithan, whence he deputed embassies to Berar, Khandesh and Bidar soliciting help. Meanwhile, the allies laid siege to Ahmednagar; but Ibrahim Qutub Shah, unwilling that 'Adil Shah should add this fort to his dominions, connived at supplies passing through his camp to the garrison, and later on slipped away to Golconda[40].

When the siege was pressed hard, Nizam Shah deputed Qasim Beg and Mulla 'Inayatu'l-lah to Ramaraj for seeking peace. The allies granted peace on the following terms: that Nizam Shah should cede the fortress of Kalyani to 'Adil Shah; that he should put to death Jahangir Khan who commanded the auxiliary troops of Darya 'Imad Shah and who was extremely active against the allies; and that he should pay a visit to Ramaraj to receive pan from his hands.

After the meeting between Nizam Shah and Ramaraj, the former gave the keys of the fort of Kalyani to the latter, who in turn passed it to 'Adil Shah.

Though the treaty was concluded between Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar, Bijapur was the benefactor of it.

Nizam Shah did not loose hopes of recovering back Kalyani and he made attempts for its recovery. For this purpose in 1562, Nizam Shah and Ibrahim Qutub Shah met in the neighbourhood of Kalyani. To strengthen their alliance and bond of friendship, Bibi Jamila, the daughter of Nizam Shah was married to Ibrahim Qutub Shah. Immediately, they laid siege to the Kalyani fort. In this situation they were attacked by Ramaraj and 'Ali 'Adil Shah, who were joined by 'Ali Barid from Bidar and Burhan 'Imad Shah from Berar. Nizam Shah's plan proved to be abortive, as Golconda forces deserted. Nizam Shah had to retreat with heavy losses.

The allies chased Nizam Shah and even after raising siege of Ahmednagar, they chased him to Junair from whence he retired into the mountains. At the approach of the rainy season, the allies again laid siege to Ahmednagar but after some time raised it. Nizam Shah tried to smuggle food grains into the fort of Sholapur, which was besieged by the allies[41].

Confederacy against Vijayanagar

The indignity and the atrocities committed by the army of Ramaraj on the people of Ahmednagar, during the last war, and the plunder of the Bijapur and Golconda territories by his foraging party and his compulsion on both 'Ali 'Adil Shah I and Ibrahim Qutub Shah to cede certain territories, opened the

eyes of the Deccan Sultans. For the time being both ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Hussain Nizam Shah I forgetting their hereditary animosity and enemity, allied together along with their common enemies – rulers of Golconda and Bidar.

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I resolved to curb Ramaraj’s insolence and reduce his power. For this purpose, on the advice of Shah Abu Turab and Kishwar Khan Lari, ‘Adil Shah directed the latter to take measures to effect a general league of the Deccan Sultans. To strengthen the military alliance, matrimonial alliances were formed, by which it was agreed that Husain Nizam Shah should give his daughter Chand Bibi in marriage to ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah, with the fortress of Sholapur as her dowry. And in reciprocation, ‘Adil Shah’s sister Hadiya Sultana, was to be given as a consort to Murtaza, eldest son of Husain Nizam Shah. Further, it was decided to enter into a treaty of friendship between the two dynasties, and they were to unite sincerely to reduce the power of Vijayanagar. For this purpose they were to march to Vijayanagar at the earliest practicable time. The terms of the treaty having been settled, Mulla ‘Inayatu’l-lah accompanied Mustafa Khan as an envoy. The political treaties and matrimonial agreements were drawn and were mutually confirmed by the most solemn oaths. It was also agreed that the nuptial rejoicing and festive should be held simultaneously at Bijapur and Ahmednagar and the two princess be sent to their new homes[42].

The four Sultans of Ahmednagar, Bijapur, Bidar and Golconda, after making necessary preparations and working out the strategy for war, jointly attacked Vijayanagar in 972/1565. ‘Adil Shah entertained his ally Nizam Shah

with great splendor and sent strict orders to all the governors of his kingdom to forward supplies of provisions from their districts regularly to the allies camp. This action was necessitated because Bijapur was contiguous with Vijayanagar and the allied army had to trespass through Bijapur territory. 'Adil Shah was keen on pleasing his new friends and he told them that they should consider themselves as his guests and that he would gladly arrange for supplies for their armies.

The allied armies marched from Bijapur to Talikota, and thence to the Krishna on 28-5-972/24-12-1564 and the great battle of Bannihatti was fought on 20-6-972/23-1-1565 which decided in favour of the Sultans[43].

The Break-up of the Confederacy

Since there was no agreement of a permanent modus Vivendi between the Deccan Sultans, the process of break-up started soon after the battle of Bannihatti. The old hereditary animosity once again started playing its role. It was the jealousy of territorial gains that flared up mutual strife.

Before the conquest of Vijayanagar, it was agreed between the allies that after the conquest, the Krishna-Tungabhadra doab should be restored to 'Adil Shah. But soon after the battle, when the question of distribution of the war gains arose, Nizam Shah and Qutub Shah sent secret messengers to Tirumala not to restore the doad forts to the men of 'Adil Shah. Tirumala, on his part,

communicated lame excuses to ‘Adil Shah, adopting delaying tactics, expressing his inability to restore the forts immediately.

In the meanwhile, when the Qutub Shahi commander Mustafa Khan went to hand over the territory of the doab, Husain Nizam Shah was touched to the quick and he sent a strongly worded message to Qutub Shah to the effect that it was against all etiquette that Mustafa Khan should hand over the territory to the representative of ‘Adil Shah without his consent. Apparently Nizam Shah professed friendship towards ‘Adil Shah but in reality he possessed inner hereditary animosity. ‘Adil Shah too had evinced similar attitude towards Nizam Shah[44].

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Murtaza Nizam Shah I

Husain Nizam Shah was succeeded by a minor, Murtaza Nizam Shah. This ‘Adil Shah conceived a favourable opportunity for territorial aggrandisement. He therefore marched towards the south in 1566. When Venkatadri informed of ‘Adil Shah’s designs to Nizam Shah and the Queen Khunza Humayun, the latter could not tolerate the territorial expansion of Bijapur. She therefore took the young Sultan with her and marched at the head of a large army to Bijapur. This compelled ‘Adil Shah to retreat to Bijapur expeditiously from Anegondi. After frequent skirmishes between the Bijapur and Ahmednagar forces, they dispersed.

During the course of an year the hostile feelings between ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah were patched up; and at the request of the Queen-Regent of Ahmad-nagar, ‘Adil Shah in 1567 marched with his army to her assistance during the invasion of Berar. But the alliance soon faded out and the depleted state of affairs at Ahmednagar tempted ‘Adil Shah to extend his dominions. Thus, in the beginning of 975/1567, ‘Adil Shah detached Kishwar Khan, to invade Nizam Shahi territory. The Bijapur occupied Nizam Shahi territory. Murtaza Nizam Shah, now grown up, marched to recover his lost territory. He laid siege to Dharur, where Kishwar Khan shut himself up in the fort. In an assault the latter was hit and killed; thereupon the Bijapur fled and the fort fell to Nizam Shahis. With this signal victory, the latter also recovered other districts, which had been captured earlier by the Bijapur. In the meanwhile, ‘Ainu’l-Mulk Bijapur rushed towards Ahmadangar for plundering and devastating the Nizam Shahi territory. But on being chased by the Nizam Shahis, he returned to Bijapur with heavy losses[45].

Nizam Shah admitted the weight of the argument put forth by Qutub Shah that – “None of us possess any rich and fertile land to the south of Bijapur. It is rumoured that, Bijapur force under Kishwar Khan has been dispatched to that side. In view of our present resources we cannot offer any opposition to Bijapur. But with fresh conquest and annexations ‘Adil Shah would grow more powerful and he would reduce us to subjection. Under such circumstances it is only becoming that we should attack Bijapur. We would, in that case either conquer a portion of his kingdom or compel him to recall his

army devoid of any military glory." Consequently, Nizam Shah persuaded Berar to join the confederacy against Bijapur. The combined forces of the three allies then marched into Bijapur. 'Adil Shah came to Shahdurg to meet the invaders. The allies had no courage to give battle. They marched against Bijapur through a different route and halted near the tank at Shahpur. 'Adil Shah, on the other hand, took no alarm and he detatched contingents to defend Bijapur. The allies laid siege to Bijapur. Two battles were fought in which the Bijapur offered stubborn resistance. Finally the Bijapur emerged victorious and the allies retreated to their respective capitals[46].

After the conclusion of peace, 'Adil Shah desired to strengthen his relations with Nizam Shah by an alliance. As such diplomatic relations between the two courts were re-established. 'Adil Shah sent an envoy to Ahmednagar for the confirmation of the last treaty and for the formation of an alliance against their common enemies. Nizam Shah, once again forgetting all their past animosity with 'Adil Shah, considered it expedient to establish good relations with Bijapur. In pursuance of this policy, the 'Adil Shahi envoy was accorded a grand reception at Ahmednagar. The two Sultans met near Ausa, where a treaty of peace was renewed and military alliance was formed against Berar.

Following this alliance, the combined armies marched towards Berar. After some skirmishes the allies defeated the Berar army. Both the Sultans now led an expedition to Berar. Tufal Khan, unable to cope with the combined strength, wisely retreated and played diplomatic strategy of fomenting animosity between the allies, by enticing 'Adil Shah to march against Qutub

Shah for better gains. Forgetting that it was he who had invited Nizam Shah to form an alliance against Tufal Khan, 'Adil Shah discarded the alliance, and retreated from the campaign. He even went to the extent of seizing the person of Murtaza Nizam Shah.

The conflict did not end here. Now was the turn of the Queen Khunza Humayun to avenge 'Adil Shah's treachery, through an alliance with Tufal Khan of Berar. Further, she wished to recover some of the districts which 'Adil Shah had captured from Ahmednagar. The combined armies of Ahmednagar and Berar attacked Bijapur. The Queen's strategy was quite successful; as 'Adil Shah got frightened and retreated. At the same time he detached Kishwar Khan to engage the allied army. Kishwar made Gulbarga his headquarters, from where he made skirmishes. After some time the allies raised the siege and returned[47].

Though in 1566, Bijapur and Ahmednagar joined in league against Berar, still in 1568 rift appeared between the allies. 'Ali 'Adil Shah seized the opportunity of the confused state of affairs at Ahmednagar and abetting by the advice of Kishwar Khan, he wanted to avenge the loss of Raichur and Mudgal. When news of the proposed attack reached Ahmednagar Nizam Shah sought help from Golconda and Berar. The armies of the three allies met between Qandhar and Kaulas. 'Adil Shah was taken aback by these development and unable to cope up with the combination, retreated to Bijapur. The allies now advanced into Bijapur territory itself, forcing 'Adil Shah to take refuge in the

plains of Konkan. ‘Adil Shah then approached Ibrahim Qutub Shah for peace and on latter’s advice the allies withdrew.

‘Ali ‘Adil Shah did not keep up the terms of the peace. Seizing the opportunity of the confused state of affairs at Ahmednagar and the rift between the Queen and Nizam Shah ‘Adil Shah captured Dharur.

In September 1569 Murtaza Nizam Shah assumed powerand decided to recover the Nizam Shahi territory captured by ‘Adil Shah during the regency of his mother. He first tried to settle the issue through diplomatic means and adviced Kishwar Khan to vacate Dharur. The latter’s insolent reply enraged Nizam Shah. Murtaza now marched to Dharur, and after a short siege captured it. He them marched to Bijapur itself accompanied by the Golconda forces.

The crafty ‘Adil Shah now having recourse to a ruse, sent Shah Abu’l-Hasan (son of Shah Tahir) to Murtaza, evincing the mutual benefits accruing from the friendly relations of the two states on the previous occasions. He also exhorted him about the futility of Ahmednagar-Golconda alliance. At the same time ‘Adil Shah, on the diplomatic offensive, corresponded with Qutub Shah and successfully created animosity between the two allies. Qutub Shah withdrew, resulting in the break-up of the alliance[48].

Then ‘Adil Shah tried to be friendly with Nizam Shah. But when the latter wished to avenge Qutub Shah, ‘Adil Shah readily changed his allegiance and agreed to the proposal of Qutub Shah against Nizam Shah. Further, ‘Adil Shah came to a secret understanding with Shah Haidar and Jamalu’d-din

Husain, former ministers of Ahmednagar. But the clever strategy of Nizam Shah successfully prevented the junction of the allies. The confederacy fell to pieces, and in consternation the allies retreated to their respective capitals.

However ‘Adil Shah did not maintain this policy. Very soon, in 1572, he changed his allegiance. And once again he allied with Nizam Shah to form a dual alliance. ‘Adil Shah and Nizam Shah being inspired by the ambitions projects of territorial aggrandisement, agreed mutually that “Ali ‘Adil Shah should conquer as much of the Karnataka as would produce a revenue equal to Berar and Bidar, which the latter kingdoms Murtaza Nizam Shah should be at liberty to wrest from the hands of Tufal Khan and ‘Ali Barid Shah.” Further, they agreed to exchange permanent envoys at their courts. Accordingly the two sultans executed the terms of the treaty by undertaking their respective expeditions[49].

Murtaza Nizam Shah maintained the terms of the treaty with ‘Adil Shah inspite of being induced and tempted by Ibrahim Qutub Shah and Venkatadri of Vijayanagar. The latter had offered a sum of seven lakhs huns, as expenses of war on Bijapur. While the former jealous of Bijapur’s successful expeditions in the south, offered five thousand huns per day for defraying the cost of expedition against Bijapur.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II and Murtaza Nizam Shah I

Death of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I in 1580 altered the diplomatic relations of Bijapur. Nizam Shah forgetting the past relations, casted envious and aggressive designs on Bijapur. The commotion at Bijapur, during the minority of ‘Adil Shah was a natural incentive for Nizam Shah. He formed a pretext for the invasion in taking revenge for ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah’s help to ‘Ali Barid against Ahmednagar. Acting on the notorious tradition of Deccan Sultans, Nizam Shah seeking vengeance on the son for the deeds of the father, detached Malik Bihzad for the investment of Sholapur which was the bone of contention between the two kingdoms. Bijapur retaliated and penetrated into Ahmednagar territory and the Ahmednagar forces were defeated at Daraseo. Nizam Shah’s plans were all upset and in order to save the critical situation he sought help from Golconda. The combined armies of Ahmednagar and Golconda marched to the ‘Adil Shahi fort of Naldurg and invested it. But soon, the allies realising the futility of investing Naldurg, turned towards Bijapur itself. They met no opposition, until they reached Shahpur, which was a suburb of Bijapur. In the meanwhile, the Bijapur garrison of Naldurg, rushed to Bijapur’s rescue and gave a pitched battle to the allies. The Bijapur were forced to shut up in the fort on the defensive. Due to the civil strife the defences of the fort were in grave danger. Further, the defection of Kishwar Khan and ‘Ainu’l-Mulk and their crossing over to the side of Ahmednagar encouraged the invaders[50].

At last the Bijapur had no other alternative than to sue for peace and to come to terms. As such they resorted, in vain, to underhand dealings, by

sending Syed Murtaza to the commander of the Ahmednagar forces with a message that they were prepared to appoint his friend Shah Abu'l-Hasan as Peshwa, provided that Murtaza breaks with and attacks the Golconda forces. The Bijapur then resorted to guerilla warfare. This compelled the allies to raise the siege of Bijapur and retreat. While retreating, they ravaged the country at several places such as, Satara, Gulbarga, Miraj, Raibagh; and they again laid siege to Naldurg. But the death of Ibrahim Qutub Shah in June 1581 changed the situation.

With the accession of new Sultan Muhammad-Quli Qutub Shah at Naldurg in September 1581 the siege operations were intensified. But when the allies could not capture it even after four months of investment by fair means, they resorted in vain to underhand dealings, by tempting and bribing the defenders. Qutub Shah got sick of unsuccessful fighting and decided to return back, leaving a composite contingent to guard the territories which had been recently wrested from Bijapur.The allies then returned to their respective capitals in about the middle of February, 1582. Later on, the contingent was compelled by Bijapur to withdraw[51].

The Regent of Bijapur Dilawar Khan in order to re-establish cordial relations with Ahmednagar sent in 1584, his ambassador to Murtaza Nizam Shah. The latter requested for Ibrahim 'Adil Shah's sister Khadija Sultana in marriage for his son Miran Husain. Both the parties agreed to strengthen their dynastic relations through the new matrimonial alliance. As such Qasim Beg come to receive the princess and escorted her to Ahmednagar. The bride was

accompanied by her aunt Chand Bibi, who wished to visit her brother Murtaza Nizam Shah.

Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II and Husain Nizam Shah II

After Chand Bibi’s return to Ahmednagar, the Nizam Shahi Minister Salabat Khan, demanded in 1586, the cession of Sholapur and its dependent districts by Bijapur, which ‘Adil Shah was reluctant to surrender. Consequently Salabat Khan refused to celebrate the nuptials and he did not send back ‘Adil Shah’s sister to Bijapur. At this attitude, ‘Adil Shah invaded Ahmednagar towards the end of 995/1587. Nizam Shah was unaware of Salabat Khan’s diplomacy. But when the reality dawned upon him, he suspended Salabat Khan and appointed Qasim Beg in his place, and also effected reconciliation with ‘Adil Shah. The latter retreated from Parenda to Bijapur. Afterwards, the nuptials were celebrated[52].

But no alliance could keep the Deccan Sultans from going back to their mutual quarrels and jealousies. When Ahmednagar was in utter confusion due to internal dissensions, after the assassination of Husain Nizam Shah, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah, on the ill-advice of Dilawar Khan thought it there was now an opportunity to annex parts of Ahmednagar, and in 1588, ‘Adil Shah actually invaded Ahmednagar. The Nizam Shahi army under Jamal Khan marched to meet the Bijapur. The two armies faced each other at Ashti, without engaging. At length Jamal Khan came to the ‘Adil Shahi camp and prudently sued for peace. Dilawar Khan consented on the conditions that Chand Bibi returns to

Bijapur; Khadija Sultana, sister of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah and widow of the late Husain Nizam Shah, should also be sent back to Bijapur; and that Ahmednagar paid two hundred and seventy five thousand huns as the war indemnity (nal baha). Jamal Khan readily fulfilled the terms and the Bijapur army retreated.

Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II and Burhan Nizam Shah II

Burhan Nizam Shah II, who had taken refuge for two years (1580-82) at Bijapur was now, in 1590 backed by Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II and his forces, made second bid to regain the throne of Ahmednagar. 'Adil Shah himself with his forces marched to Ahmednagar. Jamal Khan marched from Ahmednagar to meet the Bijapur. A pitched battle was fought in which Bijapur emerged victorious. Consequently, Burhan Nizam Shah II ascended the throne, on 15th May 1591.

Even though Burhan owed the throne of Ahmednagar mainly to the military assistance of Bijapur, yet he very soon forgot the obligation he owed to 'Adil Shah and did not reciprocate a friendly gesture. Thus, when in 1591 Dilawar Khan fled from Bijapur to Ahmednagar he was favourably received by Burhan, who enrolled him among his nobles and ordered him to reduce the forts of Sholapur and Shahdurg. 'Adil Shah sent his envoys with a letter to Burhan protesting against the breach of diplomatic etiquette. Contrary to expectation, Burhan illtreated the Bijapur envoys and replied arrogantly to his erstwhile benefactor[53].

Again, ‘Adil Shah sent Mulla ‘Inayatu’l-lah to Burhan, demanding restitution of 300 elephants which Dilwar Khan had taken with him to Ahmednagar. Burhan, instead of conceding the demand, and forgetting all that he owed to. ‘Adil Shah, prepared for war at the instigation of Dilawar Khan. Burhan declared war in March 1592. The Nizam Shahi forces marched into Bijapur territories and laid waste the country as they passed.

In 1594, Burhan embroiled himself again in the internal affairs of Bijapur. He adopted an anti-Bijapur policy by promising to render military assistance to prince Isma’il, for deposing Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II. Accordingly Burhan marched from Ahmednagar towards Belgaum. But, having heard on his arrival at Parenda, that prince Isma’il had been defeated by the Bijapur and put to death he returned to Ahmednagar. This was a sufficient cause for ‘Adil Shah, to take offensive action. He resolved to punish Burhan for supporting his rival brother and ordered his army to lay waste the Ahmednagar frontiers. Burhan further provoked ‘Adil Shah by allying with Venkatadri of Penukonda for the invasion of Bijapur. However to create a double diversion, it was agreed between the allies that Venkatadri would take the fortress of Bankapur, while in the North, Burhan would reduce Sholapur and Shahdurg. Accordingly, Murtaza Khan Inju advanced as far as Parenda, but when he found that Ramaraj had not yet began his march, he prudently halted in order to effect a proper combination[54]. However, he sent out detachments to lay waste and plunder the adjacent Bijapur territory. These troops received a severe check from those of Bijapur. This struck the rest of the Nizam Shahi army with terror

and they stopped their plundering operations. In March 1595, on hearing of the serious illness of Burhan and party dissensions, Murtaza Khan retreated to Ahmednagar.

Ibrahim Adil Shah II and Ibrahim Nizam Shah

After the death of Burhan Nizam Shah in May, 1595 and during the minority of Ibrahim Nizam Shah, the Habashis came to power at Ahmednagar. These Habashis behaved insolently towards the Bijapur ambassador, Mir Sufi. The latter, who had gone to condole the death of Burhan and congratulate Ibrahim on the lineal succession, had to quit Ahmednagar in disgust. 'Adil Shah was so much offended at this affront that he resolved to take revenge upon Nizam Shah and on 18th May, 1595 he marched with his army to Shahdurg. 'Adil Shah was not determined to declare war but he only wanted to have redress of the misbehaviour of the minister. As such, in expectation of apologies, he marhed slowly to Shahdurg,n where he fixed his headquarters.

IKhlas Khan of Ahmednagar instead of endeavouring to make peace, marched with Nizam Shah and his army to meet the Bijapur. Even at this action of Nizam Shah, 'Adil Shah advised his commander Hamid Khan not to initiate hostilities if the Nizam Shahis did not enter Bijapur territory[55]. However, contrary to the expectation of 'Adil Shah, the Ahmednagar army crossed the Bijapur frontier. A severe battle was fought, in which the Bijapur were saved from a near defeat. After another encounter, the Nizam Shahi army had to leave

the field and retreat; the Bijapur emerged victorious. During the retreat Nizam Shah died on 10^{th} May, 1595. However, 'Adil Shah, not withstanding this signal advantage and the confused state of affairs at Ahmednagar, did not consent to invade Ahmednagar but recalled his army from the borders and retreated to Bijapur.

Bijapur-Ahmednagar Coalition against the Mughals

Soon after the Mughal invasion of Ahmednagar on 16^{th} December, 1595, Mian Manju who was unable to cope up with the formidable Mughal army, fled with his protégé Ibrahim Nizam Shah from Ahmednagar for Ausa on the Bijapur frontier, and from there he appealed to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah for help against the Mughals. Chand Bibi, who was now at the helm of the affairs at Ahmednagar, also sent urgent messages to 'Adil Shah for help. The latter, realizing that due to civil war at Ahmednagar its defences were weak, sent Rafi 'ud-din Shirazi, with messages to various claimants to the Nizam Shahi throne and their protectors to shun their rivalries for the present to ward off unitedly the Mughal aggression, and then to decide the successor to the throne. The judicious advice of 'Adil Shah had the desired effect, and the opposing factions united with Chand Bibi[56]. 'Adil Shah responding to the fervent appeal of Chand Bibi, detached a contingent for helping the Nizam Shahi forces. When the siege of Ahmednagar was hard pressed and when the Mughals succeeded in causing the breach, the 'Adil Shahi envoy Rafi 'ud-din Shirazi who was at that

time in the fort, took charge of artillery and began to fire in defence of Ahmednagar. The forces of ‘Adil Shah played a strategic role and the Mughals had to sue for peace and retreat.

The Mughal invasion brought the rulers of Ahmadnagr and Bijapur close to each other. Now Rafi ‘ud-din Shirazi assumed the role of a mediator in the internal affairs of Ahmednagar. To settle the mutual quarrels, Shirazi had to “re-peatedly and severely admonish and threatened” the nobles of Ahmednagar on behalf of ‘Adil Shah. ‘Adil Shah thus succeeded in not only bringing about reconciliation between Bahadur Nizam Shah and his nobles but also in warding off Mughal aggression of Ahmednagar. This brought tranquility to the people of Ahmednagar. Great rejoicings were celebrated and prayers for the safety, long life and prosperity of ‘Adil Shah were recited at Ahmednagar.

However, the settlement brought about by the intervention of ‘Adil Shah did not last long. Shirazi returned to Bijapur, after having tried in vain four times in the space of fourteen months to make permanent settlement between the contending factions[57].

Chand Bibi too requested the assistance of her nephew, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II, to quell the internal commotions of Ahmednagar. ‘Adil Shah deputed Mustafa Khan with a boby of four thousand horse to her aid. At the same time, ‘Adil Shah, addressing a letter to Mian Manju called him to Bijapur. He succeeded in satisfactorily ascertaining that Ahmad, son of Shah Tahir was not a lineal of the Nizam Shahi family and as such had no claim to the throne.

Further he granted to the Ahmad a handsome estate for life, and enrolled Mian Manju among the nobles of Bijapur.

Again in 1597, when the Mughals broke the truce with Ahmednagar by territorial encroachments, ‘Adil Shah readily joined the anti-Mughal alliance with Ahmednagar and Golconda and the allied armies encamped at Sonpet. The Bijapur fought with the Nizam Shahi forces against Mughals in the battle at Ashti, resulting in the defeat of the Mughals in the initial stage; but, later on the Bijapur general fled away, and finally the Mughals emerged victorious[58].

Ibrahim ’Adil Shah II and Malik ‘Ambar

Malik ‘Ambar was a far-sighted diplomat and politician and realised the importance and necessity of forming a united front of the Deccan kingdoms against the Mughals. With this foresight, emerged the cardinal principal of his policy to assiduously win support and co-operation of his former master, ‘Adil Shah. The latter too, reciprocated similar gesture by fore-seeing the benefits accruing from such a relationship. ‘Adil Shah with a view to maintain a barrier between Bijapur and the Mughals not only encouraged friendly relations with Malik ‘Ambar but also did his best to strengthen ‘Ambar’s power.

‘Adil Shah exercised considerable influence over ‘Ambar and in 1607, ‘Ambar sought advice on the plan to depose Murtaza Nizam Shah; but on ‘Adil Shah’s disapproval he did not take the drastic step.

Thoughout the struggle with Mughals. Malik ‘Ambar sought help from Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah extended help both in men and money. In 1609 ‘Adil Shah sent 10,000 horsemen as military assistance. Due to these obligations ‘Ambar professed humility towards ‘Adil Shah and acted like his subordinate. The result of Malik ‘Ambar’s alliance with Bijapur was the utter failure of the Mughals in 1609-10 and the dispatch of prince Parvez by Jahangir to retrieve the situation.

‘Adil Shah had high regards for Malik ‘Ambar and wanted to strengthen him as a barrier between himself and the Mughals. When in 1615 ‘Ambar sought help from ‘Adil Shah to avert the conspiracy of the mutinuous soldiers, the latter responded the call by sending 20,000 horse under Mulla Muhammad Lari to Kharki. In the battle that ensued in February 1616 Nizam Shahi and the Bijapur forces suffered. ‘Ambar again with the help of ‘Adil Shah, brought back to his side Adham Khan, Jadhav Rao, Balaji Kate and Uda Ram who had deserted him and joined the Mughals. When ‘Ambar accused Mulla of collusion with the Mughals and induced ‘Adil Shah to recall him the latter complied with the request. Later, ‘Adil Shah deprived Mulla of his jagir for two years due to displeasure[59].

‘Adil Shah not only supported and collaborated with ‘Ambar against the Mughals, but he took keen interest in the external affairs of Ahmednagar in order to strengthen ‘Ambar’s position. ‘Adil Shah was instrumental in establishing cordial relations between ‘Ambar and the Portuguese at Goa. For this purpose the envoys of both ‘Ambar and Portuguese Viceroy came to

Nauraspur (near Bijapur) in October 1615. ‘Ambar sent Kashi Pandit with a letter dated 18th September, 1615 stating that “whatever agreement is entered into by Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah and Shah Nawaz Khan (‘Adil Shahi) with the (Portuguese) Viceroy shall be signed by our ambassador, Kashi Pandit, this will be observed by us.” This manifests the great influence and confidence that ‘Adil Shah enjoyed among the Deccan lers and especially Malik ‘Ambar.

It seems that the humiliating treaty of 1621 which ‘Ambar had to enter with the Mughals, was as a result of the undue pressure exerted on Malik ‘Ambar by ‘Adil Shah (and Qutub Shah) to suit their purpose. Bijapur thus played dual diplomacy, by keeping the Mughals pleased and pacified and at the same time ‘Adil Shah extended all possible help by way of men, horse and cash to ‘Ambar. This caused a rupture between ‘Ambar and ‘Adil Shah and the former became resentful towards the latter[60].

The rupture matured in 1623. ‘Adil Shah was extremely displeased on account of ‘Ambar’s bad behavior and inordinate pride and insolence. This gave an opportunity to the Mughals to further alienate ‘Ambar from ‘Adil Shah. Prince Parvez sought the friendship of ‘Adil Shah with many gifts. ‘Adil Shah took this opportunity and sent his confidential envoy Mulla Muhammad Lari to Parvez, at Nalcha (a dependency of Mandu). The Mulla was highly honoured by Parvez and the latter placed all the deserters of ‘Ambar, under Mulla’s command.

This alarming news of Mughal-Bijapur offensive-defensive alliance greatly perturbed ‘Ambar, and he wrote repeated letters to ‘Adil Shah begging him to recall the Mulla from the Mughal camp, as there was a definite peace between ‘Adil Shah and himself. But Ibrahim did not at all agree. Again ‘Ambar in 1624 came to Nauraspur (near Bijapur) and sought in vain to make peace.

Having failed to settle peace ‘Ambar retreated towards his dominions. ‘Adil Shah sent a large force under Ikhlas Khan on the heels of ‘Ambar, while from behind Mulla Muhammad arrived with Mughal troops. At this critical juncture ‘Ambar shut himself in the fort of Bhatwadi. But soon ‘Ambar fled away and was chased by the Bijapur army. After prolonged campaign of several months, the rival armies fought a contested battle on 15th June 1625, in which ‘Ambar emerged victorious[61].

Muhammad Adil Shah, Murtaza Nizam Shah-II and Husain Nizam Shah-III

Following the death of Malik ‘Ambar in May, 1626, the Ahmednagar Kingdom was thrown in utter confusion and anarachy prevailed. ‘Adil Shah, tried to secure parts of the flatting wreckage of the ruined Kingdom by bribing Nizam Shahi officers and these officers later entered ‘Adil Shahi service.

During the Mughal operations against Ahmednagar from 1628 onwards ‘Adil Shah persistently adopted dual diplomacy by allying at the same time both, with the Mughals and the Nizam Shah. He entered into compact with both of them. When Shah Jahan threatened ‘Adil Shah, the latter rendered military help to the Mughals. At the same time he sent financial help to the Nizam Shahis. On the one hand, ‘Adil Shah tried to give lease to the life of Nizam Shahi dynasty and save it from extinction, while on the other he tried to capture the western portions of Nizam Shahi Kingdom. The Bijapur, in the Tal Konkan captured Mahad, Chodegaon, Nizampur and Chaul; but Chaul was later on recovered by the Nizam Shahis[62].

‘Adil Shah rendered useful help to the Nizam Shahi minister, Muqarrab Khan, when the latter fervently appealed to Randaula Khan to save the Nizam Shahi dynasty from extinction. Muqarrab Khan offered to cede the fort of Sholapur as the price of the help against the Mughals.

‘Adil Shah and his commanders Randaula Khan and Murari Pandit rendered valuable service in 1632-33 to Shahji in the latter’s attempt to revive and give a fresh lease of life to the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Murari was instrumental with Shahji in crowning Murtaza Nizam Shah, and when Shahji with Murtaza was tossed from place to place, ‘Adil Shah and Randaula Khan supported him by all possible means.

This action of ‘Adil Shah made Shah Jahan to order three pronged attack on Bijapur, with the result that ‘Adil Shah was compelled to restrain his

support to Ahmednagar and safeguard its own interest. But, then, even Shah Jahan was doubtful of his success. Shah Jahan deputed his envoy Mo'inu'd-din to 'Adil Shah for negotiating joint Mughal-Bijapur collaboration for the extinction of Ahmednagar and partition of its territory between them. Shah Jahan annexed Ahmednagar Kingdom in 1636, and Muhammad 'Adil Shah was partly responsible for the extinction of the Nizam Shahi dynasty[63].

Adil Shahis – Imad Shahis Relations:

Fathu'l-lah 'Imad Shah, the founder of the 'Imad Shahi dynasty of Berar, assumed independence in 1490 in concert with Yusuf 'Adil Shah of Bijapur.

Since Bijapur and Berar were not contiguous and the question of direct hostility or territorial aggrandisement did not exist, as such, their relations were friendly and cordial.

In the year 1506, with the introduction of Shi'ah faith at Bijapur, when Sultan Muhammad Shah Bahmani made a war on Bijapur and invited 'Imad Shah to the confederacy, the latter did not join, in view of his good relations with Yusuf 'Adil Shah.

Yusuf 'Adil Shah, finding his position untenable to oppose the confederate armies fled to Berar and threw himself into the arms of Fathu'l-lah 'Imad Shah, who was on intimate terms with him. 'Imad Shah, first

reprimanded Yusuf for his religious innovation and then advised him to give up the new creed. In compliance with the counsel thus offered, Yusuf issued a command to his agent at Bijapur ordering him to discontinue the reading of Shi'ah khutbah and reinstate the Sunni khutbah. 'Imad Shah then, apprenhensive of the danger of openly espousing the cause of Yusuf 'Adil Shah, advised him to retire towards Burhanpur, till some plan could be devised of dissolving the confederacy formed against him. In compliance, Yusuf left for Burhanpur.

'Imad Shah on his part deputed one of his nearest relations to Malik Ahmad Bahri and Sultan-Quli, recommending strongly to retire, instead of weakening themselves and becoming the dupes of an artful minister Amir Barid. Further he issued a proclamation on behalf of Yusuf, expressing regret for the Sultan Muhammad's conduct[64].

When Amir Barid, being unaware of the role of 'Imad Shah in the confederacy, approached the latter for alliance against Yusuf 'Adil Shah, he declined to join. This led to fleeing of Amir Barid.

The Bijapur-Berar relations took a turn with the accession of Isma'il' Adil Shah at Bijapur and 'Alau'd din 'Imad Shah in Berar. When Amir Barid sought military assistance from 'Alau'd-din against Bijapur in 1514 the latter sent a contingent. Again in 1526, 'Alau'd-din, at the call of Burhan Nizam Shah I, led the contingent of Berar against Bijapur. In the battlefield, the forces of 'Imad Shah were opposed by Asad Khan of Bijapur. The former fled from

the field without making any opposition and did not halt till he bad reached Gawilgarh in Berar.

Isma ‘il now instigated ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah to attack Ahmednagar territory. The allies succeeded in capturing Pathri, but being chased by Burhan the latter fled to Khandesh.

In 1528 both Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah and ‘Alau‘d-din ‘Imad Shah realising the consequences of the great power that Ahmednagar had achieved and the frequent aggrandizement made by Burhan Nizam Shah of their territories, came to an understanding. To strengthen their position, on the advice of Asad Khan, Isma‘il gave his sister Khadija in marriage to ‘Alau‘d-din ‘Imad Shah.”

In 1532 in Bijapur’s conflict with Bidar ‘Alau‘d-din at the request of Amir Barid came to mediate peace. When Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah went to visit ‘Alau‘d-din, the latter congratulated the former on his recent success. ‘Imad Shah diplomatically disclosed that he had come to Bidar merely to share the victories of Isma‘il ; but now he wished to mediate terms in Bijapur-Bidar conflict. Finding Isma‘il adamant for Barid’s submission, ‘Alau’d-din did not press and the two rulers, after spending a week together in festivity, parted[65].

‘Alau’d-did ‘Imad Shah again in 1530, interceded for Amir Barid, when the latter was a captive in the hands of Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah. Then after a week ‘Imad Shah joined ‘Adil Shah in alliance and marched to recover Raichur and Mudgal from Vijayanagar. After their success in the enterprise the two rulers held a banquet in festivity.

In 1542, when Bijapur was attacked and hard pressed by the forces of Ahmednagar and Bidar, Darya ‘Imad Shah, on being solicitated fervently for help by Asad Khan, came to the rescue and compelled the invaders to raise the siege of Bijapur. After this, ‘Imad Shah convinced of the integrity of Asad Khan heartily espoused his cause, and conducted him to Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah in order to remove the misunderstandings. Thus by ‘Imad Shah’s intervention, ‘Adil Shah and his minister were reconciled, and this had a profound impact on Bijapur’s politics.

In the following year, 1543, Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah married Rabi ‘ah Sultana daughter of ‘Alau’d-din ‘Imad Shah, and the nuptials were celebrated with great splendour. But in spite of this matrimonial alliance in 1548 Darya ‘Imad Shah joined the confederacy of Burhan Nizam Shah and ‘Ali Barid against Bijapur, to enthrone the prince ‘Abdu’l-lah at Bijapur. The three Sultans met at Pathri and enrolled the support of Ramaraj also. But when the fall of Bijapur became imminent, ‘Imad Shah came to its rescue and saved it by deserting Burhan, and the confederacy broke.

By 1566 the friendly relations between Bijapur and Berar ceased to exist. ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I, at the request of Queen-regent of Ahmednagar accompanied Murtaza Nizam Shah to invade Berar. The allies advancing as far as Ellichpur, laid waste the territory of Berar and returned to their capitals, on the approach of the rainy season[66].

This anti-Berar policy persisted until 1572, when ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Murtaza Nizam Shah I came to an understanding and the former agreed to the latter’s free hand in the conquest of Berar. Berar was conquered by Murtaza Nizam Shah in 1574.

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CHAPTER – VII

Relations with Vijayanagara and Their Succession States

Bijapur and Vijayanagar being contiguous, direct relations were but imminent. The 'Adil Shahis tried, on several occasions, to maintain good neighbourly relations with Vijayanagar in order to maintain the balance of Power in the Deccan. The causes of the recurring hostilities between the two States were political, economic and geographical.

RELATIONS WITH THE SALUVA AND THE TULUVA DYNASTIES

Soon after Yusuf 'Adil Shah became de facto ruler of Bijapur in 1489, Qasim Barid called in the aid of Vijayanagar against Yasuf. Qasim promised as reward the cessation of Nandyal and Raichur, or the country between the two rivers, Krishna and Tungabhadra. Narasimha collected the forces of Vijayanagar, crossed the Tungabhadra, and after laying waste the country seized the two cities of Nandyal and Raichur[1].

A few years later, in April 1493, Yusuf marched to recover the lost territory. He advanced to the river Krishna, but falling ill he halted there for about two months. After Yusuf's recovery from the illness the two parties clashed. Though initially the Bijapurs suffered reverses, they finally emerged victorious and the Vijayanagar forces fled away. The disputed territory of

Raichur doab was now occupied by the Bijapurs. But it appears from the events of 1502 that Vijayanagar recaptured the doab region some time between 1493 and 1502. It seems that Bahmani Sultan Mahmud (along with Yusuf ‘Adil Shah) recaptured the same region in 908/1502 from Vijayanagar and entrusted it, together with the forts of Raichur and Nandyal to Yusuf ‘Adil Shah.

In the following years both Yusuf and the Raya persistently attempted to extend the boundary of their kingdoms at the expense of the other. Vijayanagar rulers desired to have a port, free from the Muslim control, through which they could get their supplies of arms, ammunitions and horse. To achieve this objective Timoja, governor of Honavar, which belonged to Vijayanagar, helped the Portuguese in capturing the Bijapur port of Goa[2].

In pursuance of the above policy, Krishna Devaraya, who was in fact waiting for a favourable opportunity to dislodge the ruler of Bijapur from the Krishna Tungabhadra doab, readily responded to the invitation of the people of Belgaum, who rose up in rebellion against Bijapur and requested the Raya to come and occudy the city. The Raya led his armies against Bijapur in August 1510 and laid siege to Raichur. Kamal Khan, the Regent at Bijapur does not seem to have concerted measures to meet the challenge of Vijayanagar ; as he was too busy with internal problems. Kamal Khan was defeated by the Raya. His treacherous design on the throne hastened his fall and by May-June 1511 the Raya captured Raichur and moved further north towards Gulbarga.

Isma'il 'Adil Shah could not forget the loss of the Raichur doad, which he was determined to recover, and in 1519, he marched to recover Mudgal and Raichur. The Raya of Vijayanagar on gaining early intelligence of 'Adil Shah's intentions moved with a large army. The two armies encamped on the bank of Krishna. In the battle that ensued, though the Bijapurs gained initial success eventually they were defeated and they retreated to Bijapur.

During the next decade Isma'il 'Adil Shah tried to strengthen his rule and the army. He was awaiting an opportune time. This came with the death of powerful Krishna Devaraya in 1529. He was succeeded by Achuyuta Raya, who proved to be a weak ruler. Early in 1530, Isma'il 'Adil Shah in alliance with 'Imad Shah of Berar marched against Mudgal and Raichur. He laid siege to Mudgal and pressed it hard. Deprived of any outside help, the garrison surrendered. 'Adil Shah now turned his attention towards Raichur and before he made the assault, the picket surrendered. Vijayanagar lost the doab[3].

Bhoj Tirmal Raya, the ruler of Vijayanagar, on attaining majority, got sick of Ramaraj's authority who was ruling during the infancy of Bhoj Tirmal Raya. When Ramaraj was away from the capital, the young Raya sent an ambassador, with a petition and presents of six lakhs of huns and other precious articles, to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah. The Raya wrote: "Your Majesty ('Adil Shah) may be good enough to direct your auspicious steps to my country and there by transform it into a paradise. For goodness' sake do away with the traitor (Ramaraj) whose authority lies heavy on me and my country, and let me have a

will of my own. Upon my honour, I shall offer you enormous wealth and shall ever be at your back and call."

Ibrahim 'Adil Shah readily agreed to rescue the Raya and dispatched his army towards Vijayanagar. While the Bijapur army was on the move, Ramaraj approached 'Adil Shah and misguided him by saying that now the things at Vijayanagar were set right, he should not take the trouble of sending the army. Ibrahim was pacified by 80 lakhs of huns, which Ramaraj sent to him. Since the sole object of 'Adil Shah was to acquire wealth out of the expedition and set the Rayaat ease, he retreated with his army to Bijapur.

On becoming cognisant of the Raya's death and treachery of Ramaraj, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah sent Asad Khan with a formidable army, against the fort of Adoni. Asad Khan besieged the fort; whereupon Ramaraj dispatched his younger brother Venkatadri with a heavy detachment against the besiegers. In the battle that ensued, Bijapurs were victorious and Venkatadri sued for peace[4].

It was as a matter of policy that Ramaraj concluded peace with Bijapur. But while consolidating his power he was waiting for an opportunity to avenge and retaliate 'Adil Shah. This came in 1543 when Burhan Nizam Shah formed a secret alliance with Ramaraj in order to create a diversion in the south and to attack Bijapur simultaneously on various fronts. Ramaraj deputed his brother Venkatadri to recapture the doab. Now 'Adil Shah attacked by three powerful adverseries, on three fronts was unable to cope up. On the advice of Asad Khan, he thought it prudent to make peace with Ahmednagar by surrendering

the five and half districts and reconciliate Vijayanagar by sending rich presents, and then to deal with Golconda alone. ‘Adil Shah sent ambassadors to Ahmednagar and Vijayanagar and concluded peace.

However, bitterness and hatred prevailed in the heart of Ramaraj and he was determined to regain the doab. In 1544 Ramaraj instigated Burhan Nizam Shah to attack Gulbarga. ‘Adil Shah led his forces and emerged victorious in the battle that ensued. Again in 1549, When Nizam Shah deputed ambassadors to Vijayanagar, ‘Adil Shah got greatly annoyed and treated the ambassadors of Ramaraj with such marked neglect that they became alarmed, and retired abruptly, without taking leave, to Vijayanagar. Ramaraj was much incensed and in order to involve ‘Adil Shah in a war with Ahmednagar, wrote to Nizam Shah recommending to attack Kalyani, belonging to ‘Ali Barid, the ally of ‘Adil Shah[5].

In 1551 Ramaraj and Burhan Nizam Shah held a conference at Raichur and arrived at an agreement for the recovery of the doab from Bijapur. Ramraj agreed to help Burhan for the recovery of Sholapur from Bijapur. The confederate armies succeeded in taking Mudgal and Raichur. Then Ramraj left Venkatadri at Sholapur for assisting Nizam Shah; and they recaptured Sholapur.

After the death of Burhan Nizam Shah in 1553 ‘Adil Shah, to recapture Sholapur from Ahmednagar, came to an understanding with Ramaraj. It was agreed that Ramaraj will not attack Bijapur territory while he was busy with

Ahmednagar affair and that he would not help Ahmadhagar. ‘Adil Shah met reverses thrice and was forced to take refuge in the citadel of Bijapur, which was ultimately blockaded by the Ahmednagar forces. When pressed hard, ‘Adil Shah made a requisition for armed assistance from Ramaraj. The latter sent his army, under his brother Venkatadri, to ‘Adil Shah. This made Ahmednagar forces to withdraw from Bijapur.

‘Adil Shah in distress forgot all hatred and enimity that existed between the two states. This altered Vijayanagar’s policy towards Bijapur. Hitherto Ramaraj had made unsuccessful attempts in alliance with Ahmednagar to destroy the power of Bijapur. But hence forward he supported Bijapur in its wars against Ahmednagar. The background of this changed relations was Ahmednagar’s overgrown power, and in order to maintain the balance of power, Ramaraj transferred his allegiance to Bijapur[6].

From the very beginning of his reign ‘Ali showed a desire to continue and further strengthen his father’s alliance and friendship with Vijayanagar. He established friendship with Ramaraj and wished to visit him. When one of the princes of Vijayanagar had died, it gave an impetus to ‘Adil Shah for seeking an interview with Ramaraj and to offer him condolences. In spite of the risk and danger that were involved in the enterprise ‘Adil Shah having put his trust in God proceeded to Vijaynagar. When this information reached Ramaraj he deputed nobles of his Court to welcome the royal guest. A mandate was issued to the effect that the royal guest should be courteously received at the Krishna and conveyed with due honour to the place appointed for his residence.

When ‘Adil Shah had crossed the Krishna, the nobles of Vijayanagar gave him a grand reception and led him towards the capital. In the meantime, Ramaraj had issued orders for decorating the capital in a marvelous way. A wide plain on the Tungabhadra, noted for its beautiful scenery and secullent climate, was assigned for ‘Adil Shah’s rest. The quarters were decorated with costly screens, embossed in gold, velvet and poly-chromatic carpets. Accompanied by the royal family the nobles and the soldiers, Ramaraj came out of the city to receive ‘Adil Shah. He then took ‘Adil Shah to his capital with great honour[7].

A conference was held in the royal palace. At the outset, ‘Adil Shah made Ramaraj to put on the special robe of honour that he had brought with him. ‘Adil Shah, having put on the mourning costume, offered his condolences to Ramaraj. Ramaraj was delighted and he conversed with ‘Adil Shah intimately. ‘Adil Shah gave away to Ramaraj sixteen lakhs of huns in cash, some rare and valuable jewels, elephants and beautiful horses and several other rare presents which dazzled the sight of the beholders. Having accepted these presents, Ramaraj showed due respect and courtesy to ‘Adil Shah and offered in return a gift of a robe of honour.

‘Adil Shah on invitation of the queen paid a visit to the harem. The queen of Vijayanagar addressed ‘Adil Shah as her son and her daughters looked up to him as their brother. Accompanied by all the princesses and the other ladies of the harem, the queen greeted ‘Adil Shah and performed nadhar in his honour. With the motherly affection, the queen had an interview with the

Sultan and placed him on the royal throne. She enquired about his welfare and talked with him on other subjects. She secured from ‘Adil Shah a promise of timely help to her husband.

When ‘Adil Shah returned to his camp, his nobles offered their thanks to God for the Sultan’s safe return from the harem of Ramaraj. At the end the nobles and the public of Vijayanagar offered their homage to ‘Adil Shah. After this event, harmonious relations between ‘Adil Shah and Ramaraj were firmly established and whenever either of them needed any help the other sent it.

Soon after his return from Vijayanagar, ‘Adil Shah in 1558 started expedition against Ahmednagar for the recovery of Sholapur and Kalyani. For this, ‘Adil Shah sought help from Ramaraj. The latter lost no time in marching out with a big force towards Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah and Ramaraj sallied forth against Ahmednagar. The forces of Nizam Shah took to heels. The army of Ramaraj plundered and destroyed Ahmednagar territory. The vanity of Vijayanagar forces exceeded all limits. They even showed discourtesy towards ‘Adil Shah. It was out of policy that ‘Adil Shah paid no attention to the discourteous conduct of the Vijayanagar army. The vijayanagar forces raided and destroyed the country extending from Junair to Daulatabad[8].

In 1561 Ramaraj played the role of peacemaker in the Bijapur-Ahmednagar conflict and effected a treaty by which ‘Adil Shah got Kalyani from Nizam Shah. After the conclusion of the treaty the forces of both Vijayanagar and Bijapur with drew to their own territory. And in the following

year, when Nizam Shah laid siege to Kalyani, ‘Adil Shah sought help of Ramaraj. Ramaraj immediately sent his infantry numbering two lakhs and cavalry numbering fifty thousand to the help of Bijapur. The joint forces of Bijapur and Vijayanagar again attacked Ahmednagar. But, on account of his friendship with Nizam Shah, Ramaraj had no relish for the contest. He thought of playing the role of peacemaker between the two Sultans. ‘Adil Shah on the other hand, had his doubts about Ramaraj’s conduct. He refused to believe that the latter could be both friendly to him and solicitate for the welfare of Nizam Shah. This sort of dissimulation thought ‘Adil Shah, was unworthy of Ramaraj. Thus, ‘Adil Shah got distrusful of Ramaraj’s help and tried to meet the challenge single handed. Being suspicious of Ramaraj’s attitude he slackened his efforts and prepared himself for the battle-field. In the battle that ensued ‘Adil Shah emerged victorious[9].

‘Adil Shah, on account of the precautionary measures of Ramaraj, marched to Sholapur. As a matter of policy he did not lay siege to it. He thought that if he conquered the fort Ramaraj who had grown insolent, might seize it. So he changed the plan and with Ramaraj’s help he rebuilt the fort of Naldurg, made it impregnable and named it Shahdurg.

The policy of Ramaraj to exploit from the enmity of Bijapur and Ahmednagar, devastate and plunder their territories proved fatal not only for himself but for the Vijayanagar. ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah, on the testimony of the previous expeditions, had, by this time learnt the futility and danger of inviting the forces of Vijaya nagar against the Deccan Sultans. He began to doubt the

ulterior motives behind Ramaraj's help as to establish his supremacy by encouraging the internecine wars among the Deccan Kingdoms, leading to weakening of their power. This led to bitterness between 'Adil Shah and Ramaraj. The latter's arrogance knew no bounds ; but his pride was the preclude to his fall.

Ramaraj after reaching Vijayanagar casted an evil eye on Bijapur and dispatched armies to the Bijapur frontiers. 'Adil Shah was compelled to purchase his forbearance by ceding the districts of Yadgir and Bagalkot. A similar deed was made with the Sultan of Golconda by which he ceded Kovilkonda, Panagal and Chanpura to Ramaraj. This peremtory demand the two sultans, due to their obligation to Ramaraj, were not in a position to refuse. This helped the two sultans to cement their mutual enmity and unite together for a common cause[10].

This session of territory by 'Adil Shah altered the natural boundary formed by the river Krishna between Bijapur and Vijayanagar. And this acquisition placed Ramaraj on an advantageous position for regular and direct encroachments into the territory of the Deccan Kingdoms. Further it gave an opportunity for building Vijayanagar empire north of Krishna, at the cost of the Deccan sultans. But Ramaraj was too harsh and sultans had learnt their lesson. He was trying to become military dictator and the arbitrator of the destinies of the Deccan sultanates. His expedition and alliance borne testimony to his sinister intentions which became apparent to the sultans. His reckless diplomacy and inconsiderate attitude towards the religion of others filled the

minds of the sultans with disgust. And out of this was born their hatred towards the Vijayanagar, the source of Ramaraj's strength, the symbol of his arrogance. To save the Deccan Kingdoms from the menace of this autocrat, the only salvation was in uniting together against him for destroying his military strength and over-throwing Vijayanagar. And this, the Deccan sultans proceeded to do so as a resentment against Ramaraj's unjust aggression of their dominions. The real cause of the confederacy was the feat engendered in the minds of the sultans of the rapid growth of Ramaraj's power to avenge the offended dignity of Islam[11].

The Battle of Banihatti–League of the Four Sultans

'Ali 'ADIL Shah I resolved to curb the insolence and power of Ramaraj by a league of the Deccan sultans. For this purpose 'Adil Shah convened the Majlis-i Kingash or Advisory Council for discussion. Two of the prominent members of the council, Kishwar Khan Lari and Shah Abu Turab Shirazi, while up-holding 'Adil Shah's desire to curb the pride of Ramaraj, advised that it could not be effected unless all the Deccan sultans joined together. 'Adil Shah commanded Kishwar Khan to take measufes to effect the object of a general league. For this purpose, an ambassador was dispatched to sound Ibrahim Qutb Shah and to open to him, the designed plan. Ibrahim Qutb Shah, who had been inwardly stang with indignation at the hauty insolence and

usurpation of Ramaraj, eagerly acceded to the proposed alliance, and offered to mediate a union between ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Hussain Nizam Shah I.

The preliminaries being over, ‘Adil Shah preparatory to declaring war, and in order to afford himself a pretence for breaking with Ramaraj, dispatched an ambassador to Vijayanagar, demanding restitution of Yadgir, Bagalkot, Raichur and Mughal, which had been, wrested from him. Ramaraj, expelled the ambassador with disgrace. This gave to the Deccan sultans an opportunity for hastening their preparations to crush their common enemy.

In 972/1564, the four sultans – ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I, Ibrahim Qutb Shah, Hussain Nizam Shah and ‘Ali Barid, at the head of their respective armies, met at the plains of Bijapur and on the 26th December 1564 they marched towards Krishna.

Ramaraj, though he saw the formidable union of the four sultans against him, he did not descend in the least from his former haughty language. He treated the ambassador of ‘Adil Shah with scorn, and their unity as momentary. In the first instance he detached his youngest brother Yeltumaraj with an army to occupy the right bank of the Krishna and secure all the passage to the river. He also sent his second brother Venkatadri in another direction; and himself followed up. The armies of the opponents encamped on the opposite banks of the Krishna[12].

On 5th January 1565 a fierce battle ensued between the allies – the Deccan sultans and Ramaraj at a place called Banihatti. And finally the allies

emerged victorious and Vijayanagar was conquerred. For six months the allied army re mained and enjoyed at the city of Vijayanagar. Tirumala made peace with the sultans by surrendering to them all the places which Ramaraj had wrested from them. Except this war, there were no hostilities between ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I and Ramaraj.

After the battle of Banihatti ‘Adil Shah was free to make conquests in the south. He first tried to subdue southern Bijapur-belt. In 1568, he led his army to Anegondi to place Timaraj, son of Ramaraj, on the throne of Penukonda, the new capital of Vijayanagar, and deposed Venkatadri in the hope of acquiring for himself a portion of the Vijayanagar territory. Venkatadri, when informed of these designs of ‘Adil Shah, appealed to both to Nizam Shah and his mother for help. The queen of Ahamadnagar came to the rescue of Vijayanagar by attacking Bijapur territory in the rear. This created a diversion in favour of Vijayanagar which compelled ‘Adil Shah to retreat to Bijapur. In 1569 – Nizam Shah changed the policy and came to an agreement with ‘Adil Shah that the latter could have a free hand in conquering the dependencies of the Vijayanagar and they agreed for non-inter-ference in each other’s projects[13].

THE ARAVIDU DYNASTY

The battle of Banihatti did not perish the Vijayanagar Kingdom, but it definitely reduced the extent of the kingdom and shifted its capital to

Penukonda from Vijayanagar. The kingdom then lingered on for nearly a century. Tirumala governed the state as a regent in the name of Sadasiva Raya. In 1568, Tirumala assassinated his sovereign Sadasiva and seized the throne for himself.

With the fall of Vijayanagar, Bijapur was free to extend its boundary in the trans-Krishna region. For this purpose, Bijapur and Ahmednagar came to a mutual understanding and this proved to be fatal for the tottering new dynasty of Vijayanagar. In 1573, ‘Adil Shah set out to invest Turkal, then in the possession of Venkatayasu Raya, who surrendered it after seven months of strenuous defence. Then ‘Adil Shah moved to reduce Dharwar, which had been under the possession of one of the officers of Ramaraj, and who paid annually a small tribute to Tirumala. The fortress took six months to subdue. ‘Adil Shah next turned his arms against Bankapur. This place was the principal residence of Velapa Raya, who had rebelled against Vijayanagar after the battle of Banihatti. He prepared to oppose the Bijapur army and at the same time he sent letters to Venkatadri, brother of Ramaraj, seeking help. Venkatadri expressed his inability to render any help to Velapa. The latter, was able to defend the siege, which lingered on for one year and three months. At last Velapa Raya surrendered on condition of being allowed to depart with his family, to which ‘Adil Shah agreed[14].

In 1574, four months after the reduction of Bankapur, its different chiefs submitted to pay tribute. ‘Adil Shah dispatched Mustafa Khan with a large army to reduce the forts of Jerreh and Chandragutti. Jerreh’s Raya resisted for

fourteen months, at the end of which, the fort was carried by storm in 1575. ‘Adil Shah then came to Chandragutti from Bankapur and stayed there for three months, after which he went back in triumph to Bijapur.

Sri Ranga I, who ascended the throne at Penukonda, early in 1572, could not render assistance to his rebel chiefs of the Kanara country whose territories ‘Adil Shah conquered gradually.

In 1575 ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah, after his short campaign in the Kanara country, joined the troops of Mustafa Khan and advanced towards Penukonda. At that time Sri Ranga was away from the capital. While returning back, he appealed for help to Qutb Shah. The latter, detached his general Shah Muhammad, to skirmish and plunder the borders of Bijapur. This created a diversion in favour of Ranga. Then the forces of Shah Muhammad and Sri Ranga formed a junction and induced ‘Adil Shah to raise the siege of Penukonda and retreat to Bijapur[15].

In the following year, 1576, ‘Adil SHha again invaded Sri Ranga’s territory. Sri Ranga set out from Penukonda to check this repetition. When the two armies met, a great battle ensued, in the course of which Sri Ranga fell into the hands of the Bijapurs, who emerged victorious. The immediate result of this victory was the possession by ‘Adil Shah of the territories to the north of Penukonda. Sri Ranga was soon released on payment of a heavy ransom. ‘Adil Shah renewed the attack on Penukonda. ‘Adil Shah’s motive was to weaken the

foundation of the new capital, Penukonda. Sri Ranga's forces defended the place and the Bijapurs, foiled in their attempt, raised the siege and retired.

Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II, continued the expansionist policy of his predecessor. He sent several expeditions against the Karnatak country. Venkata Raya II entered into an alliance with Burhan Nizam Shah against Bijapur. When in 1592, 'Adil Shah laid siege to Penukonda, Venkata firsttried to oppose the Bijapurs, but on the approach of 'Adil Shah he handed over the command to one of his general and retired with his treasures, to Chandragiri. 'Adil Shah besieged the city, investing it closely for three months. At the end of three months, when the garrison was about to surrender, Venkata bribed Handiatum Nayak the chief of the bergies in the 'Adil Shahi army with twenty four lakhs of pagodas and five elephants, to desert Bijapurs with his followers. The bergies deserted and 'Adil Shah was compelled to retreat to Bijapur, leaving Mustafa Khan to protect the frontiers[16].

For about a decade the relations between two states were peaceful. In 1604, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II sent an envoy to Venkata at Chandragiri. Unfortunately no information about this legation is available. It seems that the two rulers, though previously irreconciliable foes, became friends.

Taking advantage of the civil war among the rulers of the Aravidu dynasty, 'Adil Shah in 1619 despatched an expedition to Karnul, under Abdu'l-Wahhab Khan. Gopalaraja, the chief of that place under the Aravidu ruler offered stout resistance. It seems that Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, being on

friendly terms with that chief, rendered some assistance, which compelled 'Adil Shah to make truce in December 1621. However, 'Adil Shah did not give up his designs upon Karnul. Again in 1624 he sent Wahhab Khan who laid siege to it. Gopalaraja was reduced to great straits and he appealed to the neighbouring chiefs for assistance. With their help Gopala gave battle to the Bijapurs. After prolonged fighting Gopalaraja realised that it was futile to continue the war further. He abandoned the fort, and sought refuge in an unknown place. The fort of Karnul, with its dependent territory was occupied permanently by the Bijapurs. Sri Ranga who after his fall in 1576 took refuge in Karnul and was adopted by Gopalaraja now became, after the conquest of Karnul by Bijapurs, a subject of 'Adil Shah[17].

In 1636 'Adil Shah with envious eyes on Penukonda, detached an army under Randaula Khan.Venkata III, for the defences of the capital sent in August 1636, his dalavay Koneti Nayak to Penukonda. This place was bestowed on the dalavay, together with its dependen territory as amaram, and himself retired to Vellore. Randaula Khan allied with Sri Ranga in 1637 and began to prosecute war against the petty chiefs of the Karnatak. The Bijapurs also invested Bangalore in 1639 and Venkata had to buy peace at the cost of a large indemnity.

Then again in May 1641, Sri Ranga, in collaboration with Randaula Khan, captured two forts belonging to Venkata. Now the way to the interior of Vijayanagar Kingdom was open for the Bijapurs. Accompanied by Sri Ranga they marched upon Vellore. But the timely arrival of help from the Nayaks of

Madura, Thanjavur and Ginji, checked the advance of the Bijapur forces, and gave temporary relief to Venkata. Randaula Khan collected the moveable booty from the forts and handed over some of the forts to Sri Ranga.

However, Sri Ranga did not maintain the alliance with Bijapur for a long, and he wished to achieve his own interest. When Sri Ranga learnt that, his uncle Venkata III, who had no children, lay dying among the hills of Narayanavaram, thought it an opportunity to seize the throne for himself. So, he deserted the Bijapur general and came forward to defend his ancestoral kingdom. He proclaimed himself king as Sri Ranga III on the 29th October, 1642.

Sri Ranga now exploited the rift between Bijapur and Golconda over the conquest of Karnatak. He sent to 'Adil Shah a squad of elephants as gift and promised a sum of fifteen lakhs pagodas for his help against Golconda. In June 1643 'Adil Shah detached 6,000 horse and 20,000 foot, for Sri Ranga's help. With this aid Sri Ranga marched against Udayagiri, dislodged the Golconda forces from the fort in January 1644 and checked further advances. In the same year, Sri Ranga being exasperated with his insurgent Nayaks sought help from Rustum-i Zaman of Bijapur to check them[18]. The two agreed that their forces would jointly undertake the campaign and whenever a fort was captured, its moveable property would be the share of the Bijapurs while the immoveable that of Sri Ranga. In this way, the latter was able to save his country from passing into the hands of his enemy. This alliance was a strategy to the insubordination of the Nayaks and it produced the desired effect[18]. Later in

1644 Sri Ranga gave to ‘Adil Shah, a protion of the large sum of money he had collected from his vassals–the Nayaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura as the price of his support against Golconda. Again, when the Nayaks of Madura and Ginji had reverted to their old ways, Sri Ranga, With the help of Bijapur army made an attempt to wrest the town of Arani from the Nayak of Ginji.

However, Sri Ranga did not strictly observe the terms of the treaty and made common cause with the local Rajas, refused to be coerced by the Bijapurs and prepared to oppose them. Bijapur and Golconda came to an understanding for the conquest and division of the Karnatak. Their combined armies soon made their appearance in 1644 on the frontiers of Sri Ranga’s Kingdom. The latter was unable to cope up with the united armies of the two sultans. He again implored for peace to Bijapurs and promised to pay 50 lakhs of huns as indemnity. Rustum-i Zaman did not pay any heed to this request[19].

While the campaign of Rustum-i Zaman was in progress, ‘Adil Shah, in June 1646, detached Mustafa Khan to subdue the Kanara country of Sri Ranga. He reached the fort of Gutty, on the Malprabha river, via Bakargunda, which he took. Thence marching via Gadag and Lakshmeshwar to Honhalli, he met Asad Khan and Shahji on 30th October, who had gone ahead, by order of ‘Adil Shah, for the defence of the Karnatak frontiers. At Sakrapatan, Bijapurs were joined by the contingents of the following petty chiefs – Shivappa Nayak, Dad (or Dodde) Nayak (Raja of Harpanhalli), Jhujjar and Abaji Ghatge (Keng Nayak’s brother) the desais of Lakshmeshwar and Kopal, and Balaji Haibat Rao.

In successive marches, Mustafa Khan reached Shivagana. Venkayya Somaji, envoy of Sri Ranga waited on Mustafa Khan with peace offerings and induced him to stop the invasion. Mustafa Khan refused to be dissuaded from his purpose by the deceitful words of the envoy and hastened towards the Kanvi pass near Vellore. He agreed to stop whenever he would hear that Sri Ranga had withdrawn from the war with the three Nayaks of Thanjavur, Madura, and Ginji, who had rebelled against Sri Ranga, and agreed to make peace with them. Somaji promised to induce Sri Ranga to return to Vellore within one week. He took leave of Mustafa Khan and was accompanied by Mulla Ahmad, on behalf of 'Adil Shah to settle the terms with the Rayal and induce him to visit Mustafa Khan near Nilipatan in the uplands of Mysore. Mustafa halted before a difficult pass awaiting Mulla. At first he had wished to detain Somaji in his camp and send Mulla Ahmad alone for his peace mission, but on the assurance of Shahji Bhonsle who stood surety for Somaji, the latter was allowed to go[20].

Immediately on arrival at Vellore, Somaji advised the Rayal to prepare for war and blockade the pass. On this breach of faith, Mustafa Khan decided to make a detour and first entered the kingdom of Jagdev Rao by the Kanvi pass.

The Raya hastened to defend the Kanvi pass. Mustafa, was near Bangalore and on 21 December, 1646, he sent Asad Khan ahead of himself with a strong force. They forced their way into Jagdev's country and then halted for twenty days at a tank, five leagues from Masti. The Raya advanced

with a vast army by way of Guritatan and Krishnadurg, to attack the divisions left at the tank under Shahji and Asad Khan. The Bijapurs were attacked by the Raya's army and a bloody battle was fought in which the Bijapurs emerged victorious. Mustafa advanced further and reaching Krishnagiri on 30th January 1647, captured it after a brief siege. The Bijapurs marched to Virabhadradurg, the capital of Jagdev. It was taken after a severe fight. The Bijapurs marched on 7th February 1646 to Devdurg which was also captured. They marched, by way of Anandbar, Amravati and Goriatam and captured Uranjpur. The Bijapurs then reached Vellore. Here a severe battle was fought in which the Bijapurs emerged victorious, and the Raya submitted promising 50 lakhs of huns and 150 elephants as war indemnity. After a halt of one month at Vellore, the Bijapurs set out for further conquests. Turning back from Vellore, by way of Gunjatam, the Bijapurs, under Mustafa proceeded in March 1647 and conquered the following places of Sri Ranga's kingdom: Ambor, Kankuti, Tirupatur, Kaveripatan, Hasan Raidurg, Raidurg, Kayakpiri, Ratnapri, Melpri, Arjunkot and Dhalinkot[21].

In 1648, Sri Ranga, the Raja of Mysore and the Nayak of Madura allied together and also obtained help of Mustafa Khan (Who was again detached from Bijapur tn January 1648) to meet the Golconda forces, who were making further conquest in the south. The allies met the Golconda army at the plains outside Wandiwash and in a fierch battle the latter emerged victorious.

Finally, Sri Ranga had to abandon all resistence and seek refuge in Thanjavur. When Ginji and Thanjavur fell to Bijapur in 1649, Sri Ranga

repaired to Mysore, where he kept his court, with the aid of the Keladi chiefs, dreaming of the reconquest of Vellore.

In 1652, when war broke out between Bijapur and Golconda over the division of the Karnatak, Sri Ranga recovered some of his lost possessions from Bijapur. Thus encouraged, in 1654, Sri Ranga returned to Vellore in 1654 and raised a large army to drive the Bijapurs out. Khan Muhammad then proceeded to Vellore to put down Sri Ranga and re-establish the authority of Bijapur. On the approach of Khan Muhammad Sri Ranga sought safety in flight. Vellore was compelled to submit. Khan Muhammad was obliged to cede the fort of Chandragiri with its dependencies to Sri Ranga.

In 1656 Sri Ranga, through Mir Jumla, appealed to Aurangzeb for help against Bijapur. Pending intervention of Aurangzeb, ‘Adil Shah instructed his governor in Karnatak to chastise Sri Ranga for attempting to embroil them in a war with the Mughals. What action was taken is not clear due to the confused account of Zuhur[22].

In spite of hostile attitude of ‘Adil Shah towards Sri Ranga, some of the Bijapur officers especially Shahji rendered valuable assistance to Sri Ranga in the latter’s efforts to recover the lost possessions. With the death of Sri Ranga, the last ruler of the Aravidu dynasty in 1672, the Bijapur-Vijayanagar relations closed.

RELATIONS WITH THE SUCCESSION STATES OF VIJAYANAGAR

After the battle of Banihatti of 1565 Bijapur was free to follow expansionist policy in the trans-Krishna region of the former Vijayanagar Kingdom. As a result of this, its immediate territorial acquisitions were in the southern Bijapur-belt. Further down south it took a century for Bijapur to conquer almost the entire territory of the former Vijayanagar. The process of conquest was very slow and gradual and the expansion was not in one particular direction or region. The expansion was three pronged in the three viceroyalties – the Telugu Viceroyalty of the North, the Kanarese Viceroyalty of the West, and the Tamil Viceroyalty of the East and South into which the former Vijayanagar Kingdom was divided after 1565. These regions comprised various small principalities of the feudatories, called Nayaks. They were feudatories to the Raya of Vijayanagar and with the latter's decline in power, some of them, became independent[23].

The study of Bijapur's expansion in the trans-Krishna and coastal regions and its relations with the feudatories and the succession states of Vijayanagar can be made by the division of the former Vijayanagar kingdom into three regions the West Coast of Kanara; the Central Region of Karnatak and the East Coast of Coromandel.

This classification can be further broken down into the principalities of the feudatory chiefs. They were Malabar and Kanara Coast-Honawar, Bhatkal (Baticole); Gersoppa and Ankola and Barcelore (Basrur); Karnatak – Ikkeri,

Basavapatanam, Sira etc., Mysore and Bangalore; East Coast – Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura.

The new government of Vijayanagar under Tirumala, with the new capital at Penukonda, was too weak to exercise its sovereignty over the far – flung feudatories of Kanara and Malabar coast. Several petty feudal chiefs and governors of Vijayanagar, fulfilled their ambition by exerting autonomous rule within their principalities. 'Ali 'Adil Shah I, taking advantage of the anarchy marched in 1573 against Bankapur, Dharwar, Jerrah, Chundragutty and Karur and he compelled the feudal chiefs of these places to acknowledge his sovereignty and pay tribute. In 1576 the Rani of Barcelore and several other chiefs of Kanara came to pay homage to 'Ali 'Adil Shah, presented offerings of a considerable amount and agreed to pay annual tribute[24].

These southern conquest of Bijapur introduced new dimensions in its external relations. The new conquests and parts of Karnatak were not directly absorbed in Bijapur Kingdom and were not directly governed by 'Adil Shahi officers. The 'Adil Shahis left the small kingdoms or principalities to their original chiefs and only compelled them to acknowledge his overlordship and pay annual tribute. Thus in these southern conquests the 'Adil Shahis adopted the policy of 'conquest' only and not of 'consolidation'.

In pursuance of the policy of his predecessor Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II dispatched in 1584 Bahlol Khan with twelve thousand horse to collect the arrears of tribute from the rulers of Kanara country, and in case they refused

payment, to reduce their forts. Bahlol Khan's campaign in Kanara lasted about an year at the end of which, he returned to Bijapur. On his return, several rulers of the Kanarese country accompanied him to pay their homage to 'Adil Shah. These chiefs were honoured by 'Adil Shah with robes. Nevertheless this subjugation of Kanara country's petty rulers was mainly due to the mighty show of Bijapur's army. For, soon after Bahlol Khan's retreat in 1585 to Bijapur no tributary cared to pay the tribute. 'Adil Shah again resolved in 1593 to humble the refractory chiefs by dispatching Majjhula Khan with a large army. The Khan, on arriving at Bankapur halted for a time and summoned all the Rajas to meet him with their tributes, promising protection to those who obeyed but threatening the refractory with vengence. Most of the chiefs prepared to comply with the Khan's demand and evinced intention to visit him. Ganga Nayak who was one of the principal Rajas of Kanara and had eight or ten thousand horse and foot in his pay went first to pay his homage. This created jealousy among other chiefs. They suspected a Nayak-Khan conspiracy against them and broke off their engagement and withdrew to the mountains. The Khan considered it prudent not to follow them into an unknown country and marched with Ganga Nayak against Jerreh. This belonged to Arsappa Nayak, who consented to pay tribute; and immediately made an offering of two fine elephants and some valuables for the Khan and 'Adil Shah respectively. Afterwards the Nayak joined the Bijapur army and assisted them in the siege of Mysore[25].

In 1629 Bhaira Devi ruler of Ancola and Gersoppa which places were on the boarders of Bijapur, became tributary to Muhammad ‘Adil Shah. The Raja of Onore (Honawar) became a tributary of Ali ‘Adil Shah II in November 1663 by paying a large amount of tribute. By 1664, though Kanara country was practically conquered, yet ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II invaded it in 1644. Since this expedition was mostly for booty, Ali ‘Adil Shah arranged with the Nayak that the conquered countries would be given back to him on condition of payment of fifteen thousand pagodas. On receipt of this amount, ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah triumphantly returned to Bijapur in January 1665.

The Bijapur envoys who usually went to collect annual tributes from various chiefs also intervened in the internal affairs of the petty kingdoms. In 1672 the Bijapur envoy, who had gone to Bednur to collect the arrears of tribute, helped the weary Chief, who conspired to murder the Raja of Bednur (Ikkeri). Again, the Bijapurs assisted Naran Mulla of Bhatkal who took up arms in favour of one of the aspirants to the Chieftain-ship of Bhatkal.

The death of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II on 24 November, 1672 was followed by a rebellion of the Raja of Sonde (in alliance with the Raja of Bednur), and invaded Bijapur territory. After taking Mirjan, they laid siege to Ankola. Sikandar ‘Adil Shah dispatched Muzaffar Khan to suppress the rebel chiefs[26].

The Ikkeri kingdom comprised at its zenith an area corresponding to the whole coast of Kanara from Goa in the North to Cannore in the South and also parts of the Shimoga district. It had a nebulous beginning from about 1500

under Keladi Chandappa Nayak. Venkatappa Nayak was a feudatory to the rulers of the Aravidu dynasty till about 1613. He ruled over Tulu and the Male Rajya. During his reign (1586-1629) Ikkeri became an independent kingdom.

Ikkeri came in contact with Bijapur during the reign of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II On hearing about the extended power of Venkatappa Ibrahim ordered in 1626 all his hawaladars, commanding the Konkan to march against it. Under the command of Sheru'l Mulk, the Bijapurs reached as far as Candesvara, where Venkatappa met them. Bijapur forces suffered a reverse and they had to retreat beyond the river Mirju which, ever after remained the common boundary between Bijapur and Ikkeri. However, in spite of the reverses of the Bijapurs, Ikkeri was subdued and Venkatappa was compelled to pay 1,000 pagodas annually to Bijapur as tribute.

Bijapur adopted the policy of siding one feudatory of its against another feudatory. In 1629 Muhammad 'Adil Shah took side with Hanuma the chief of Basavapatanam in the latter's conflict with Ikkeri[27].

In 1629 when the news of the death of Venkatappa and succession of Virabhadra reached Bijapur, 'Adil Shah sent an envoy demanding one million gold pieces, five elephants and 200 Arab horses. He also demanded 80,000 pagodas as two years arrears of tribute which Venkatappa Nayak owed; and to evacuate all the territory takeu for the Queen (of Bhatkal) and the chiefs of the Kanara coast. Virabhadra Nayak was annoyed at this demand. In order to avoid war with a powerful neighbor he offered 30,000 pagodas on condition that,

‘Adil Shah would help him to supress the revolts of the minor chieftains under him. But this condition was not acceptable to ‘Adil Shah and he anxiously awaited an opportunity to wage war.

Mysore’s Chamaraja Wodeyar brought about Bijapur’s invasion of Ikkeri. Kenge Hanuma a petty poligar of Basavapatanam was set up against Virabhadra Nayak of Ikkeri. But Virabhadra put down Kenge Hanuma and his vassals and dispossessed the former of his fief. Kenge Hanuma went over to the Bijapur court to solicit the aid of ‘Adil Shah against Ikkeri. Already a similar appeal had been made to Bijapur by another poligar Chennayya of Nagamangala who had been deprived of his fief by Chamaraja Wodeyar. ‘Adil Shah taking advantage of the state of affairs accepted the invitation to intervene and undertook the first invasion of Mysore. The Bijapur army, under Randaula Khan and Shahji marched to Ikkeri and took its possession on 3rd December 1637. Virabhadra finding his position untenable retired to Bhuvangiri. But the Bijapurs with the help of Kenge attacked this fort. A treaty was concluded by which Virabhadra gave up his claims to the conquered forts and he was allowed by ‘Adil Shah to rule over the remaining portions of his kingdom on terms of subordination to ‘Adil Shah. Thus Ikkeri became a tributary to Bijapur[28].

After the campaign and conclusion of a treaty Randaula Khan left Kenge Hanuma in charge of the territories acquired by him and returned to Bijapur. Then Virabhadra reported against Kenge to Bijapur alleging that the latter was disloyal to the Sultan. Thereupon a commission of inquiry was

ordered by 'Adil Shah to investigate into the matter. Virabhadra played a significant role in shaping Bijapur's policy towards the southern feudatories.

In 1638 Virabhadra, anticipating some trouble from the Bijapurs, approached the Portuguese Viceroy to exert his diplomatic pressure at Bijapur to check the impending military action against Ikkeri. He sent Ramappa to Goa with instructions to request the Viceroy to write to the Portuguese ambassador at Bijapur to settle his affair with 'Adil Shah. The Viceroy readily complied by writing a letter to his ambassador at Bijapur recommending the case. Following this diplomatic move, which was quite successful in bridging the relations and creating a suitable atmosphere, Virabhadra sent Rama Krishnappa to Bijapur with rich presents in December 1638. The motives behind this mission was to obtain 'Adil Shah's consent for Virabhadra to join Randaula Khan, in his expedition against Basavapatanam. To avenge the previous defeat 'Adil Shah gave favourable consent and sent a large army under Randaula Khan. In this expedition Virabhadra joined with his forces, the army of Bijapur, at Harihara, on the Tungabhadra. The Ikkeri forces were led by Sivappa. The rebellion of Kenge was put down by the joint efforts of Randaula Khan and Virabhadra. They besieged Tarikere and destroyed it and then they attacked and captured Basavapatanam and Belur[29].

The relations between Bijapur and Ikkeri became so cordial that when Randaula Khan advanced against Bangalore in 1640, he accompanied by the Ikkeri army. It appears possible that Ikkeri after the conquest of Bangalore and death of Kenge Hanuma, encouraged the Bijapurs to invade Mysore. Ikkeri

played a significant role in the external relations of Bijapur and its conquests in the south. But all this cordiality and alliance was only a matter of policy and show and Virabhadra was never reconciled to himself the loss of territory. He stirred up rebellion and concerted measures to overthrow the authority of Bijapur. ‘Adil Shah on hearing the outbreak of this insurrection commanded Randaula Khan to lead an expedition against Ikkeri and put down the insurgents. Randaula Khan set out from Bijapur with a large army to Malnad or the Kanara country, laid siege to the fort of Ikkeri and captured it. Randaula Khan appointed Khan-i Jahan as its hawaladar. He then proceeded to Shimoga and invested it. In the battle that ensued, the Bijapurs sustained a reverse and were forced to retreat. Shivappa then re-occupied Ikkeri. This disaster which befell the Bijapurs aroused the wrath of ‘Adil Shah, who having put Randaula Khan to disgrace, collected another army and marched at its head, personally to chastise the Nayak. ‘Adil Shah reached Bankapur on 11th January, 1644, and having made it his headquarters, appointed Mustafa Khan and Muzaffaruddin as the Commanders of the expedition. Shivappa Nayak did not give up the battle, fortified Ikkeri and retired to the hills. The Bijapurs proceeded and captured the town of Sagar in Ikkeri. They next moved to Kelavur. Virabhadra sent Saraja Ray, a niyogi, to Bankapur and concluded peace with ‘Adil Shah through the agency of Sivappa Nayak. ‘Adil Shah then returned to the capital on 25th March 1644[30].

Sivappa succeeded in acquiring Vasudhara, Mirji, Sakrepatna and other places from Bijapur during 1647 to 1652. Sunda, a tributary to Bijapur was also

seized by Sivappa. Shortly after the death of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah, in 1656, Sivappa systematically carried on his aggression. He recaptured the forts of Ikkeri Soralsa, Udgani, Mahadevapuram and Ambatigolla from Bijapur.

The death of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah set in a weak administration at Bijapur which was unable to have full control over the far off southern territories. As such the Court had to depend on the local governors, who too were losing power. Sivappa re-acquired Vasudhara, Sakkorepatna and other bordering places from Bijapur.

By 1662 ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II found that the power of Ikkeri had increased considerably and he decided to march against Bednur. The expedition was a short one, but as it was sudden, Bhadrappa Nayak was unable to check the tide and Bednur forces had to withdraw. In alliance with the ruler of Sunda ‘Adil Shah sent an advance detachment under Bahlol Khan and Sharza Khan. A battle was fought and the Bednur forces were utterly routed. Bednur was besieged and captured. Sharza Khan then besieged the fort of Bhuvanagiri. Bhadrappa was not disheartened by the reverses, but relied forthwith in forces, blockaded the road and passes and intercepted the line of communication. The Bijapurs were forced to retire from the battlefield. Bhadrappa sent his envoy Huvayya to ‘Adil Shah to conclude peace. ‘Adil Shah was not very much interested in the conquest, but being out mostly for booty, readily agreed to the peace overtures and a treaty was concluded. ‘Adil Shah agreed to hand over all the conquered territories to Bhadrappa, provided that he paid war indemnity of 1,50,000 pagodas. After the treaty ‘Adil Shah returned to Bijapur[31].

On the death of Bhadrappa in 1664, a civil war broke out at Ikkeri. ‘Adil Shah availing the opportunity to conquer further portions of Ikkeri, came down to the borders. It seems that some of the officials of Bednur had conspired to deliver the country to ‘Adil Shah. Again in 1668, ‘Adil Shah marched to Bednur. The expedition was under the charge of two generals Sharza Khan and Bahlol Khan. The Bijapurs were able to capture three of the best forts of Ikkeri and they collected taxes from five villages.

Sikandar ‘Adil Shah, who succeeded ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II, in 1672, followed the same expansionist policy of his predecessor. ‘Adil Shah, taking advantage of the confused state of affairs at Ikkeri during the closing period of Somasekhara’s reign sent his Wakil Jannopant to Bednur. Some of the wicked men of Ikkeri joined with the Bijapurs and conspired to kill Somasekhara. Cannammaji was able to thwart their plans and assert herself with courage and ability and prepared to challenge the diplomacy of Bijapur Wakil. In the meanwhile the allies of Bijapur took up arms against Cannammaji and one of them was Kenge Hanumappa Nayak of Tarikere. Thimmanna and Krishnappayya joined hands with the Bijapur Wakil and peace was concluded. It seems that during the campaign of Cannammaji against Mysore, she was assisted by the Bijapur forces in the Karnatak under Husain Khan and Bahlol Khan. The Bijapurs assisted in 1672 the people of Nagara, who rebelled against Cannammaji when she adopted Basavappa son of one Mariyappa Setti[32].

Bijapur was ever anxious to take advantage of the weak state of affairs at Ikkeri. With a show of arms and after initial conquest they were prepared to

withdraw on payment of war indemnity regular tribute and acknowledgement of sovereignty

Bijapur and Mysore came in contact for the first time in 1638 during the reign of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah and the ruler of Mysore Kanthirava Narasaraja Wodeyar I. Before the Bijapurs could reach Bangalore and Mysore they had to traverse considerable territory of northern Karnatak. The Bijapur army under Randaula Khan and Shahji Bhonsale marched upon Bangalore and took possession of it in 1048/1638. At that time Bangalore was under Immadi-Kempe-Gauda. The Bijapurs laid siege to Mysore and Srirangapatanam where they met stiff resistance. The Bijapurs had to end the campaign in a treaty, by which the Bijapurs got war indemnity of six lakhs of huns and possession of the entire country to the north of the Kaveri, including Bangalore and Sira. Afte this conquest Randaula Khan posted Kenge Hanuma as incharge of these territories. He permanently posted Shahji at Bangalore, with the sanction of ‘Adil Shah. Shahji made Bangalore his seat of administration for the southern territories of Bijapur[33].

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CHAPTER – VIII

Conclusion and Epilogue

The political geography of the Deccan Sultanates prevented it to flourish and exist in rigid isolation. Their history, therefore in full of contacts and active diplomatic and commercial intercourse with other countries and contemporary political India. The external relations of Deccan Sultanates were of a multifarious nature, political and diplomatic, commercial and economic, social, cultural and religious. Though the relations were manifold, this study is mainly a graphic study of political and diplomatic relations and the principles underlying them. However, other aspects of the relations- anthropological, demographic, geopolitical, socio-economic, commercial, cultural and religious which have a bearing or impact on the diplomatic and political relations, shall be discussed in the context of external relations. Thus, this study which is first of its kind among medieval histories in its approach and interpretations presents the evolution of the rise and fall of the personalities of the Deccan Sultanates.

The external relations of Deccan Sultanates were multiplex. They maintained heterogeneous relations simultaneously with diverse states. Their diplomatic relations can be broadly classified into seven groups, their parent being Bahmani kingdom, Iran and other Islamic Afro-Asian countries, Deccan Sultanates, Vijayanagara and its succession states, the Mughals, the Marathas

and the European settlements (Portuguese, British, Dutch and the French) in south India. The relations with these groups of states shall be discussed from conceptual point but maintaining the chronological order.

Though the diplomatic relations of Deccan Sultanates differed from state to state, the primary motives behind the relations were the struggle for existence and territorial expansion. To achieve the goal, they came in clash with several other states, and their diplomacy interacted. This interaction of diplomatic relations has been carefully evaluated in this study to produce a synthesis of Deccan Sultanates diplomatic history from their origin to their fall. And a summing up of the entire study of Deccan Sultanates diplomatic history has been classified in five phases, discussed in this study.

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The Deccan sultanates were five dynasties of various ethnic backgrounds that ruled late Medieval Sultanates namely, Bijapur, Golconda, Ahmednagar, Bidar and Berar. The Deccan sultanates were located on the Deccan Plateau, between the Krishna River and the Vindhya Range. These

Sultanates became independent during the break-up of the Bahmani Sultanate. In 1490, Ahmednagar declared independence, followed by Bijapur and Berar in the same year. Golconda became independent in 1518 and Bidar in 1528. In 1510, Bijapur repulsed an invasion by the Portuguese against the city of Goa, but lost it later that year.

Although generally rivals, they did ally against the Vijayanagar Empire in 1565, permanently weakening Vijayanagar in the Battle of Talikota. In 1574, after a coup in Berar, Ahmednagar invaded and conquered it. In 1619, Bidar was annexed by Bijapur. The sultanates were later conquered by the Mughal Empire; Berar was stripped from Ahmednagar in 1596, Ahmednagar was completely taken between 1616 and 1636, and Golconda and Bijapur conquered by Aurangzeb the campaign of 1686-87.

Malik Ahmed Shah Bahri, the governor of Junnar after defeating the Bahmani army led by general Jahangir Khan on May 28, 1490 declared independence and established the Nizam Shahi dynasty rule over the sultanate of Ahmednagar. The territory of the sultanate was located in the northwestern Deccan, between the sultanates of Gujarat and Bijapur. Initially his capital was in Junnar . In 1494, the foundation was laid for the new capital Ahmednagar. Malik Ahmed Shah after several attempts, secured the great fortress of Daulatabad in 1499. After his death in 1510, his son Burhan, a boy of seven was installed in his place. Burhan Shah-I died in Ahmednagar in 1553. He left six sons, of whom Hussain succeeded him. After the death of Hussain Shah I in 1565, his minor son Murtaza ascended the throne. During his minority, his

mother Khanzada Humayun Sultana ruled as a regent for several years. Murtaza Shah annexed Berar in 1574. On his death in 1588, his son Miran Hussain ascended the throne. But his reign could last only a little more than ten months as he was poisoned to death. Ismail, a cousin of Miran Hussain was raised to the throne, but the actual power was in the hands of Jamal Khan, the leader of the Deccani group in the court. Jamal Khan was killed in the battle of Rohankhed in 1591 and soon Ismail Shah was also captured and confined by his father Burhan, who ascended the throne as Burhan Shah. After the death of Burhan Shah his eldest son Ibrahim ascended the throne. Ibrahim Shah died only after a few months in the battle with Bijapur sultanate. Soon, Chand Bibi, the aunt of Ibrahim Shah, proclaimed Bahadur, the infant son Ibrahim Shah as the rightful Sultan and she became the regent of him. In 1596, Mughal attack led by Murad was repulsed bravely by Chand Bibi. After the death of Chand Bibi in July,1600 Ahmednagar was conquered by the Mughals and Bahadur Shah was imprisoned. But Malik Ambar and other Ahmednagar officials defied the Mughals and declared Murtaza Shah II as sultan in 1600 at a new capital Paranda. Malik Ambar became prime minister and *Vakil-us-Saltanat* of Ahmednagar. Later, the capital was shifted first to Junnar and then to a new city Khadki. After the death of Malik Ambar, his son Fath Khan surrendered to the Mughals in 1633 and handed over the young Nizam Shahi ruler Hussain Shah, who was sent as a prisoner to the fort of Gwalior. But soon, Shahji with the assistance of Bijapur, placed an infant scion of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, Murtaza on the throne and he became the regent. In 1636 Aurangzeb, then

Mughal viceroy of Deccan finally annexed the sultanate to the Mughal Empire after defeating Shahaji.

During the disintegration of Bahmani sultanate, Fathullah Imad-ul-Mulk, governor of Berar declared independence in 1490 and founded the Imad Shahi dynasty of Berar sultanate. He established the capital at Achalpur (Elichpur). Gawilgad and Narnala were also fortified by him. He was succeeded by his eldest son Ala-ud-din after his death in 1504. In 1528, Ala-ud-din resisted the aggression of Ahmednagar with the help from Bahadur Shah, sultan of Gujarat. The next ruler, Darya first tried to align with Bijapur to prevent aggression of Ahmednagar, but was unsuccessful. Later, he helped Ahmednagar on three occasions against Bijapur. After his death in 1562, his infant son Burhan succeeded him to the throne. But in 1574, Tufal Khan, a minister of Burhan usurped Burhan Imad Shah, the last ruler of Imad Shahi dynasty and in the same year Murtaza I, sultan of Ahmednagar annexed it to his sultanate. Burhan, along with Tufal Khan and his son Shamshir-ul-Mulk were taken to Ahmednagar and confined to a fortress where all of them subsequently died.

Bidar was the smallest of the five Deccan sultanates. Qasim Barid, founder of the Barid Shahi dynasty joined the service of Bahmani ruler Mahmud Shah Bahmani (r.1482–1518) as a *sar-naubat* but later became *mir-jumla* of the Bahmani sultanate. In 1492, he became de facto ruler of Bahmani sultanate, though Sultan Mahmud Shah Bahmani remained as the formal ruler. After his death in 1504, his son Amir Barid controlled the administration of the

Bahmani sultanate. In 1528, with the flight of the last Bahmani ruler Kalimullah from Bidar, Amir Barid became practically independent. Amir Barid was succeeded by his son Ali Barid, who was the first to assume the title of *Shah*. He participated in the Battle of Talikota. He was fond of poetry and calligraphy. The last ruler of the Bidar Sultanate Amir Barid Shah III was defeated in 1619, and the sultanate was annexed to Bijapur Sultanate.

The Bijapur sultanate was ruled by the Adil Shahi dynasty from 1490 to 1686. The Adil Shahis were originally provincial rulers of the Bahmani Sultanate, but with the break-up of the Bahmani state after 1518, Ismail Adil Shah established an independent sultanate, one of the five Deccan sultanates.

The Bijapur sultanate was located in southwestern India, straddling the Western Ghats range of southern Maharashtra and northern Karnataka. Ismail Adil Shah and his successors embellished the capital at Bijapur with numerous monuments.

The Adil Shahis fought the empire of Vijayanagar, which lay to the south across the Tungabhadra River, and fought the other sultanates as well. The sultanates combined forces to deliver a decisive defeat to Vijayanagar in 1565, after which the empire broke up. Bijapur seized control of the Raichur Doab from Vijayanagar. In 1619, the Adil Shahis conquered the neighbouring sultanate of Bidar, which was incorporated into their realm. In the 17th century, the Marathas revolted successfully under Shivaji's leadership and captured major parts of the Sultanate like Bijapur. The weakened Sultanate was

conquered by Aurangzeb in 1686 with the fall of Bijapur, bringing the dynasty to an end.

The dynasty's founder, Sultan Quli Qutub-ul-Mulk, migrated to Delhi with some of his relatives and friends in the beginning of the 16th century. Later he migrated south to Deccan and served Bahmani Sultan Muhammad Shah. He conquered Golconda and became the Governor of Telangana region in 1518, after the disintegration of the Bahmani sultanate into the five Deccan sultanates. Soon after, he declared independence from the Bahmani sultanate, took title *Qutb Shah*, and established Qutb Shahi dynasty of Golconda. The dynasty ruled for 171 years, until the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb's army conquered Golconda in 1687.

The rulers of five Deccan sultanates had a number of cultural contributions to their credit in the fields of art, music, literature and architecture.

An important cultural contribution of the Deccan sultanates is the development of Dakhni language. Dakhani, which started growing under the Bahmani rulers, developed into an independent spoken and literary language during this period by continuously drawing resources from Arabic-Persian, Marathi, Kannada and Telugu. This language later became known as Dakhani Urdu to distinguish it from the North Indian Urdu. The Deccani miniature painting, which flourished in the courts of Ahmednagar, Bijapur and Golconda is another major cultural contribution of the Deccan Sultanates. The

architectural splendors of Deccan like Char Minar and Gol Gumbaz belong to this period.

The religious tolerance displayed by the Nizam Shahi, Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi rulers is also worthy of mention.

The Nizam Shahi rulers of Ahmednagar enthusiastically patronised miniature painting. The earliest surviving paintings are found as the illustrations of a manuscript *Tarif-i-Hussain Shahi* (c.1565), which is now in Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala, Pune. A miniature painting of Murtaza Nizam Shah (c.1575) is in Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris while another one is in State Library, Rampur. Three other paintings, The *Running elephant* in an American private collection, The *Royal picnic* in the India Office Library, London and the *Young prince embraced by a small girl* in the Edwin Binney 3rd collection in the San Diego Museum most probably belong to the period of Burhan Nizam Shah II.

Amongst the monuments of Nizam Shahi rulers in Ahmednagar, the earliest one is the tomb of Ahmad Shah I Bahri (1509) at the centre of Bagh Rouza, a garden complex. The Jami Masjid also belong to the same period. Mecca Masjid, built in 1525 by Rumi Khan, a Turkish artillery officer of Burhan Nizam Shah I has originality in its design. The Kotla complex constructed in 1537 as a religious educational institution. The impressive Farah Bagh was the centrepiece of a huge palacial complex completed in 1583. The other monuments in Ahmednagar of the Nizam Shahi period are Do Boti Chira (tomb of Sharja Khan, 1562), Damri Masjid (1568) and the tomb of Rumi

Khan (1568). The Jami Masjid (1615) In Khirki and the Chini Mahal inside the Daulatabad fort were constructed during the late Nizam Shahi period (1600–1636). The tomb of Malik Ambar in Khuldabad (1626) is another impressive monument of this period. The Kali Masjid of Jalna (1578) and the tomb of Dilawar Khan (1613) in Rajgurunagar also belong to the Nizam Shahi period.

During the reign of Ahmad Shah I Bahri, his keeper of imperial records, Dalapati wrote an encyclopaedic work, the *Nrisimha Prasada*, where he mentioned his overlord as *Nizamsaha*. It is a notable instance of the religious tolerance of the Nizam Shahi rulers.

The ruined palace of *Hauz Katora*, 3 km. west of Achalpur is the only notable surviving Imad Shahi monument.

The main architectural activities of the Barid Shahi rulers are the garden tombs. The tomb of Ali Barid Shah (1577) is the most notable monument in Bidar. The tomb consists of a lofty domed chamber, open on four sides located in the middle of a Persian four-square garden. The *Rangin Mahal* in Bidar, built during the reign of Ali Barid Shah is a complete and exquisitely decorated courtly structure. Other important monuments in Bidar during this period are tomb of Qasim II and Kali Masjid.

An important class of metalwork known as Bidri originated from Bidar. These metalworks were carried out on black metal mainly zinc, which were inlaid with designs of silver and brass and sometimes copper.

The Adil Shahi rulers contributed greatly in the fields of art, architecture, literature and music. Bijapur developed into a cosmopolitan city, and it attracted many scholars, artists, musicians, and Sufi saints from Rome, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Turkestan.

Amongst the major architectural works in Bijapur sultanate, one of the earliest is the unfinished Jami Masjid (started by Ali Adil Shah I in 1576). It has an arcaded prayer hall with fine aisles supported on massive piers has an impressive dome. Most splendid monument built during the reign of Ibrahim II was the Ibrahim Rauza which was originally planned as a tomb for queen Taj Sultana but later converted into the tomb for Ibrahim Adil Shah II and his family. This complex, completed in 1626, consists of a paired tomb and a mosque. The tomb is an exquisite structure with delicate carvings. Ibrahim II also planned to construct a new twin city to Bijapur, Nauraspur. The construction began in 1599 but never completed. The greatest monument in Bijapur is Gol Gumbaz, the mausoleum of Muhammad Adil Shah. The diameter of the hemispherical dome is 44 m. externally. This monument was completed in 1656. The other important architectural works of this period are the *Chini Mahal*, the *Jal Mandir*, the *Sat Manzil*, the *Gagan Mahal*, the *Anand Mahal* and the *Asar Mahal* (1646) in Bijapur, *Kummatgi* (16 km from Bijapur), the Panhala fort and Naldurg (45 km. from Solapur.

Persian artists of Adil Shahi court have left a rare treasure of miniature paintings, some of which are well-preserved in Europe's great museums. The earliest miniature paintings are ascribed to the period of reign of Ali Adil Shah

I. The most significant of them are the paintings in the manuscript of *Nujum-ul-Ulum* (Stars of Science) (1570), kept in Chester Beatty Library, Dublin. The manuscript consists about 400 miniature paintings. Two other illustrated manuscripts which can be attributed to the period of Ali Adil Shah I are *Jawahir-al Musiqat-i-Muhammadi* in British Library which contains 48 paintings and a Marathi commentary of Sarangadeva's Sangeeta Ratnakara kept in the museum of City Palace, Jaipur which contains 4 paintings. The maximum number of miniature paintings came down to us belong to the period of reign of Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah II. The most celebrated painter of his court probably was Maulana Farrukh Hussain. The miniature paintings of this period are preserved in Bikaner Palace, Bodleian Library, Oxford, British Museum, London, Victoria and Albert Museum, London, Muśee Guimet, Paris, Academy of Sciences, St. Petersberg and Napstrek Museum, Prague.

Under the Adil Shahi rulers many literary works were published in Dakhani. Ibrahim Adil Shah II himself wrote a book of songs, Kitab-i-Nauras in Dakhani. This book contains a number of songs whose tunes are set to different *raga*s and *ragini*s. In his songs, he praised Hindu goddess Sarasvati along with the Prophet and Sufi saint Hazrat Khwaja Banda Nawaz Gesudaraz. A unique tambur (lute) known as Moti Khan was in his possession. The famous Persian poet laureate Zuhuri was his court poet. The Mushaira (poetic symposium) was born in the Bijapur court and later travelled north.

The Adil Shahi kings were known for tolerance towards Hindus and non-interference in their religious matters. They employed Hindus to high posts, especially as the officers who deal with the accounts and the administration, since the documents pertaining to the both were maintained in Marathi.

One of the earliest architectural achievements of the Qutb Shahi dynasty is the fortified city of Golkonda. The Jami Masjid (1518) erected by Quli-Qutb-ul-Mulk, the tomb of Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah (1611), the tomb of Muhammad Qutb Shah (1626) and the mosque of Hayat Bakshi Begam (1666) are the notable monuments in Golkonda. Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah decided to shift the capital to Hyderabad, 8 km east of Golkonda. Here, he constructed the most original monument in the Deccan, the Char Minar in the heart of the new city. This monument (completed in 1591) has four minarets of 56 m. height. The construction of the Mecca Masjid, located at the immediate south of Char Minar was started in 1617 during the reign of Muhammad Qutb Shah but completed only in 1693. The other important monuments of this period are the Toli Masjid (1671) and the Jami Masjid at Gandikota.

The Qutb Shahi rulers were great patrons of literature and invited many scholars, poets, historians and Sufi saints from Iran to settle in their sultanate. The most important contribution of the Golconda sultanate in the field of literature is the development of Dakhni language. Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah patronised Telugu literature also. Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah was not only a great patron of art and literature but also a poet of high order. He wrote in

Dakhani, Persian and Telugu and left an extensive *Diwan* (volume) in Dakhani, known as *Kulliyat-i-Mohammad Quli Qutb Shah*. Apart from the praise of God and the Prophet, he also wrote on nature, love and contemporary social life.

The Qutb Shahi rulers invited many Persian artists like Shaykh Abbasi and Muhammad Zaman in their court, which left a profound impact of different phases of Iranian art on the miniature paintings of this period. The earliest miniature paintings like the 126 illustrations in the manuscript of *Anwar-i-Suhayli* (c. 1550–1560) in the Victoria and Albert Museum, London and the illustrations in Sindabad Nama in the India Office Library, London and *Shirin and Khusrau* in the Khudabaksh Library, Patna most probably belong to the period of reign of Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah. First 6 of the total 8 illustrations in the manuscript of *Kulliyat-i-Mohammad Quli Qutb Shah* (c. 1590–1600) in Salar Jung Museum, Hyderabad are masterpieces. The 5 illustrations in a manuscript of the *Diwan-i-Hafiz* (c.1630) in the British Museum, London belonged to the period of reign of Abdullah Qutb Shah. The most outstanding surviving Golkonda painting probably is the *Procession of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah riding an elephant* (c. 1650) in Saltykov-Shtshedrine State Public Library, St. Petersberg.

Qutb Shahi rulers appointed Hindus in important administrative posts. Ibrahim Quli Qutb Shah appointed Murari Rao as *Peshwa*, second to only *Mir Jumla* (prime minister).

The ‘Adil Shahis were Shi’ahs intermittently and there were periods when Sunnism prevailed as the State religion in Bijapur. Out of the nine rulers

of the ‘Adil Shahi dynasty five were Shi’ah while the others were Sunnis. The Shi’ah rulers looked to the Shah of Iran for allegiance, spiritual leadership, etc.

The territories of which the Bijapur Kingdom was composed were collected in a rather haphazard way-by inheritance from the Bahmanis, by indiscriminate conquests in various directions and by barter etc. Consequently, the inhabitants of the Kingdom lacked the unifying bond of a common nation-hood. The only cohesive force which built and maintained the State was the dynastic loyalty, but that too was blind and was based on power. It was the military power only that could maintain the integrity of the State. The afaqis, in their own personal interest, were of course loyal to the ruler, with a few exceptions, and contributed much to the making of the external policy and continuance of the dynasty.

Bijapur was a feudal State. It was built on the system of contractual relations. The Sultan offered land and protection, which the nobility reciprocated by allegiance and sevice both, military and civil. It was subjected to the inherent danger of the delegated authority of losing actual control over the powerful vassals down in the feudal nexus.

Thus the various structural factors which contributed to the making of the Bijapur State the formulation of the external or foreign policy of its rulers and these constantly impinged on the external affairs, either directly or indirectly.

The Sultan was the supreme power as a sovereign head of the State. He was the ruler, judge, administrator, military general, sometimes even a preacher

and leader of public worship. The personal character of the Sultan, the environment in which he was educated and brought up, his predilections, whims and fancies etc., had a profound sovereignty devolved upon the minister. Though theoretically the Sultan's authority was unlimited, in practice he took advice of his ministers on all matters particularly in the case of external affairs. The chief duty of these ministers was of course, implicit obedience to the Sultan's wishes, whose decision was final.

Next to the Sultan the highest officer of the kingdom was Vakilu's-Saltanat or simply Vakil. He was also known, as wazir. During the sixteenth century the wazir was in charge of practically the entire administration of the kingdom. Sometimes he acted as a regent for the infant Sultan and thus controlled all the affairs of the State both internal and external. Even during the times of powerful Sultans the advice of the wazir in external affairs carried weight. The wazir could declare war or make peace at his discretion. Once during the reign of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I, the wazir was entrusted with the royal seal by the Sultan, so that he could issue orders on any measure he deemed fit in the best interest of the State. As the wazir's duties embraced all duties, acting as the head of civil and military administration, conquering new territories, realizing tributes from the vassals and subdued states, and maintain diplomatic relatic relations with other states. In the discharge of all these duties the wazir was assisted by several other officers of the central government at the capital and the provisional governors.

In important matters of external affairs the Sultan consulted the Maijis-i Kingdom which consisted of high officials of the court, military officials, and jagirdars. It was purely an advisory body. Though the Sultan was not bound to accept its advice, he often agreed to act upon it. On several conspicuous occasions the Sultans implemented the policy of the Majlis in regard to the external affairs.

The international relations with the Islamic world, viz., Iran, Turkey, Egypt and Arab States. from the eighth century onwards wave after wave of immigrants from ‘Ajam Persia and central Asia poured in to India either as peaceful traders or proud conquerors. These immigrants slowly migrated to the Deccan parts of which later constituted the sultanates of the Deccan. Further, during the thirteenth century and fourteenth centuries, the political situation in Persia deteriorated due to the Mongol devastation. Consequently, thousands of peace loving Persians fled to west coast of India and settled there or migrated to other parts. Again emigration took place due to the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Daulatabad by Muhammad bin Tughluq bringing in the nobility and the gentry consisting of Persians and central Asian nationals to the Deccan.

Thus by the time the Adil Shahis and Qutub Shahis were founded the demographic structure of the consisted of “Iranian Race”, which included not only Persians but also Afghans and others. The Iranian plateau which extends over Persia, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and eastern portion of the Asia minor etc., is the domain of the Iranian race.

The relations with Europeans, viz., Portuguese, Dutch, British and French. The Portuguese were the first European nation to establish overseas commercial intercourse with India during the medieval period of Indian history. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Portuguese were keenly desirous of bringing Christianity to “vast tribes lying under the wrath of God”. Inspired by religious fervor and fired with the crusading spirit, the Portuguese, during the closing years of the fifteenth century, attempted to drive all Muslim shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The next hundred years were occupied in establishing factories on the west coast of India and in waging wars with the Indian rulers. With the landing of Vasco da Gama on 17th May, 1498, near Calicut, the Portuguese became the first Christian nation of Europe to acquire power in India, and they maintained it by the policy of “*dvide et impera*” by playing off one Indian State against another. They succeeded in achieving their goal and in obtaining foothold in western India, only after several determined naval attacks on Muslim traders, their fleet and their States.

The relations between the five offshoots of the Bahmani Sultanates and with the Mughals. The dismemberment of the Bahmani sultanate and the establishment of the five sultanates, Ahmednagar, Bijapur, Bidar, Golconda and Berar created an unprecedented political situation in the Deccan. Above everything else it introduced the idea of division and partition fruitful of discord and strife.

The Seventh Chapter highlights the relations with Vijayanagara kingdom, which was the neighbour kingdom of Bahmani Sultanate. Bijapur

and Vijayanagar being contiguous, direct relations were but imminent. The 'Adil Shahis tried, on several occasions, to maintain good neighbourly relations with Vijayanagar in order to maintain the balance of power in the Deccan. The causes of the recurring hostilities between the two States were political, economic and geographical.

Soon after Yusuf 'Adil Shah became de facto ruler of Bijapur in 1489, Qasim Barid called in the aid of Vijayanagar against Yasuf. Qasim promised as reward the cessation of Nandyal and Raichur, or the country between the two rivers, Krishna and Tungabhadra. Narasimha collected the forces of Vijayanagar, crossed the Tungabhadra, and after laying waste the country seized the two cities of Nandyal and Raichur.

A few years later, in April 1493, Yusuf marched to recover the lost territory. He advanced to the river Krishna, but falling ill he halted there for about two months. After Yusuf's recovery from the illness the two parties clashed. Though initially the Bijapuris suffered reverses, they finally emerged victorious and the Vijayanagar forces fled away. The disputed territory of Raichur doab was now occupied by the Bijapuris. But it appears from the events of 1502 that Vijayanagar recaptured the doab region sometime between 1493 and 1502. It seems that Bahmani Sultan Mahmud (along with Yusuf 'Adil Shah) recaptured the same region in 908/1502 from Vijayanagar and entrusted it, together with the forts of Raichur and Nandyal to Yusuf 'Adil Shah.

In the following years both Yusuf and the Raya persistently attempted to extend the boundary of their kingdoms at the expense of the other. Vijayanagar rulers desired to have a port, free from the Muslim control, through which they could get their supplies of arms, ammunitions and horses. To achieve this objective Timoja, governor of Honavar, which belonged to Vijayanagar, helped the Portuguese in capturing the Bijapuri port of Goa.

In pursuance of the above policy, Krishna Devaraya, who was in fact waiting for a favourable opportunity to dislodge the ruler of Bijapur from the Krishna-Tungabhadra doab, readily responded to the invitation of the people of Belgaum, who rose up in rebellion against Bijapur and requested the Raya to come and occudy the city. The Raya led his armies against Bijapur in August 1510 and laid siege to Raichur. Kamal Khan, the Regent at Bijapur does not seem to have concerted measures to meet the challenge of Vijayanager; as he was too busy with internal problems. Kamal Khan was defeated by the Raya. His treacherous design on the throne hastened his fall and by May-June 1511 the Raya captured Raichur and moved further north towards Gulbarga.

Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah could not forget the loss of the Raichur doab, which he was determined to recover, and in 1519, he marched to recover Mudgal and Raichur. The Raya of Vijayanagar on gaining early intelligence of ‘Adil Shah’s intentions moved with a large army. The two armies encamped on the bank of Kirshna. In the battle that ensued, though the Bijapuris gained initial success eventually they were defeated and they retreated to Bijapur.

During the next decade Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah tried to strengthen his rule and the army. He was awaiting an opportune time. This came with the death of powerful Krishna Devaraya in 1529. He was succeeded by Achuyuta Raya, who proved to be a weak ruler. Early in 1530, Isma‘il ‘Adil Shah in alliance with ‘Imad Shah of Berar marched against Mudgal and Raichur. He laid siege to Mudgal and pressed it hard. Deprived of any outside help, the garrison surrendered. ‘Adil Shah now turned his attention towards Raichur and before he made the assault, the picket surrendered. Vijayanagar lost the doab.

Bhoj Tirmal Raya, the ruler of Vijayanagar, on attaining majority, got sick of Ramaraj’s authority who was ruling during the infancy of Bhoj Tirmal Raya. When Ramaraj was away from the capital, the young Raya sent an ambassador, with a petition and presents of six lakhs of huns and other precious articles, to Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah. The Raya wrote: “Your Majesty (‘Adil Shah) may be good enough to direct your auspicious steps to my country and there by transform it into a paradise. For goodness’ sake do away with the traitor (Ramaraj) whose authority lies heavy on me and my country, and let me have a will of my own. Upon my honour, I shall offer you enormous wealth and shall ever be at your back and call”.

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